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ALLOCATING CONSUMPTIVE WATER RIGHTS IN A 
RIPARIAN JURISDICTION: DEFINING THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
INTERESTSt 
Lynda L. Butler* 
Histon·cally, water consumption in the eastern United States has been governed by the 
common-law riparian doctrine. Fashioned to protect the domestic uses of private individuals 
in a largely agrarian society, the doctrine is not well suited to today's environment in which 
the demands of public users have grown enormously. Even in the East, where water has long 
been abundant, the effects of increased consumption. pollution. and periodic drought have 
brought the continued viability of the doctrine into question. Professor Butler examines the 
legal standards which have developed under the riparian doctrine and identifies three princi-
pal areas in which the doctrine must be modified in order to satisfy present and future needs 
of private and public users in the eastern states: (I) traditional restrictions on the land which 
may be benefitted by particular riparian rights, (2) the defining of "reasonable use" in terms 
of low-density domestic consumption. and (3) na"ow restrictions on the transferability of 
riparian rights. The Article recommends that reforms be instituted, particularly in recogni-
tion of the essential role that public users now play in meeting consumptive needs. While 
changes are necessary, Professor Butler acknowledges that so long as the eastern states con-
tinue to enjoy relatively abundant water supplies legislatures will balk at instituting poten-
tially costly overhauls of the common-law doctrine. Until the legislatures are willing to adopt 
comprehensive reforms, the judiciary must assume responsibility for striking a more realistic 
balance between the riparian rights of private individuals and the growing needs of public 
users. Reform will require the courts to be willing to interpret the riparian doctrine with more 
flexibility, to modify "reasonable use" to encompass expanding public use, and to permit freer 
transferabz1ity of consumptive n"ghts. At the same time. courts must remain cognizant of the 
need to protect private users from unrestrained diversions by public entities. While this task 
may seem both arduous and thankless for the courts, the issue of water distribution is of such 
basic importance that the challenge ought not to be refused. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the water-rich East, 1 persistent water supply problems are a 
relatively recent phenomenon.2 Until the 1970's, serious water supply 
1. Because states in the eastern United States traditionally use a different system for allocating 
consumptive water rights than states in the western United States, this Article primarily will discuss 
states in the eastern portion of the country-that is, states lying in the humid region east of a line 
cutting through an area between the 95th and tOOth meridians, or through the Dakotas, Nebraska, 
Kansas, Oklahoma, and TexaS. See 1 R. CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS§ 4.1, at 30 (1967). 
Occasionally, however, courts in western states interpret and apply legal principles from the alloca-
tion system that developed in the East and some of these decisions also will be discussed. See infra 
note 13. 
2. In contrast, the arid West has faced many persistent water supply problems. One poten-
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problems rarely arose in the eastern United States unless a drought 
occurred,3 and once the drought conditions subsided the problems 
tially serious problem involves populous southern California. Because withdrawal from the Colo-
rado River is expected to equal supply by 1985, the United States Supreme Court has ordered the 
waters of the River apportioned among Arizona, Nevada, and California. Arizona v. California, 376 
U.S. 340, 342 (1963). Southern California thus will have to search elsewhere fora water supply large 
enough to meet the needs of its rapidly increasing population. For a discussion of southern Califor-
nia's water supply problems, see U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, NATIONAL 
WATER SUMMARY 1983-HYDROLOGIC EVENTS AND IssUES 92 (Water-Supply Paper 2250, 1984). 
The United States is not the only country facing serious water shortages. Conditions in other 
parts of the world are so serious that the United Nations declared the 1980's to be the "water 
decade." In a special meeting on November 10, 1980, the United Nations General Assembly desig-
nated 1981-1990 as the "International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade" and called 
upon member states to commit themselves to the improvement of "standards and levels of service in 
drinking water supply and sanitation." G.A. Res. 35/18, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 48) at 101 
(1980). According to some estimates, three out of five people in developing countries do not have 
access to safe drinking water, while three out of four have inadequate sanitation. See 18 U.N. 
CHRoN. No. 1, at 29 (1981). 
3. Since the mid-1970's, significant portions of the eastern United States have experienced sev-
eral severe droughts. See generally Effects of the Drought on Small Business and Agriculture: Hear-
ings Before the Select Committee on Small Business, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); Water Resources 
Problems Affecting the Northeast; The Drought. and Present and Future Water Supply Problems: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Water Resources of the Camm. on Public Works and Transporta-
tion, 91th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, NATIONAL 
WATER SUMMARY 1983-HYDROLOGIC EVENTS AND IssUES (Water-Supply Paper 2250, 1984). Per-
haps the most serious of the droughts occurred in 1983, when dry conditions persisted for months in 
northeastern, mid-atlantic, southern, and mid-western states. Described by many as the worst 
drought in fifty years, the 1983 water shortage caused an estimated seven billion dollars in damages 
to the nation's crops. VA. WATER REsoURcES REsEARCH CENTER, 14 WATER NEws, No. 10, at 1 
(Oct. 1983) [hereinafter cited as WATER NEws]; The Washington Post, Sept. 5, 1983, at At, col. 4. 
In the mid-west, for instance, com production fell by 42% in Illinois, 42% in Indiana, and 49% in 
Ohio as a result of the drought. STATISTICAL REPORTING SERVICE, CROP REPORTING BD., U.S. 
DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, CROP PRODUCTION: 1983 SUMMARY, at B-16 (1984) [hereinafter cited as 
STATISTICAL REPORTING SERVICE]. 
Similar losses occurred in the southern and mid-atlantic regions. In Virginia, for example, the 
1983 drought affected 82 out of the state's 95 counties, causing an estimated $200 million in damages 
to the state's crops. 14 WATER NEWS, supra, No. 10, at 1 (Oct. 1983). According to U.S.D.A. 
figures for Virginia's agricultural industry, com production decreased by 73%, soybean production 
by 44%, and tobacco production by 22%. STATISTICAL REPORTING SERVICE, supra, at B-16, ~17, 
-27, -36. These decreases resulted in an estimated $13 million loss in sales to the state's potato and 
commercial vegetable farmers, $30 million in com sales, $25 million in soybean sales, and $20 mil-
lion in tobacco sales. 14 WATER NEws, supra, No.9, at 1 (Sept. 1983). By the end of the 1983 
harvest season, the federal government had declared most of the affected counties disaster loan areas. 
Declaration of Disaster Loan Area No. 3026, Amendment 1, 48 Fed. Reg. 55,796 (1983); Declara-
tion of Disaster Loan Area No. 3026, Amendments 2-4, 49 Fed. Reg. 2,041-42 (1984); Declaration 
of Disaster Loan Area No. 3026, Amendment 5, 49 Fed. Reg. 7,179 (1984). 
Other southern and mid-atlantic states suffered similar agricultural losses. Tennessee officials, 
for example, predicted that farmers of the state's major crops sustained $416 million in losses, while 
in Arkansas losses were expected to exceed $500 million. Effects of the 1983 Drought on American 
Agriculture: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Agricultural Production, Marketing, and Stabilization 
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also disappeared. 4 Except for the occasional dry spell, most users 
could find sufficient water from nearby streams, lakes, or under-
ground waters to satisfy their needs. Although droughts still are a 
major cause of water supply problems in the East,5 other factors, such 
as rapid population growth, extensive commercial development, and 
pollution of available water supplies, are beginning to cause water 
supply problems to arise even when drought conditions do not exist. 6 
of Prices of the Senate Comm. on Agriculture. Nutrition, and Forestry, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 63, 105 
(1983) {statements of William H. Walker and Sen. Dale Bumpers). 
The 1983 drought also had an adverse impact on farm-related industries. For instance, sales of 
farm equipment decreased almost 50% in some areas of Virginia, while the state's livestock indus-
tries reported up to 12% decreases in productivity. 14 WATER NEWS, supra, No. 10, at 2 {Oct. 
1983) (10% decrease in milk production by dairy cows, 2 to 12% decrease in eggs laid by chickens, 
and a 2-month lag in the growth of steers). Because of the water shortage, experts predicted that the 
costs of raising livestock could increase from 4 to 13%. Id. (poultry by 11-13%, hogs by 10-12%, 
dairy cattle by 10-12%, and beef cattle by 4-7%). 
Agricultural users were not the only ones detrimentally affected by the droughts. Many locali-
ties found themselves searching desperately for alternative sources of water after facing weeks of 
dangerously low water supplies. In Virginia, for instance, a 1980 water shortage decreased ground-
water tables by as much as four feet in some areas and caused water reservoir levels to fall signifi-
cantly. M. HREzo, NORFOLK V. SUFFOLK: PROPOSED AGREEMENT LEAVES IMPORTANT IssUES 
UNSE'ITLED 1 {Virginia Water Resources Research Center, Special Report No. 14, Nov. 1981). 
Compare U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, WATER-DATA REPORT VA-81-1, 
WATER REsOURCES DATA: VIRGINIA WATER YEAR 1981 (1982) {discussing effects of 1980 
drought in Virginia) with 93 NAT'L CLIMATIC DATA CENTER, U.S. DEPT. OF CoMMERCE, CLIMA· 
TOLOGICAL DATA: VIRGINIA, Nos. 7 to 9 {July-Sept. 1983) (discussing effects of 1983 drought, 
when most areas of Virginia received less than half their normal rainfall). Drought conditions in 
southeastern Virginia became so serious that the state's governor proclaimed a water resource emer-
gency for the area. Gov. ofVa., Emergency Exec. Order No. 45(80) (Oct. 22, 1980). As late as mid-
November of 1980, the city of Norfolk only had a 100-day water supply. STATE WATER STUDY 
CoMM'N, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE GENERAL AssEMBLY OF VIRGINIA, S. Doc. No. 
15, at 5 (1981). Due to the serious conditions, mandatory water use restrictions became the norm for 
several months in southeastern localities. See, e.g., Chesapeake, Va., Ordinance No. 80-0-0188 {Aug. 
19, 1980); Portsmouth, Va., Ordinance No. 1980-67 (Aug. 12, 1980). The area's two largest munici-
palities even adopted water rationing plans. Norfolk, Va., Ordinance No. 30,737 (Jul. 29, 1980); 
Virginia Beach, Va., An Ordinance to Amend Section 37-ll{b) of the Code of the City of Virginia 
Beach, Virginia (Oct. 13, 1980). 
4. The recent droughts in the eastern United States have rekindled an interest in evaluating the 
effectiveness of the common law allocation system, especially its effectiveness in providing for the 
consumptive needs of the public. See, e.g., STATE WATER STUDY CoMM'N, REPORT TO THE Gov-
ERNOR AND GENERAL AssEMBLY OF VIRGINIA, S. Doc. No. 15 (1981); J. JONES, V. SIKORA, & J. 
WOODWARD, STUDY OF TENNESSEE WATER REsOURCES LAW: LEGAL CoNSIDERATIONS FOR EF-
FECTIVE WATER MANAGEMENT UNDER CoNDmONS OF SHORTAGE (Tennessee Water Resources 
Research Center, Research Report No. 97, Nov. 1983). 
5. See supra note 3. 
6. In Virginia, for example, the city of Virginia Beach has experienced a 52% increase in popu-
lation within the last ten years and now bas about 5% of the state's population, U.S. BUREAU OF 
THE CENSUS, DEPT. OF CoMMERCE, 1980 CENSUS OF POPULATION, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 
POPULATION-NUMBER OF INHABITANTS, U.S. SUMMARY 1-43, -177 (1982), yet the city does not 
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As these factors increase the demand on the East's available 
water resources, more and more eastern localities are experiencing 
difficulty meeting the consumptive needs of their inhabitants. Though 
it would be easy to attribute the localities' problems to the decreased 
water supply, the common-law allocation system followed in many 
eastern states is at least as responsible for the localities' ineffectiveness 
in responding to water shortages. Because the common-law system 
developed in an agrarian society, many of the legal principles gov-
erning allocation and use of water resources tend to protect low-den-
sity uses by private individuals and to impede commercial, industrial, 
and municipal development. Thus, when a locality attempts to re-
solve its water supply problems, its efforts typically encounter strong 
resistance among private users and those remaining "public users'' 
still fairly rich in water resources? who argue that the common law 
restricts redistribution of water resources for public use. 8 
States have responded in several ways to the ineffectiveness of the 
common law allocation system in meeting the consumptive needs of 
the public. One approach taken by some states is to adopt compre-
hensive reforms that totally replace the common-law rules with a per-
mit system covering all types of water resources. 9 Despite the 
have a substantial source of fresh surface water within its boundaries. Similar increases in popula-
tion, and thus in demand on surface waters, are occurring in other areas of the eastern United States. 
See generally 1 U.S. WATER REsOURCES CoUNCIL, THE NATION'S WATER REsoURCES, 1975-2000 
(1978). By the year 2000 experts predict that water use nationwide will increase 27% over the 1975 
level. Id. at 29. For a discussion of the effects of pollution and commercial development on the 
East's available water resources see U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, DEPT. OF mE INTERIOR, NA-
TIONAL WATER SUMMARY 1983-HYDROLOGIC EVENTS AND IssUES 80 (Water-Supply Paper 2250, 
1984). 
7. The phrase "public user'' shall refer to a municipality, county, or any other local political 
unit or agent of any of the above who is conducting, or planning to conduct, a use of a watercourse 
that is, or will be, primarily for the benefit of the public. The phrase "private user'' shall refer to a 
party who is not a political unit or an agent of such a unit and who is conducting, or is planning to 
conduct, a use that is not, or will not be, primarily for the benefit of the public. 
8. A conflict involving a Virginia municipality, the Army Corps of Engineers, and several 
private parties demonstrates the hostility that can exist. In the record of that case, litigants accused 
each other of using "Pearl Harbor'' tactics. Memorandum of James B. Hunt, Jr., Governor of North 
Carolina, in Support of Motion to Dismiss Complaint at 6-9, City of Virginia Beach v. Roanoke 
River Basin Ass'n, Civil Action No. 84-11-N (B.D. Va. Feb. 2, 1984). That case, and two other 
suits, involve a dispute over Virginia Beach's plan to build a pipeline from Lake Gaston to the 
municipality in order to meet the increased demand for water brought about by its population 
growth. For further discussion of the litigation see W. WALKER & P. BRIDGEMAN, ANATOMY OF A 
WATER PROBLEM: VIRGINIA BEACH'S EXPERIENCE SUGGESTS TIME FOR A CHANGE (Virginia 
Water Resources Research Center, Special Report No. 18, Aug. 1985). 
9. Most comprehensive proposals are derived from the Model Water Code, drafted in 1972. 
See F. MALONEY, R. AUSNESS, & J. MORRIS, MODEL WATER CoDE (1972). Florida has adopted a 
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persuasive arguments in favor of this approach, 10 most states in the 
eastern United States have not followed it, preferring instead to retain 
the common law system and to modify it with less comprehensive 
reforms.11 The high cost of implementing the comprehensive reforms 
appears to be one of the main reasons why the reforms have not been 
comprehensive permit system based on that Code. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 373.011 to .619 (West 
1974 & Supp. 1984). Together with Iowa, it shares the distinction of having the only really compre-
hensive water allocation systems. See IOWA CoDE ANN. §§ 455B.261 to .280 (Supp. 1984). The 
Model Water Use Act was approved in 1958, but it has been adopted by only one state, Hawaii, and 
even there in modified form. See HAW All REv. STAT.§§ 177-1 to -35 (1976). A third comprehen-
sive system was proposed by the National Water Commission in 1973. See NATIONAL WATER 
CoMM'N, WATER POUCIES FOR THE FUTURE 280-94 (1973). See generally Maloney & Ausness, A 
Modem Proposal for State Regulation of Consumptive Uses of Water, 22 HAsTINGs L.J. 523 (1971) 
(discussing reform proposals). 
10. Besides criticizing the common-law allocation system for its ineffectiveness in providing for 
public consumptive needs, proponents of reform also point out that the common-law system improp-
erly distinguishes between the different classifications of waters. This approach no longer can be 
justified, reformists argue, because scientists now agree that all waters are part of one interrelated 
hydrologic system. See infra note 20. See generally Trelease, New Water Legislation: Drafting for 
Development, Efficient Allocation and Environmental Protection, 12 LAND & WATER L. REv. 385 
(1977) (discussing arguments for reform). Because commentators have debated the desirability of 
reform for years, this Article does not focus on that issue. 
11. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT.§§ 143-215.11 to -215.22 (1983). Some of the states preferring 
the partial reform approach have retained the common-law system without significant amendments. 
The primary source of law governing water use in Virginia, for example, is the common law. 
Although some statutory changes have been made, most of the changes tend only to supplement the 
common law and do not alter it in any significant respect. But see Ground Water Act, VA. CoDE 
§§ 62.1-44.83 to -44.107 (1982). Enacted on an ad hoc basis without any serious attempt to integrate 
them with one another, these amendments are scattered throughout the Virginia Code and delegate 
various types of duties and responsibilities to eleven different state agencies. For a discussion of 
these agencies see W. WALKER & W. Cox, BULLETIN 9: WATER REsOURCES LAWS 1N VIRGINIA 
141-45 (Virginia Water Resources Research Center, 1968). Because the agencies tend to focus only 
on a particular aspect of a water resource problem and generally have separate jurisdictional powers, 
little coordination occurs between the various agencies. When this situation is combined with the 
independent power that local political units have over the resources within their boundaries, a con-
fusing and uncertain system for managing Virginia's water resources results. 
In recent years some efforts have been made to coordinate control and governance of Virginia's 
waters. The General Assembly, for instance, established the Virginia Water Resources Research 
Center to collect and evaluate data about the state's water resources. VA. CODE§§ 23-135.7:8 to 
-135.7:13 (1980). Also, in the past few years the General Assembly has passed important statutory 
provisions dealing with the formulation of state water policy and the establishment of a planning 
process. See, e.g., VA. CoDE §§ 62.1-11, -44.36 (1982). For a discussion of states which also retain 
the common law without significant amendments, see, e.g., Aycock, Introduction to Water Use Law 
in North Carolina, 46 N.C.L. REv. 1 (1967); Cohen, Water Law in Alabama-A Comparative Sur-
vey, 24 ALA. L. REv. 453 (1972); Cribbett, Water as a Species of Private Property: The Illinois Jliew, 
47 ILL. B.J. 449 (1959); Lauer, Water Law in Michigan, in WATER REsOURCES AND THE LAW 423 
(1958); Weston & Gray, Legal Control of Consumptive Water Use in Pennsylvania Power Plants, 80 
DICK. L. REv. 353 (1976); Note, The Riparian Rights Doctrine in South Carolina, 21 S.C.L. REv. 
757 (1969); Note, Ohio Surface Water Rights, 38 U. CIN. L. REv. 525 (1969); Note, Riparian Water 
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adopted in more eastern states.12 Until the problems created by the 
common-law system outweigh the costs of implementing a new allo-
cation system, most states having water-rich environments probably 
Law-Lakeshore Developments, 1966 WIS. L. REv. 172, Comment, Water Rights in Tennessee, 27 
TENN. L. REv. 557 (1960). 
Other states preferring the partial reform approach have revised the common-law system sub-
stantially. But even in those states, important statutory exemptions usually continue application of 
the common law to many users. See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 151.140 (Bobbs-Merrill1980) 
(exempting dcnestic and agricultural uses); N.J. STAT • .ANN. § 58:1A-7 (West 1982) (exempting 
diversions under 100,000 gallons per day). For a discussion of water reforms in eastern states and of 
the problems caused by the exemptions see Ausness, Water Rights Legislation in the East: A Pro-
gram for Reform, 24 WM. & MARY L. REv. 547 (1983). 
12. Although it is easy to document the reluctance of many eastern states to adopt the compre-
hensive reforms, it is not as easy to explain their reluctance. Proponents of the reforms have ad-
vanced some persuasive arguments in support of their reforms. The unwillingness to adopt a 
comprehensive solution may be due, at least in part, to the fact that a long-term water crisis has not 
yet arisen in most eastern states. In its report WATER Poucms FOR THE FUTURE, the National 
Water Commission acknowledges this point and even states that it "does not recommend the imme-
diate adoption of permit statutes by all Eastern States." NATIONAL WATER CoMM'N, WATER POL· 
ICIES FOR THE FuTuRE 280 (1973). As the Commission then explains, "[a]ny change in the law has 
some costs; a fully developed permit system with extensive recordkeeping and provisions for alloca-
tion of water would have high costs relative to the value of much of the water being regulated." Id. 
Political factors also may have contributed to the comprehensive reformists' lack of success in 
many eastern states. In Virginia, for example, it would appear that a comprehensive water bill failed 
to secure passage in part because it would place all regulatory power at the state level. Although the 
bill would authorize the state regulatory agency to appoint local advisory boards, this power is 
discretionary. The Virginia Water Law, H.B. 1420, 1981 Va. Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. § 62.1-211.11. 
See generally Butler, Commentary on the Proceedings of the Water Rights Symposium, 24 WM. & 
MARY L. REv. 767, 782-85 (1983) (discussing the role of the political process in allocation and 
management of Virginia's water resources). To the extent that political factors explain the failures of 
comprehensive proposals, those factors demonstrate that the proposals have not achieved a balance 
between the competing concerns that is acceptable in many riparian jurisdictions. 
Regardless of the reason or reasons for a state legislature's reluctance to adopt comprehensive 
reforms, it is apparent that the policy formulation and planning processes for water resources tend to 
slow down whenever the drought conditions subside and water becomes plentiful again in most areas 
of a normally water-rich state. In Virginia, for example, the severity of the droughts in 1977 and 
1980 precipitated an extensive state-wide evaluation process that culminated with the proposal of a 
comprehensive water allocation system, The Virginia Water Law, H.B. 1420, 1981 Va. Gen. Assem., 
Reg. Sess. See STATE WATER STUDY CoMM'N, REPORT TO THE GoVERNOR AND THE GENERAL 
AssEMBLY OF VIRGINIA, S. Doc. No. 15, at 3-11 (1981) (describing the evaluation process). See 
generally W. Cox, L. SHABMAN, S. BATIE, & J. LooNEY, VIRGINIA'S WATER REsoURCES: POUCY 
AND MANAGEMENT IssuES (1981). Introduced in the state legislature after the drought conditions 
had disappeared, the bill failed to pass the legislature. The Virginia Water Law, H.B. 1420, 1981 Va. 
Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (introduced Jan. 19, 1981, died in committee). Some contend that this 
failure demonstrates the crisis-oriented approach of the evaluation process. See, e.g., STATE WATER 
STUDY CoMM'N, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND GENERAL AssEMBLY OF VIRGINIA, S. Doc. 
No. 24, at 8 (1982) (statement by Louis L. Guy, Jr., P.E., that "[t]he end of the drought in Tidewa-
ter may turn out to be a curse instead of a blessing if it allows us to stick our heads back in the 
sand"). In some areas, though, the need for water has become too great to wait for the next crisis. 
See infra notes 169 & 170. For a description of more recent efforts to reform Virginia's water law see 
16 WATER NEWS, supra note 3, No.7, at 5 (July 1985). 
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will continue to use the common-law system, with some relatively mi-
nor modifications. These states generally lack sufficient incentive, in 
the short run, to adopt a totally new system. 
Given, then, that many states in the eastern portion of the coun-
try still adhere to common-law principles to a significant extent, it 
becomes important to determine whether those principles can be up-
dated and modified to permit better resolution of public water supply 
problems. One of the critical aspects of the common law that needs to 
be addressed in making this determination concerns its approach to 
allocating consumptive rights in natural watercourses between public 
and private parties. Those common-law principles governing alloca-
tion of rights in natural watercourses collectively are known as the 
riparian doctrine. 13 Because the doctrine was developed in an era 
13. The riparian doctrine primarily developed in states fairly rich in water resources-that is, 
in states in the eastern portion of the United States. See supra note 1 (giving a more accurate divi-
sion). Two variations of the riparian doctrine have developed: the natural flow theory and the 
reasonable use theory. Under the former a riparian owner is "entitled to the natural flow of the 
water of the running stream through or along his land, in its accustomed channel, undiminished in 
quantity and unimpaired in quality." Dimmock v. City of New London, 157 Conn. 9, 245 A.2d 569, 
572 (1968). This right is more limited than the right of a riparian under the "reasonable use" theory. 
In a "reasonable use" jurisdiction, every riparian generally can conduct reasonable uses even though 
they may affect the natural flow. 7 R. Cl.ARK, supra note 1, § 611 (1976). See generally 4 REsTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 210-13 (1977); 2 H. FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATERS AND WATER 
RIGHTS§ 464 (1904). Since most riparian jurisdictions follow the "reasonable use" theory, the Arti-
cle will focus on it. 
Where water was scarce, the riparian doctrine proved inefficient and counterproductive. Be-
cause the riparian doctrine gives each riparian an equal right to make reasonable uses of a water-
course, see infra notes 26-27 and accompanying text, using such an approach in the arid West would 
mean that most users would not have sufficient water to make a productive use. See 1 R. Cl.ARK, 
supra note 1, § 4.1, at 30. The drier parts of the country thus developed an allocation system based 
on the "first-in-time" principle. Known as the prior appropriation doctrine, this system basically 
awards a superior right to use water to the party who first appropriates or exercises dominion over 
the water for a beneficial use. The right continues as long as the beneficial use is exercised. See 2 H. 
FARNHAM, supra, § 649. "Beneficial use" generally refers to the "use of such water as may be 
necessary for some useful and beneficial purpose in connection with the land from which it is taken." 
State v. McLean, 62 N.M. 264, 308 P.2d 983, 988 (1957). States following the prior appropriation 
doctrine, either in its common law or statutory form, include Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, 
Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Da-
kota, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. 1 R. CLARK, supra note 1, § 4.1, at 31. See gener-
ally 4 REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 213-15 (1977). 
Some of the western states following the prior appropriation doctrine also apply the riparian 
doctrine in certain circumstances. Under the California version, for example, the law of prior appro-
priation applies to acquisitions on public lands, while the riparian doctrine applies to ~~earns which 
flow through private land and which have not been previously diverted. 1 S. WIEL, WATER RIGHTS 
IN THE WESTERN STATES§ 116, at 137 (3d ed. 1911). Other states following this approach include 
Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, and Washington. 1 R. 
CLARK, supra note 1, § 4.1, at 31. 
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when most users were private individuals, its principles traditionally 
make certain assumptions about users that limit their ability to ac-
commodate the public's consumptive needs without judicial 
modification. 
Perhaps the most serious limitation is that traditional riparian 
principles generally prohibit diversions. To operate a public water 
supply effectively, a local government often must divert water from a 
watercourse and store it for future use by its inhabitants. When an 
entire region is water-poor, the diversions may even require an in-
terbasin transfer-that is, the diversion and transfer of water from a 
watercourse located in one basin to the basin of the water-poor local-
ity. Under traditional riparian principles, diversions and other con-
sumptive uses14 conducted for the public generally are not recognized 
as legitimate consumptive uses. 
In view of the common law's restrictive approach to defining 
public consumptive rights, it is not surprising that some local govern-
ments still subject to the riparian doctrine have attempted to circum-
vent its constraints through their eminent domain powers.15 
Although this alternative is an appealing way to solve public water 
problems, it has its weaknesses and limitations. Besides requiring 
substantial financial resources, it also raises questions about whether a 
locality should be forced to pay for consumptive use rights when a 
private party would not have to pay in a similar situation. On a more 
theoretical level, not all consumptive uses conducted by a locality 
may qualify as a public use under a state's eminent domain law.l6 
Furthermore, even if acquiring public consumptive rights by eminent 
domain is legally and financially feasible, that course of action does 
not eliminate the need to reexamine traditional riparian principles. 
Before a court can determine what private property rights a local gov-
ernment must acquire, it must understand how riparian principles de-
fine private and public interests. 
14. Consumptive use has been defined as including those "uses or diversions which contem-
plate substantial reduction of supply," while nonconsumptive use refers to those "which are benefi-
cial but do not result in planned diminution." 1 R. CLARK, supra note 1, § 55.2. Uses in the first 
category would include irrigation, domestic uses, and the dumping of raw sewage, while the genera-
tion of electricity, navigation, and recreational uses would qualify as nonconsumptive. Id. See also 
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:1A-3b, -3e (West 1982) (giving statutory definition for permit provision). 
See generally 1. HIRSHLEIFER, J. DEHAVEN, & J. MILLIMAN, WATER SUPPLY: EcONOMICS, TECH· 
NOLOGY, AND PoucY 66 (1969) (discussing an economic view of consumptive and nonconsumptive 
uses). 
15. For examples of localities currently contemplating such action see infra notes 169-70. 
16. See infra notes 211-12 and accompanying text. 
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This Article will examine traditional riparian principles to deter-
mine whether a more balanced accommodation between private and 
public consumptive interests in watercourses17 can be achieved by the 
courts of a riparian jurisdiction.18 The Article will begin by discuss-
ing the conventional legal principles, rationales, and assumptions still 
used by courts in riparian jurisdictions to define private consumptive 
rights in watercourses. Three aspects of these principles that are cru-
cial to determining whether the public has consumptive rights will be 
examined: limitations on the area that can benefit from a water-
course, limitations on the quantity of water that can be used, and limi-
tations on the transferability of water rights. 
After examining how these limitations define private consump-
tive rights, the Article will examine the nature of the public interest. 
It will begin by evaluating the extent to which the legal principles 
governing private rights also recognize public consumptive interests. 
Then it will consider whether the common-law principles permit the 
development of exceptions to accommodate the public interest. As in 
the private rights section, the discussion in the public rights section 
will focus on whether the judiciary can modernize the riparian doc-
trine to achieve a more effective balance between public and private 
consumptive interests.19 From the discussion it should become appar-
17. Although this Article will focus on natural watercourses, groundwater also can be an im-
portant water source. See generally infra note 20 (defining various water classifications). Also, as 
traditionally defined, the phrase "watercourse" does not include lakes. But because the law gov-
erning use of lakes, known as the littoral rights doctrine, is very similar to the law governing use of 
watercourses, much of the legal and policy analysis of the Article should apply to lakes as well. See 
generally 6A AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY§ 28.56 (A. Casner ed. 1954); 6 R. POWELL, THE 
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY§ 709(2)(b)(iv) (1984). 
18. Although many states in the eastern United States have modified the common law in some 
respects, the legal and policy analysis conducted in the Article still should apply to most of those 
states. Only a few states have adopted comprehensive reforms that totally displace the traditional 
common-law pnnciples. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. For an application of some of the 
ideas expressed in this Article to Virginia see Butler, Defining Public Consumptive Rights in Vir-
ginia's Rivers, Streams and Lakes: Is Legislative Reform Needed?, 11 VA. B.A.J., No. 1, at 14 (Win-
ter 1985). 
Whenever the phrase "riparian jurisdiction" is used in this Article, it will refer to those jurisdic-
tions that apply traditional riparian principles in some meaningful manner, whether it be as the 
primary source of law, as the source of law governing exempted users under a permit system, or as a 
theory subordinate to the prior appropriation doctrine. 
19. The Article will not consider whether other common-law concepts, principally the public 
trust doctrine, provide independent bases for defining public consumptive rights. As a general mat-
ter, these other theories recognize that navigable waters are subject to certain rights and interests. 
Because the other theories are not related to the riparian doctrine, determining whether they recog-
nize public consumptive rights would involve a discussion of principles and policies distinct from 
those of the riparian doctrine. See infra note 164. 
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ent that the judiciary could make several helpful changes in the ripa-
rian doctrine to provide greater recognition of public consumptive 
rights. But effective implementation will require an innovative judici-
ary willing to take an active role in developing a responsive water 
allocation system. 
II. PRIVATE CONSUMPTIVE RIGHTS 
Under the common law each water resource is classified accord-
ing to its place in the "hydrologic," or water circulation, cycle and 
separate legal doctrines are developed for the major classifications.2o 
Private consumptive rights in a natural watercourse, one of the main 
classifications, are governed by the riparian doctrine, the basic tenet of 
which is that a party owning land abutting a watercourse has the right 
to make reasonable uses of the water in that watercourse for the bene-
fit of his riparian land.21 Because these use rights arise as incidents to 
ownership of land abutting a watercourse, they generally are consid-
ered to be vested property rights.22 As the holder of vested rights, a 
riparian proprietor can seek protection of his rights at law or in equity 
20. The main classifications under the common law generally are natural watercourses, 
groundwater, and diffused surface water. Natural watercourses are defined as those waters "flowing 
in a definite channel with a bed and banks or sides," 1 R. CLARK, supra note 1, § 52.1(B), at 308; 
groundwater refers to "water found in the soil below the top of the zone of saturation, which may or 
may not coincide with the •water table,' depending on nature of the soil or composition of the aqui-
fer," id. §50, at 284; and finally, the phrase diffused surface water denotes water "which is diffused 
over the surface of the ground, derived from the falling rains and melting snows, and continues to be 
such until it reaches some well-defined channel ... and • • . flow[s] with other waters • •• • " 3 H. 
FARNHAM, supra note 13, § 878, at 2556 (citing Crawford v. Rambo, 44 Ohio St. 287, 7 N.E. 429 
(1886)). 
Scientists and legal commentators now agree that the law governing the main types of water 
resources should be integrated because each type is part of one hydrologic cycle. See NATIONAL 
WATER CoMM'N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 233 (1973); Hines, A Decade of Experience 
Under the Iowa Water Permit System (Part One), 7 NAT. REsoURCES J. 499, 520-21 (1967). 
Groundwater flow, for example, may add to the volume of a watercourse, while groundwater with-
drawal may lower its water level. See Davis, Wells&: Streams: Relationship at Law, 37 Mo. L. REv. 
189, 193-97 (1972). Dealing with each classification separately ignores this type of interrelationship 
and often leads to inconsistencies. 
21. The Massachusetts Supreme Court described the doctrine in the following manner: 
. . . A proprietor may make any reasonable use of the water of the stream in connec-
tion with his riparian estate and for lawful purposes within the watershed, provided he 
leaves the current diminished by no more than is reasonable, having regard for the like 
right to enjoy the common property by other riparian owners. 
Stratton v. Mt. Hermon Boys School, 216 Mass. 83, 103 N.E. 87, 89 (1913); see also Bouris v. 
Largent, 94 ill. App. 2d 251, 236 N.B.2d 15, 17 (1968); St. Lawrence Shores v. State, 60 Misc. 2d 74, 
302 N.Y.S.2d 606, 608, 613 (1969); Virginia Hot Springs Co. v. Hoover, 143 Va. 460, 130 S.E. 408, 
410 (1925). See generally 2 H . FARNHAM, supra note 13, § 466. 
22. Dunlop v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 212 N.C. 814, 195 S.E. 43, 45-46 (1938); Hite v. 
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and cannot be deprived of them by the state without due process. 23 
Nor do riparian rights have to be exercised to merit protection: a 
riparian does not forfeit his rights because of nonuse and conversely 
does not acquire a priority over other riparians just because he has 
exercised his rights for a longer period of time.24 
The rights of a riparian owner are not absolute, for other riparian 
proprietors25 along the same watercourse also have an "equal right" 
to make reasonable uses of the watercourse.26 This "equal" right does 
not entitle a riparian to conduct uses identical to those exercised by 
another riparian. 27 But it does mean that a riparian must be con-
Town of Luray, 175 Va. 218,8 S.E.2d 369,372 (1940); Mumpowerv. City ofBristol, 90 Va. 151, 17 
S.E. 853, 854 (1893). For further discussion of the nature of riparian rights see infra note 26. 
23. See Leitch v. Sanitary Dist., 369 ill. 469, 17 N.E.2d 34, 36 (1938); Grinels v. Daniel, 110 
Va. 874, 67 S.E. 534, 536 (1910). 
24. Harris v. Southeast Portland Lumber Co., 123 Or. 549, 262 P. 243, 245 (1927); Leonard v. 
St. John, 101 Va. 752, 45 S.E. 474, 477 (1903). However, a riparian who does not exercise his rights 
may lose them if another party meets the requirements for a prescriptive use. Harris, 262 P. at 245; 
see also Fresno Canal & Irrigation Co. v. People's Ditch Co., 174 Cal. 441, 163 P. 497, 501 (1917). 
25. The phrase "riparian proprietor" will be used in the same manner as in the REsTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF ToRTS, referring to "a person who is in possession of riparian land or who owns an 
estate in it." REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 844 (1977). 
26. Arminius Chemical Co. v. Landrum, 113 Va. 7, 73 S.E. 459,462 (1912); see also Elmore v. 
Ingalls, 245 Ala. 481, 17 So. 2d 674, 675 (1944); Gehlen v. Knorr, 101 Iowa 700, 70 N.W. 757, 758 
(1897). The rights of a riparian proprietor usually include: (1) the right of access to the watercourse 
that flows through or by the riparian land, including a right of way to the line of navigability of a 
navigable watercourse, Town of Islip v. Powell, 78 Misc. 2d 1007, 358 N.Y.S.2d 985, 992 (1974); 
Thurston v. Portsmouth, 205 Va. 909, 140 S.E.2d 678, 680 (1965); Grinels v. Daniel, 110 Va. 874, 67 
S.E. 534, 536 (1910); (2) the right to accretions, State v. Johnson, 278 N.C. 126, 179 S.E.2d 371, 384 
(1971); Steelman v. Field, 142 Va. 383, 128 S.E. 558, 559 (1925); (3) the right to dredge deposits of 
sand or gravel that extend beyond low water mark, Bloom v. Water Resources Comm'n, 157 Conn. 
528, 254 A.2d 884, 887 (1969); and (4) the right to construct a wharf, landing, or pier upon the bed, 
extending out to the line of navigability where one exists, provided the structure does not impede 
navigation, Causey v. Gray, 250 Md. 380,243 A.2d 575, 581 (1968); Peek v. City of Hampton, 115 
Va. 855, 80 S.E. 593 (1914). See generally 1 H. FARNHAM, supra note 13, § 62. Significantly, many 
of these rights only can be exercised on the bed of the watercourse. Although a riparian proprietor 
located on one bank of a nonnavigable watercourse usually owns to the middle of the stream bed, 
see, e.g., Allot v. Wilmington Light & Power Co., 288 ill. 541, 123 N.E. 731, 734 (1919), title to 
riparian land abutting a navigable watercourse generally does not extend beyond the low water 
mark, see, e.g., Flanagan v. City of Philadelphia, 42 Pa. 219, 230 (1862). Riparian rights thus extend 
to the soil of the beds even though the riparian proprietor does not own the bed. See generally 1 H. 
FARNHAM, supra note 13, § 63. 
Some riparian rights have been altered by statute. For example, under the common law the 
right to build wharves and piers apparently includes the right to erect such a structure for commer-
cial use. See Grinels v. Daniel, 110 Va. 874, 67 S.E. 534, 535 (1910). The Virginia General Assem-
bly has modified that right by limiting the construction of wharves or other similar structures to 
private wharves, piers, or landings used for noncommercial purposes. See VA. CoDE § 62.1-164 
(1982). 
27. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 850 comment d (1977). It perhaps would be 
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scious of the common right of other riparians located above and be-
low his property and must not unduly interfere with their riparian 
rights in exercising his own.28 As a general matter, then, each ripa-
rian is entitled to receive and use the flow of a watercourse after rea-
sonable use by riparians upstream from him but may not prevent 
riparians downstream from him from exercising that same right. 
Under the riparian doctrine, two key principles define and limit 
consumptive interests in watercourses. The first is that a riparian pro-
prietor can exercise his rights only for the benefit of riparian land. 
The second is that a riparian's use must be reasonable. When these 
two principles developed, most riparian users were private agrarians. 
As a consequence, the principles reflect certain assumptions and legal 
standards that have restricted uses by local governments and private 
businesses. Perhaps the most restrictive aspects of the principles are 
their bias toward low-density uses and their disapproving view of un-
restrained transfers of use rights. 
Although preservation of agrarian values remains a valid objec-
tive in many areas, it should not be the primary objective of a water 
allocation system.29 To be effective, a water allocation system should 
promote an efficient use of the allocated resource for a variety of pur-
poses. 30 Granted, priorities of use must exist to help resolve conflicts, 
but the system still should retain sufficient flexibility to permit the 
more accurate to describe riparians' rights as being equal in the sense that each riparian is entitled to 
"the same protection from interference with his use that the law gives to other riparian proprietors." 
I d. 
28. See Bouris v. Largent, 94 ill. App. 2d 251, 236 N.E.2d 15, 17 (1968); White v. Whitney 
Mfg., 60 S.C. 254, 38 S.E. 456, 460 (1901); Arminius Chemical Co. v. Landrum, 113 Va. 7, 73 S.E. 
459, 462 (1912). An upper riparian, for example, generally cannot divert the flow of a watercourse 
away from a lower riparian, 2 H. FARNHAM, supra note 13, § 496, and a lower riparian cannot 
obstruct a watercourse so as to cause flooding of riparian land located above it, see id. § 546. 
29. As one commentator explained: 
A modem water law system must not only promote the welfare of water users, it must 
accomplish the state's social and economic objectives, coordinate private activities with 
state projects, protect the interests of the public in common uses and environmental values, 
and integrate the activities of individual and corporate users into comprehensive state plans 
for water development and management. 
Trelease, supra note 10, at 388. Another commentator identified the primary objectives of a water 
allocation system as including the promotion of an "optimal use of the resource" and "fairness." 
Ausness, supra note 11, at 576. 
30. For purposes of this Article, the term "efficiency'' will be used in a nontechnical manner to 
describe an outcome or use that maximizes the benefits and minim;zes the costs associated with the 
use or outcome. For a more extensive definition and discussion of efficiency see C. MEYERS & R. 
POSNER, MARKET TRANSFERS oF WATER RIGHTS: TowARD AN IMPROVED MARKET IN WATER 
REsoURCES 2-4 (National Water Commission, Legal Study No.4, 1971). 
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shifting of resources to new uses.31 Furthermore, to be effective, a 
water allocation system should distribute resources in an equitable 
manner.32 One way to promote an equitable distribution of water re-
sources is to ensure that parties have the opportunity to become new 
users. Another way is to ratify current expectations about allocation 
and use of the allocated resource. 
Parts II.A. and II.B. will consider whether it is possible to rede-
fine the legal standards that have developed under the two key ripa-
rian principles in a manner that promotes these modem policy 
objectives and achieves a better accommodation of public consump-
tive needs, without seriously undermining the private interests at 
stake. Part II. C. then will consider the ability of the riparian doctrine 
to respond to water supply problems by examining the extent to 
which riparian rights can be redistributed. 
A. The Riparian Land Limitation: Restricting the Area 
to be Benefitted 
The riparian land limitation serves an important function under 
the common law: it restricts the area that can benefit from use of a 
watercourse and thus protects present users. If physical constraints 
were not imposed on the area that could be benefitted by use of a 
watercourse, a present user could not be reasonably assured that suffi-
cient water would exist in the future. At least on a general level, then, 
the riparian land limitation serves some valid policy objectives. Be-
sides protecting the reliance interests of present users by providing 
some security for their uses, the limitation also encourages certain 
types of investments and uses of water resources. 
Closer scrutiny, however, will demonstrate that the limitation, as 
traditionally interpreted, fails to achieve many of the policy objectives 
of an effective allocation system. Because of the restrictive approach 
taken by the courts under the riparian doctrine, the standards and 
31. See infra notes 95-112 and accompanying text. 
32. As used in this Article, the terms "equity" and "equitable distribution" will refer to 
whether a use, outcome, or distribution is fair or acceptable to interested parties, as well as to society 
in general. Factors relevant to deciding whether an outcome is equitable would include the final 
distribution achieved by the outcome, the process used to choose the outcome, the extent to which 
the outcome gives equal access to water resources, and the extent to which the outcome ratifies 
reasonable expectations. Cj. Ausness, supra note 11, at 576 (describing fairness as meaning "equal 
access to the resource, freedom from arbitrary treatment, and assurances that reasonable expecta-
tions will not be frustrated by a regulatory agency"). For a more extensive discussion of the meaning 
of equitable distribution as applied to natural resources see J. HIRSHLEIFER, J. DEHAVEN, & J. 
MILLIMAN, supra note 14, at 76-77. 
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interpretations that have developed under the riparian land require-
ment often hinder development by many private users, rather than 
promote it, and pose major obstacles to public users poor in water 
resources. Four principal tests for identifying riparian land have been 
developed by the courts. 33 First, to be riparian land, a tract must 
have physical contact with a watercourse. Second, a tract must be 
located within the watershed of a watercourse to be considered ripa-
rian to that watercourse. Third, the riparian owner must have ac-
quired title to the entire tract that he is claiming as riparian land in 
one transaction. Finally, the tract must be unitary in a physical sense. 
Each test will be examined now to determine whether a court could 
improve the test's effectiveness without seriously impairing the private 
interests at stake. 
1. The Physical Contact Test 
The most obvious test for identifying riparian land is that a tract 
must have physical contact with a watercourse to be riparian. 34 With-
out this initial standard for identifying riparian land, several theoreti-
cal and practical problems would arise. If a tract of land could 
qualify as riparian land without being in physical contact with a wa-
tercourse, then a key premise of the riparian doctrine would be vio-
lated: that riparian rights arise as incidences of ownership of la11d 
adjoining a watercourse. Although other rational standards for defin-
ing consumptive rights exist, 35 the physical contact standard appears 
to reflect the land settlement pattern of early Americans, who pre-
ferred to purchase waterfront property rather than land not abutting a 
watercourse. 36 By preserving use of a watercourse for parties with 
33. Although there are some variations as to how these restrictions are interpreted, most ripa-
rian jurisdictions appear to have accepted the general concepts behind them. 
34. See 2 H. FARNHAM, supra note 13, § 463a; see also Thompson v. Enz, 379 Mich. 667, 154 
N.W.2d 473, 478 (1967). 
35. In the arid West, for example, the prior appropriation doctrine generally provides a more 
effective way of defining consumptive interests. See supra note 13. 
36. Admittedly it is difficult to determine which came first in America: the preference for 
waterfront property or the riparian doctrine. That the doctrine existed in seventeenth century Eng-
land suggests that it affected, instead of reflected, the settlement patterns of colonists. Though this 
argument is appealing, it ignores the early settlers' preoccupation with survival, which on more than 
one occasion caused them to act first and seek legal ratification of their conduct later. See, e.g., 10 
W. HENING, VIRGINIA'S STATUTES AT LARGE, ch. 11, at 38 ("[W]hereas great numbers of people 
have settled in the country upon the western waters . . . for which they have been hitherto pre-
vented from suing out patents or obtaining legal titles by the king . . • "); see also id. at 39 
("[W]hereas several families . . • have settled themselves in villages or townships, under some agree-
ment between the inhabitants of laying off the same into town lots . .. [t]hat six hundred and forty 
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waterfront property, the standard protects the premium paid by those 
parties for the location of their land. 37 
Moreover, if the physical contact test were not used, the owner of 
land considered to be riparian to a watercourse, but not contiguous to 
it, would not have any access to the watercourse. The landowner thus 
could not use the watercourse to benefit his land unless he purchased 
access rights or unless the courts decided to recognize such rights as 
riparian rights. Because of this problem, owners of nonwaterfront 
property would not be reasonable in expecting to acquire use rights in 
a nearby watercourse as an incident to their ownership of the prop-
erty. The physical contact standard thus ratifies general expectations 
about the extent of private ownership interests in waterfront and 
nonwaterfront property. 
Interpreting the standard too literally, though, can lead to an un-
necessarily restrictive approach to riparian rights. If, for example, the 
courts construe the riparian doctrine to allow the transfer of riparian 
acres of land •.. shall be reserved for ... [their] use ... until a true representation of their case 
can be made to the general assembly . • . ."). 
The settlers, for example, would have preferred waterfront property because such property pro-
vided access to ships carrying supplies and to the abundant supply of food and water found in many 
American rivers and streams. See 1 P. BRUCE, EcoNOMIC HisTORY OF VIRGINIA IN TilE SEVEN-
TEENTII CENTURY 104-16 (1907). Additionally, besides being easier to defend than many inland 
properties, waterfront land tended to be more fertile than soil farther away from a watercourse. 
Tobacco, for instance could be grown quite profitably on many lowlands in Virginia. See id. at 77-
78. Early colonists contemplating settling inland property also would have been discouraged by the 
tedious and difficult process of clearing the land. See id. at 257-58. 
37. The premium paid by settlers for waterfront property would not have been reflected in the 
actual value paid for the land. During the 1700's and 1800's, the purchase price of land generally 
was set at a constant rate for a specified number of acres. Under the land grant system of early 
colonial Virginia, for example, a party could acquire the right to claim 50 acres of waste and unap-
propriated land by immigrating to the colony at his own expense or paying for the transportation of 
another to the colony. Instructions to Sir George Yeardley (1618), reprinted in 2 VA. MAGAZINE OF 
HISTORY & BIOGRAPHY 154, 164-65 (1894-1895). By the early 1700's this land grant system was 
replaced by another system that permitted a party to purchase directly the right to a specified 
number of acres. Under the later system, a party who paid a set fee would receive a certificate, called 
a treasury warrant, entitling the party to take up and patent 50 acres of waste and unappropriated 
land. Before he could obtain a patent, though, the party would have to present his warrant to the 
surveyor of the particular county where he wanted to take up land, have the surveyor survey the 
appropriate land, and comply with a few other procedural requirements. 1 EXEC. J. OF THE CouN-
CIL OF CoLONIAL VA. 457 (1699). For a discussion of both systems see F. HARRISON, VIRGINIA 
LAND GRANTS 42-51 (1925); VA. STATE ARCHIVES, VIRGINIA LAND OFFICE INVENTORY vii-xii 
(1981). Thus, to obtain a patent for waterfront land, a party would have to acquire a warrant before 
any other party and then successfully settle the land as required by the patenting process. The 
premium paid for waterfront property then would include the time and capital required to obtain a 
patent for the maximum amount of waterfront property that could be acquired as quickly as 
possible. 
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rights, as they generally do with property rights, then a literal applica-
tion of the physical contact test can create serious conflicts with the 
transferability principle. 38 Whereas the transferability principle 
would permit alienation of riparian rights to the owner of land not 
contiguous to the watercourse, a literal interpretation of the physical 
contact standard would not allow the purchaser to exercise the rights 
for the benefit of his land. To avoid these problems, the contact stan-
dard, as well as the other tests for riparian land, should be interpreted 
in light of its key policies and functions. As will be shown, this more 
policy-oriented approach could help to minimize conflicts within the 
doctrine and to accommodate the public interest. 39 
2. The Watershed Test 
A second test for riparian land, the watershed test, defines the 
maximum amount of land that can qualify as riparian land. Under 
this standard land must be within the watershed of a natural water-
course to be riparian to that watercourse.40 If, for example, a land-
owner's tract of land abuts a watercourse, but extends beyond its 
watershed, that p-art of the tract outside of the watershed cannot qual-
ify as riparian land, in spite of the physical contact.41 As one court 
explained, the watershed limitation ensures that any water with-
drawn, but not fully used, by one riparian will remain within the wa-
tershed and thus be able to return to the watercourse for use by other 
riparians in the watershed.42 
From a scientific perspective, the watershed test seems an appro-
priate way to define the maximum area that can benefit from use of a 
watercourse. The rationale used to explain the limitation suggests 
that a watershed is the natural drainage area of a stream or river. 
38. See infra Part II.C. 
39. See infra Part II.C.2. 
40. Stratton v. Mt. Hermon Boys School, 216 Mass. 83, 103 N.E. 87, 88 (1913); Sayles v. City 
of Mitchell, 60 S.D. 592, 245 N.W.390, 391 (1932). See generally 2 H. FARNHAM, supra note 13, 
§ 463a. Without further restriction, the physical contact standard could include huge tracts of land 
within the category of riparian land. As long as the tract "touched" the watercourse at some point, 
the entire tract arguably could qualify as riparian land. Apparently recognizing this problem, the 
courts have added several other qualifications to the definition of riparian land. 
41. Bathgate v. Irvine, 126 Cal. 135, 58 P. 442, 444-45 (1899); Town of Gordonsville v. Zinn, 
129 Va. 542, 106 S.E. 508, 511 (1921). 
42. Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Fuller, 150 Cal. 327, 88 P. 978, 980 (1907); see also 2 H. 
FARNHAM, supra note 13, § 463(a), at 1571. Although California is a prior appropriation jurisdic· 
tion, California courts apply riparian principles when dealing with streams which flow through pri· 
vate land and have not yet been diverted. See supra note 13. 
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Because this definition includes all that land that contributes to the 
replenishment of the watercourse, it generally appears to take into 
account the hydrologic cycle.43 Furthermore, the definition seems to 
be consistent with the view currently held by many scientists and legal 
scholars that the legal system should resolve environmental problems 
arising in a watershed by considering the watershed as one complex, 
interrelated ecosystem. 44 
Fairness concerns also support the continued use of the water-
shed standard to define the maximum area that could be benefitted by 
a watercourse. At least in a water-rich environment, present users 
still seem to be reasonable in expecting the maximum area to be lim-
ited to the region replenishing the watercourse. As one court ex-
plained, the fact that land feeds a watercourse creates an expectation 
that if the land otherwise qualifies as riparian land it is "entitled, so to 
speak, to the use of its waters."45 Where water is less plentiful, 
though, those expectations must be tempered by the needs of water-
poor areas. Then fairness would seem to require some sharing of the 
available water resources. Working out such an arrangement, how-
ever, would not necessarily require rejecting the watershed test as a 
standard for detennining who initially has riparian rights. Rather, it 
would require focusing on the flexibility of the riparian doctrine and 
evaluating the extent to which riparian rights are or should be trans-
ferable. As will be seen momentarily, the results of this evaluation 
will have a significant impact on a locality's ability to satisfy the con-
sumptive needs of its inhabitants. 
Whether the watershed test promotes an efficient use of water 
resources is a more troublesome question. To the extent that the test 
is interpreted as limiting the maximum area and thus the number of 
potential users, it protects the reliance interests of users and rewards 
present investments. Confusion arises, however, because the water-
shed test is a difficult standard to apply. Where a watercourse is a 
major river, the natural drainage area could encompass a vast amount 
43. See generally K. GREGORY & D. WALLING, DRAINAGE BASIN FORM AND PROCESS: A 
GEOMORPHOLOGICAL APPROACH 96-105 (1973). 
44. Perhaps the best examples of this view are the various reports and studies of the Chesa-
peake Bay conducted under the direction of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. See, e.g., 
U.S. ENVT.L. PROTECTION AGENCY, CHEsAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM: FINDINGS AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS (1983) (recommending specific approaches for improving the Bay's water quality); U.S. 
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, CHESAPEAKE BAY: A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION (1983) (present-
ing a framework for maintaining the Bay's ecological integrity). See generally NATIONAL WATER 
COMM'N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FuTuRE 19-37 (1973). 
45. Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Fuller, 150 Cal. 327, 88 P. 978, 980 (1907). 
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of land. The drainage basin of the Tennessee River, for example, in-
cludes about 40,000 square miles of land spanning seven different 
states. 46 Furthermore, detennining the drainage area of a particular 
watercourse involves questions of fact better resolved by experts in 
geology and hydrology. 
Some of the inefficiencies of the watershed test become very ap-
parent when the test is applied to the situation where two streams 
merge. According to a leading California case involving that situa-
tion, Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Fuller,41 the watersheds of the two 
streams must be dealt with separately. This means that land solely 
within the watershed of one stream would not be riparian to the other 
stream, even though the land may be part of a tract that otherwise 
falls within the watershed of the first stream. 48 In Anaheim Union 
Water Co., plaintiffs sought to enjoin the proprietors of riparian land 
located above plaintiffs' land from diverting water from a river and 
conducting it to land located within the drainage area of a tributary of 
the river. Defendants had argued that the watershed of the river 
should be defined broadly to include the river's "[entire] valley from 
its sources to its mouth."49 Under this approach, land within that 
general area would be riparian to the river even though it did not 
directly feed the river. In rejecting defendants' argument, the court 
explained that their broad interpretation of watershed was inconsis-
tent with the purposes of the watershed test, which were to ensure 
that unused water would return to the particular watercourse being 
used and to restrict riparian rights to land "entitled" to use the 
watercourse. 50 
The implications of the California approach are significant, for it 
requires a riparian to place his land precisely within its appropriate 
watershed. Under this approach, land solely within the watershed of 
a tributary cannot be within the watershed of the main stream. Only 
that portion of the tract within the watershed of each stream can be 
considered riparian to that stream, and a riparian landowner must use 
the waters of each stream accordingly, even though such conduct may 
inconvenience the landowner. Where the riparian is a sprawling lo-
46. G. Scorr, STUDIES OF THE POLLUTION OF THE TENNESSEE RivER SYSTEM 1 (1970). 
47. 150 Cal. 327, 88 P. 978 (1907). 
48. Id. at 980. The few cases addressing this issue appear to have taken a similar approach. 
See Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail, 11 Cal. 2d 501, 81 P.2d 533, 548 (1938); Town of Gordonsville 
v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 106 S.E. 508, 512 (1921). 
49. Anaheim, 88 P. at 980. 
50. Id. 
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cality, that inconvenience could include a significant duplication of 
financial, administrative, and physical resources. 
Similar problems arise when the California approach is applied 
together with some of the other tests for riparian land. If, for in-
stance, a tract of land borders the main stream and not the tributary, 
yet extends into the watershed of the tributary, that portion of the 
land within the tributary's watershed would not be riparian to the 
tributary and therefore could not be benefitted by it. 5 1 Few landown-
ers possess the expertise necessary to make such a precise allocation of 
resources. And, at an even more fundamental level, few landowners 
would anticipate that such a precise and artificial division of resources 
would be required of them. More likely, they would expect to be able 
to use one, if not both, watercourses to benefit their entire tract. 
Because a restrictive definition of watershed does not ratify the 
expectations of riparians and requires an expertise not possessed by 
many of them, it is not surprising that riparian landowners often are 
confused and uncertain about the nature and extent of their rights. 
The more uncertain they are about their rights, the less likely they 
will be to rely on those rights and productively use their resources. 52 
A legal rule that fails to ratify reasonable expectations of property 
owners also tends to increase the costs of dealing with the property 
and under certain circumstances encourages noncompliance. In such 
a situation, a property owner either will realize the confusion sur-
rounding his rights and investigate the situation or will fail to realize 
the discrepancy between the law and his expectations and proceed as 
he believes the situation should be. Whereas the first option is costly 
in terms of the owner's time and money, the second is costly in terms 
of his misused property rights. 
A more productive result perhaps could be achieved by adopting 
the broader view of watershed advanced in Anaheim Union Water Co. 
or by defining the maximum area that could benefit from a water-
course with another standard. The first alternative would seem to 
eliminate some of the confusion and conflicts caused by the more re-
strictive approach without undermining the basic functions of the wa-
tershed test. 53 Implementing it, however, would require gathering 
51. See, e.g., Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail, 11 Cal. 2d 501, 81 P.2d 533, 547-49 (1938). 
52. See Trelease. supra note 10, at 404; see also DeVany, Eckert, Meyers, O'Hara, & Scott, A 
Proper System for Market Allocation of the Electromagnetic Spectrum: A Legal-Economic-Engineer· 
ing Study, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1499, 1506 (1969). 
53. A broader interpretation, however, would probably lead to some inconsistencies with the 
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data about various watercourses54 and developing guidelines for dis-
tinguishing between major and minor drainage basins, tasks not well 
suited to the case-by-case approach of the common law. 
If the second alternative were pursued and a narrower standard 
than the watershed test were adopted, the new standard would not 
maximize the area that could be benefitted by a watercourse as well as 
the watershed test. Fewer people would have the opportunity of ini-
tially using the watercourse and, to the extent that redistribution 
would not be possible, fewer people also would have the opportunity 
of eventually using the watercourse. Nor would a narrower standard 
define the maximum area in a manner that accurately reflected the 
hydrologic cycle. Because the standard would exclude land that was 
within the natural drainage area of a watercourse, it would prevent 
land that contributed to the replenishment of the watercourse from 
qualifying as riparian land. 
If, on the other hand, the new standard were more expansive, 
permitting land outside the watershed of a watercourse to be riparian, 
it would better ratify the expectations of water-poor areas and defi-
nitely would increase the area of land that could be benefitted by use. 
The broader standard, however, would not necessarily promote other 
desired policies, such as protection of present users' reliance interests 
and preservation of the environment. As mentioned earlier, the wa-
tershed limitation apparently developed because the courts perceived 
a need to protect present users. Adopting a broader standard thus 
would require some fundamental changes in the philosophy of the ri-
parian land restriction. 
Furthermore, ecologists and marine scientists generally agree 
that diverting a watercourse to areas outside of its watershed would 
have detrimental consequences on the watershed's environment. 55 
other tests for riparian land. It, for example, would appear to permit land within the watershed area 
to be riparian even though it is not in physical contact with the watercourse. 
54. This data-gathering process already has begun in most states, which have established water 
research centers as mandated by Congress. See 42 U.S.C. § 7811 (1983) (repealing 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1961a (West 1974)). The centers are formed for the purpose of collecting information about the 
relevant state's water resources and problems. See, e.g., VA. CoDE§§ 23-135.7:8 to -135.7:13 (Supp. 
1982). 
55. Although all diversions have adverse environmental impacts, diversions to areas outside 
the watershed can have especially serious consequences. A large-scale diversion occurring in Cali-
fornia illustrates some of these consequences. In Inyo County, California, a diversion from Mono 
Lake, one of the state's most beautiful lakes, has diminished the lake's surface area by one-third and 
has increased its salinity level significantly, causing serious damage to the lake's fisheries. The 
shrimp hatch in 1981, for example, was down by 95%. See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Ct., 
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Admittedly, these consequences also would result from diversions 
within the watershed, though probably to a lesser degree. 56 Thus, if 
the primary policy objective of a water allocation system is environ-
mental preservation, the courts should restrict use of a watercourse to 
a narrow area of land near the watercourse. Even in a water-rich 
environment, such an approach seems undesirable and unrealistic, for 
it would prohibit numerous parties from benefitting from the 
watercourse. 
Assuming, then, that some adverse.environmental impact will be 
tolerated, the watershed test would appear to be the preferable judi-
cial standard for defining the maximum amount of land that can be 
riparian. Unlike an agency administering a water permit system, a 
court applying the riparian doctrine cannot actively supervise and 
manage the state's water resources. 57 But through the watershed test, 
a court can maintain some control over use of watercourses and thus 
can provide some protection for the reliance interests of present 
users. 58 Rather than adopting a broader standard and upsetting those 
reliance interests, the courts could accommodate at least some of the 
needs of water-poor areas by permitting appropriate transfers of use 
rights within a watershed. 59 Nor would a narrower standard seem as 
desirable since it would increase the number of areas poor in water 
resources. 
If the watershed test were retained, some problems of application 
still would exist. Most private riparians, for instance, continue to lack 
the expertise required to apply the standard. Scientists and appropri-
33 Cal. 3d 419, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 348, 352, 658 P.2d 709, 711, 715, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 413 
(1983). See generally Hagan & Roberts, Ecological Impacts of Water Storage and Diversion Projects, 
in 1 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT 543 (C. Goldman ed. 1971). For a 
general discussion of the environmental effects of water projects see NATIONAL WATER CoMM'N, 
WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 19-37 (1973). 
56. At least with diversions within a watershed, it is more likely that a smaller ecological area 
will be affected by the diversions. For example, the number of miles of conduit pipes probably would 
be smaller. In its report WATER POLICIES FOR mE FUTURE, the National Water Commission 
generally agreed with this observation, stating: "There is no difference in kind between interbasin 
transfers and any other water development project, so far as social, environmental, or economic 
values are concerned. But there is a difference in degree where the interbasin transfer is a large-scale 
project .•.. " NATIONAL WATER CoMM'N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 319 (1973). 
57. A court, however, may be able to impose planning responsibilities on the state government 
by invoking the public trust doctrine. See United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota State Water 
Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976). 
58. To the degree that redistribution of use rights is allowed, the protection given the reliance 
interests of present users diminishes. 
59. For further discussion of the transferability issue see infra Part n.c. 
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ate government officials, however, have succeeded in developing more 
sophisticated tools and guidelines for determining the watershed of a 
stream or river. Through more precise topographical maps, they usu-
ally can determine the watershed of a watercourse with specificity. 60 
Given this progress, then, the watershed limitation appears to be the 
preferable standard for courts in riparian jurisdictions. More than the 
other alternatives, it permits the courts to achieve a better balance 
between the expectations set by traditional riparian principles and 
more modern concerns like environmental preservation, equitable re-
distribution, and efficient use of today's resources. Absent a shift in 
the fundamental philosophies of the riparian doctrine, the watershed 
limitation should be retained. 
3. The Single Transaction Test 
A third qualification to the definition of riparian land, known as 
the single or same transaction test, provides that land not abutting the 
60. Courts, legislatures, and commentators alike have been vague in their definition of water-
shed. See Maxwell Land-Grant Co. v. Dawson, 7 N.M. 133, 34 P. 191, 193 (1893) (a watershed is 
"that district of country that drains into a river or stream"), rev'd on other grounds, 151 U.S. 586 
(1894); IND. ConE ANN. § 13-2-1-4(6) (Burns 1981) (A watershed is "an area from which water 
drains to a common point. The watershed of an entire watercourse shall be measured to its mouth 
and the watershed of any part of a watercourse shall be measured to the farthest downstream point 
in question."); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 151.100(8) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1982) (a watershed in-
cludes "all of the area from which all drainage passes a given point downstream"); Farnham, The 
Pennissib/e Extent of Riparian Land, 7 LAND & WATER L. RE.v. 31, 34 (1972) (the watershed of a 
lake or stream is "the drainage area contributing to the water found in a particular lake or stream"). 
Even the United States Environmental Protection Agency defines a watershed simply as "[t]he land 
area that drains into a stream." U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, CoMMON ENVIRONMENTAL 
TERMS 16 (1977). 
The Soil Conservation Service bas formulated a more precise definition of a watershed area to 
use under the Federal Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1001-09 (1985). 
It provides in pertinent part: 
A watershed area comprises all land and water within the confines of a drainage divide 
or a land and water problem area. A watershed area may comprise the land and water of 
two or more minor drainageways that are separate tributaries to a stream, artificial water-
way, lake, or other tidal area. Areas from which water is brought into it by diversion may 
be excluded from the watershed if these sources of water have no significant effect on the 
fiood prevention and water management problems of the watershed area. The watershed 
area must necessarily include all direct tributary drainageways and lands from which, after 
project installation, water and sediment could adversely affect any proposed structural 
measure such as an irrigation or drainage canal, fioodway, or fioodwater-retarding struc-
ture included in the plan. 
SOIL CONSERVATION SERVICE, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, NATIONAL WATERSHEDS MANuAL, 
tit. 390, ch. V, § 500.11(a) (1981). 
For a more detailed discussion of the meanings of watershed and drainage basin see K. GREG-
ORY & D. WALLING, supra note 43, at 96-105. 
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watercourse must have been acquired in the same transaction as the 
portion touching the watercourse to qualify as riparian. 61 The practi-
cal effect of this single transaction requirement is to limit riparian 
land to the smallest area held by a party under a chain of title includ-
ing the land adjoining the watercourse. 62 
Restricting the definition of riparian land to land acquired in the 
same transaction means that some land within the watershed of a wa-
tercourse will not qualify as riparian and that therefore the area to 
which riparian rights attach will not be maximized. The courts in 
many riparian jurisdictions apparently preferred a less efficient alter-
native to one that would maximize the size of the area that could be 
benefitted-the watershed-because of certain equitable concerns. By 
restricting the definition of riparian land to land acquired in a single 
transaction, the courts prevented financially secure riparian landown-
ers from enlarging their tracts of riparian land and expanding their 
rights by purchasing land contiguous to their original tract but not 
contiguous to the watercourse. 63 Thus, the courts have used the sin-
gle transaction test to achieve a more equitable distribution of use 
rights. 
In addition to discouraging riparians from monopolizing con-
sumptive rights, the single transaction test also helps to preserve the 
priority status of riparians, which are set in part by physical location 
along a watercourse. If, for example, a riparian owns two noncon-
tiguous tracts of waterfront property, the single transaction test would 
prevent the riparian from purchasing a thin strip of land to connect 
the two tracts and then claiming the right to use water taken from the 
watercourse on the upper tract for the benefit of the lower tract with-
out regard for riparians between the two tracts. Since all the land had 
61. See Crawford Co. v. Hathaway, 67 Neb. 325, 93 N.W. 781, 790-91 (1903); Watkins Land 
Co. v. Clements, 98 Tex. 578, 86 S.W. 733, 735 (1905). See generally 2 H. FARNHAM, supra note 13, 
§ 463(a), at 1571-72. In some jurisdictions the courts apply a "unity of title" test, instead of the 
single transaction or "chain of title" test. Under the unity of title standard, land not abutting a 
watercourse may still qualify as riparian if it is held under common ownership with land contiguous 
to it and to the watercourse. For a discussion of both approaches see Levi & Schneeberger, The 
Chain and Unity of Title Theories for Delineating Riparian Land: Economic Analysis as an Alterna-
tive to Case Precedent, 21 BUFFALO L. REv. 439 (1972). Because the unity of title test closely 
resembles the unitary tract test, the policies and values furthered by the unity of title test will be 
analyzed in the discussion of the unitary tract test. See infra notes 70-79 and accompanying text. 
62. See, e.g., Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail, 11 Cal. 2d 501, 81 P.2d 533, 547 (1938) (amount 
of land held in chain of title was 10,402 acres, which was only about half of the original grant). 
63. See 2 H. FARNHAM, supra note 13, § 463(a), at 1572 & n.4. In contrast to the single 
transaction test, the unity of title standard would permit a riparian to enlarge his riparian tract by 
purchasing adjoining lots. See Levi & Schneeberger, supra note 61, at 442. 
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not been acquired in the same transaction, the riparian could not 
claim that his holdings formed one tract of riparian land entitling him 
to use the watercourse before other riparians located below the upper 
tract. In exercising his riparian rights for the lower tract, the riparian 
still would be subject to the reasonable use rights of riparians located 
above the lower tract. 64 
Although both functions should remain important objectives 
under the riparian doctrine, they could be furthered even if the single 
transaction test were abandoned or modified. The first objective, eq-
uitable distribution of use rights, still would require some limitations 
on the ability of a riparian to enlarge his riparian tract. That objec-
tive, however, could arguably be achieved in a less restrictive man-
ner. 65 If, for example, a riparian were allowed to extend his riparian 
estate by subsequent purchase directly back to the outer boundary of 
the watershed, he still should not be able, in most situations, to in-
crease his estate so substantially that he could monopolize riparian 
rights for the area. Furthermore, as will be demonstrated momenta-
rily, a fourth, more sensible refinement to the definition of riparian 
land limits the extent to which a riparian can change the size of his 
riparian estate without having to account to other riparians. 66 The 
second objective, preservation of priorities based on physical location, 
also would require some limitations to ensure that a riparian could 
not improve his priority by purchasing tracts located upstream to his 
original tract. But, once again, a fourth test for riparian land provides 
appropriate limitations and effectively preserves priorities. 
That the single transaction test duplicates functions served by 
another standard is not, by itself, sufficient reason to reject the test. 
When, however, the adverse policy implications of the single transac-
tion standard are considered, the argument for abandonment becomes 
stronger. One adverse consequence of the single transaction test is 
that it refuses to recognize the reasonable growth needs of riparians. 
Where the riparian is a locality, this can have serious consequences. 
64. Riparians generally have the right to receive the flow of a watercourse after reasonable use 
by upstream riparians. See generally 2 H. FARNHAM, supra note 13, § 461. 
65. It is ironic that a rule designed in part to prevent monopolization of rights may result in an 
inefficient use of resources. 
66. See infra notes 70-79 and accompanying text. Furthermore, other laws now prevent par-
ties from monopolizing property rights in land and other resources. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. Co. 
v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1958) (finding practice of granting or leasing land with condition 
that products from that land be shipped on grantor's railroad illegal). See generally 2 P. AREEDA & 
D. TuRNER, ANrrrRUsr LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANrrrRUsr PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPUCA• 
TION § 409f (1978) (finding monopolization of divisible resources to be a barrier to entry). 
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If, for example, a locality situated next to a watercourse has annexed 
adjoining areas, the single transaction test would prevent it from exer-
cising its riparian rights for the benefit of annexed areas. 67 
Equally as significant, the single transaction test impedes the de-
velopment of land. Even if there presently existed a riparian who 
owned a large tract of land extending from the watercourse to the end 
of the watershed, once that riparian decided to subdivide his tract and 
sell off parts of it, the single transaction test would prevent the tract 
from being considered a riparian tract. 68 Because the reasonableness 
of a riparian's use rights are measured in part by the size of his tract, 69 
this consequence could be serious. Moreover, the chances that such a 
large tract of land would remain intact indefinitely are slim. The sin-
gle transaction test thus has become a test of chance. As long as a 
riparian tract happened to extend to the end of the watershed, the 
owner could exercise his riparian rights for the benefit of the entire 
area. When, however, he decided to subdivide the tract, his riparian 
rights no longer could benefit the entire area. 
The above analysis suggests that the single transaction standard 
no longer serves a useful purpose and should be abandoned. This 
course of action, however, should not occur without recognition of 
the need to protect the interests of small private users. These interests 
are especially strong when a neighboring riparian is a growing munic-
ipality or a developing industrial user. Without the single transaction 
test, the small private user legitimately could fear that such a neigh-
bor would expand its riparian holdings at the small user's expense. 
As the following discussion demonstrates, a fourth test for ripa-
rian land should allay some of these fears. It basically serves the same 
functions as the single transaction test without being as inflexible as 
the single transaction standard. But even the fourth test would not 
protect the small private user against the likelihood that a riparian 
locality would increase its population as well as its geographic limits. 
As will be explained, protecting the small private user from this possi-
67. The unity of title test for riparian land also would appear to prevent a riparian locality 
from exercising its rights for the benefit of the annexed areas. Because those areas usually consist of 
lots owned by private parties, the annexed areas would not be held under common ownership with 
the riparian tract. For a discussion of how the fourth test, the unitary tract standard, would deal 
with the annexed areas, see infra note 74. 
68. The physical contact standard also would affect the riparian status of subdivided parts not 
contiguous to the watercourse. 
69. See generally infra Part ll.C. 
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bility can only occur through the reasonable use requirement, which 
imposes quantitative limits on use rights. 
4. The Unitary Tract Test 
A fourth qualification to the riparian land requirement, the uni-
tary tract test, restricts riparian status to tracts that are unitary in a 
physical sense, as defined by reasonable community standards and lo-
cation in the watershed. 70 Like the single transaction test, the unitary 
tract restriction helps to define the priority status of riparians. Under 
this restriction, for example, the riparian owning the two noncontigu-
ous tracts of riparian land described above could not claim that the 
lower tract should receive the same priority as the upper tract, even 
though the two are connected by a thin strip, because his holdings 
would not form a physically continuous and uniform tract of land. 71 
70. See Wasserburger v. Coffee, 180 Neb. 149, 141 N.W.2d 738, 744 (1966); Town of Gor-
donsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 106 S.E. 508 (1921). The REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS bas 
adopted a similar requirement in its definition of riparian land. To qualify as riparian land, a tract of 
land must be "a continuous tract or plot ofland in one possession, no part of which is separated from 
the rest by intervening land in another possession." REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 843 com-
ment c (1979); see also 2 H. FARNHAM, supra note 13, § 463(a) (defining riparian land as "all that 
parcel which is regarded as one tract"). 
71. Such a claim was advanced by a riparian in Town of Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 
106 S.E. 508 (1921). That case involved a conflict between the town of Gordonsville, which owned a 
one-acre lot abutting a nonnavigable stream, and an individual riparian landowner, who had sepa-
rately purchased two tracts of land, located above and below the town's lot and connected by a strip 
of land. The land above the town's lot was approximately 25 feet in width and abutted the stream. 
The town sought an injunction to prevent the individual landowner from withdrawing water from 
the stream at a point located on her upper property and pumping it to her dwelling on the lower 
section. 
In considering the status of the defendant's land, the court concluded that although the lower 
property was riparian to the stream, it could at best be regarded as lower riparian land in relation to 
the town lot. As explained by the court, the lower section was not within the watershed of the upper 
section and therefore could not be considered to be riparian to that part of the stream abutted by the 
upper property. Zinn, 106 S.E. at 512. Thus, the court focused on physical location within the 
watershed in defining riparian status. 
Because the state supreme court in Zinn provided only a vague description of this fourth limita-
tion, the court's language is susceptible to several interpretations. Under the strictest interpretation, 
the decision could be construed as limiting riparian status to land lying directly behind that area 
bordering the stream. This interpretation, however, could limit severely the amount of land consid-
ered to be riparian and seems to require that water return to a watercourse at a precise point behind 
the area of contact. It also ignores an important fact of Zinn: the two tracts of land owned by the 
defendant were not regarded in the community as a unitary tract of land. Thus, a broader interpre-
tation of the Zinn limitation would be that riparian land includes only that portion of a riparian 
proprietor's land that is considered to be unitary under reasonable community standards, as reflected 
in local custom and understandings. Under certain circumstances, like those in Zinn, a unitary tract 
would encompass only that land lying directly behind the area abutting the stream because only that 
land would form a cohesive tract. 
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Similarly, when the owner of a waterfront lot subsequently purchases 
the lot directly above his, he may not be able to claim that the two lots 
form a unitary tract, for they may not meet community standards for 
a unitary tract of land. 72 As long as those standards focus solely on 
whether a tract is held under common ownership or possession, the 
party could treat the two lots as one riparian tract. 73 But if the com-
munity standards for a unitary tract require consideration of addi-
tional factors, such as the placement of lot boundary lines on a 
locality's plat, then the two lots would not form one riparian tract. 
Unlike the single transaction test, the unitary tract standard has 
sufficient flexibility to permit changes in the results achieved by the 
standard. For instance, if in the last situation community perceptions 
about the two adjoining lots eventually changed and the lots later 
were recognized as one tract, 74 they then would meet the unitary tract 
standard. Under the rigid single transaction test, the two lots never 
could be considered as one tract of riparian land. 
This notion of a unitary tract defined by community standards 
and physical cohesiveness is not foreign to property law. It appears in 
72. Other riparians, however, may have difficulty establishing injury, which generally is re-
quired in riparian jurisdictions. See infra note 198. If, however, the cost of gaining access to the 
watercourse is prohibitive for one of the lots and the riparian decides to divert water from the other 
lot to the lot with the poor access, then the lower riparian may be able to convince a court that its 
rights are injured. 
73. See, e.g., REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 843 comment c (1977). Under this ap-
proach the unitary tract test almost becomes synonymous with the unity of title test. See supra note 
61. 
74. The flexibility of the unitary tract test arguably could help a riparian locality that has 
annexed adjoining areas. If community perceptions about the boundaries of the locality's riparian 
tract change to include the annexed area, the tract then may meet the unitary tract test. But unless 
the test were changed for public users, the locality could not include lots held in fee by private 
parties within its unitary tract. A lot separately owned by a private party generally would be re-
garded as a unitary tract. Evidence of community perceptions about the boundaries of unitary tracts 
could be found in the appropriate locality's plat, tax map, or other documents setting forth the 
subdivision oflots in the locality. See generally 6 G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIFS ON THE MODERN 
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY§§ 3034-3036, 3040 (1962) (explaining how a landowner can change his 
boundaries). 
Perhaps because the unitary tract test is based on the somewhat vague notion of community 
perceptions, some courts prefer instead to apply a unity of title or single ownership standard. Under 
this standard several tracts within a watershed could qualify as riparian if they are contiguous to 
each other, if at least one abuts the watercourse, and if all of them are held under common owner-
ship. See Ausness, Water Use Permits in a Riparian State: Problems and Proposals, 66 KY. L.J. 191, 
202 (1977). The single ownership test thus permits a riparian to enlarge his riparian tract by 
purchasing contiguous lots. See generally Levi & Schneeberger, supra note 61, at 442. Although the 
single ownership and unitary tract tests are very similar, some differences exist. For example, 
whereas the unitary tract test would involve inquiring into reasonable community perceptions, the 
single ownership test could be applied simply by examining the deeds of the appropriate party. 
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several different areas of real property where flexibility is needed to 
ensure fair results and to protect third party interests. The law of 
adverse possession, for instance, uses the concept to help define when 
an adverse possessor of a portion of a tract of land can acquire title to 
the entire tract of land. 75 By requiring that the entire tract qualify as 
a unitary tract under reasonable community standards before an ad-
verse possessor can acquire title to it, the law of adverse possession is 
better able to respond to particular circumstances and thus produce 
just results. Additionally, this requirement ensures that third parties 
are not unreasonably burdened. If the unitary tract requirement were 
not imposed, a landowner would have to review the deeds of his 
neighbors periodically to ensure that a conveyance had not included 
his land within the boundaries of neighboring land. 76 
Despite its advantages, the unitary tract standard presents seri-
ous obstacles to localities attempting to satisfy their public's con-
sumptive needs. Even where a locality abuts a watercourse, that 
locality would have difficulty arguing that it formed one large unitary 
tract that could be benefitted by the watercourse. A riparian chal-
lenging a use by the locality simply would respond that at the very 
least the unitary tract test requires common or single ownership. A 
locality generally could not meet this standard because it consists of 
numerous unitary tracts owned by private parties. 77 Furthermore, 
modifying the unitary tract test for the public user could pose a seri-
ous challenge to the interests of private riparians. If the locality's ar-
gument is accepted, it would appear to permit the public user to 
expand its riparian holdings, increase its quantitative use rights, and 
improve its priority status by annexing adjoining areas. 
75. Under the concept of constructive adverse possession, a party in actual adverse possession 
of a part of a unitary tract of land can acquire title to the whole if he meets the requirement of 
adverse possession for the part and if he enters under color of title. See, eg., Murphy v. Doyle, 37 
Minn. 113, 33 N.W. 220 (1887); Mullis v. Winchester, 237 S.C. 487, 118 S.E.2d 61 (1961). See 
generally 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY§ 15.11 (A. Casner ed. 1952); 5 G. THOMPSON, supra 
note 74, § 2545 (1979). 
76. If the unitary tract standard did not exist, an adverse possessor conceivably could enter 
onto a part of one tract and acquire title to the entire tract, as well as a neighboring tract, through 
the concept of constructive adverse possession. To establish his claim to the neighboring tract, 
though, the adverse possessor generally would have to establish color of title to the neighboring tract 
by producing a written instrument, like a deed, that included that tract. See 3 AMERICAN LAw OF 
PROPERTY§ 15.11 (A. Casner ed. 1952). Thus, if the unitary tract standard were not imposed, a 
landowner would need to review the deeds for neighboring land to discover and prevent possible 
constructive adverse possession claims. 
77. Cf. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 843 comment c (1977) (riparian land only in· 
eludes tract held "in one possession,). 
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But if the meaning of the unitary tract test is not changed for the 
public user, then the test effectively precludes meaningful uses by a 
riparian locality. The only way to give the public riparian rights com-
parable to the private riparian's is to define the unitary tract of a ripa-
rian locality as including all land that adjoins the locality's waterfront 
property, that forms a physically cohesive area, and that is held under 
"common jurisdiction" with the waterfront parcel. Whether this ap-
proach would infringe impermissibly on the rights of private riparians 
depends on the meaning of the reasonable use requirement, for most 
of their concerns raise issues that are at the heart of that requirement. 
Protecting the reliance interests of private users thus could occur 
through the reasonable use requirement. 
Like the physical contact and watershed tests, the unitary tract 
test still effectively serves several important functions. 78 But, to avoid 
unnecessarily restrictive results, all three tests must be interpreted in 
light of those functions to ensure that the tests can respond to modem 
water supply problems. If, for instance, a court is willing to permit 
transfers of riparian rights, then the court should not interpret the 
physical contact standard literally to require all benefitted land, even 
the land to which the rights are transferred, to be in physical contact 
with a watercourse.79 A functional or policy-oriented approach to 
those tests also would ensure that the watershed test is the key stan-
78. In its report WATER Poucms FOR THE F'uruR.E, the National Water Commission recom-
mends that "[r]iparian restrictions on who may use water at what locations should be abolished." 
NATIONAL WATER CoMM'N, WATER POUCIES FOR THE FUTURE 281 (1973). Although this rec-
ommendation may be advisable when a state is willing to substitute the riparian doctrine with a 
comprehensive permit system, the three riparian land tests identified above should be retained, with 
the suggested modifications, where a state is not willing to do so. Indeed, if interpreted as suggested, 
the restrictions may even help to further another recommendation of the Commission: that states in 
the East at least "proceed on a basin-by-basin basis," id. at 280. 
79. See infra Part II.C.2. Applying the watershed limitation and the physical contact standard 
together also demonstrates some of the problems that can arise if a literal approach is taken. Once 
the maximum area is defined by the watershed test, the physical contact standard becomes as much a 
test of happenstance as a test of reasonable expectations. If a landowner happened to own a tract of 
land stretching from the watercourse to the end of the watershed, the entire tract would qualify as 
riparian land. But, if the landowner later sold that part of his tract beginning one mile from the 
watercourse and extending to the end of the watershed, the conveyed land literally would not meet 
the physical contact test and thus would not seem to be riparian land. A literal interpretation of the 
physical contact standard would limit the utility of the watershed test. Once development occurred 
and a portion of the tract lost physical contact with the watercourse, that portion would cease to be 
riparian land, regardless of whether the watershed test was met. A more functional or policy-ori-
ented approach would focus on whether the policies served by the physical contact test would be 
undermined by allowing the land to retain its riparian status. 
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dard and that artificial interpretations do not prevent the maximum 
possible area from being benefitted. 
Unlike the other tests, the single transaction standard fails to 
serve an independent function that justifies its retention. Courts aban-
doning the standard, though, need to adopt some restrictions to pro-
tect present users. While the unitary tract test would provide 
protection against significant geographic development, the reasonable 
use test should be used to protect against unreasonable increases in 
quantitative use. 
Abandoning the single transaction standard, however, will not 
reverse the adverse consequences it already has caused. Subdivided 
tracts of riparian land should not reacquire the riparian rights that 
once could be exercised for the entire tract. But if this suggestion is 
combined with a rule permitting transferability of riparian rights, 
then some of the consequences can be reversed through the market-
place. Before such a possibility can be discussed further, the standard 
used to define the quantitative use rights of riparians must be ex-
amined. That standard is the reasonable use requirement. 
B. The Reasonable Use Requirement: Balancing Use Rights 
Through Quantitative Limits 
The second key principle, that a use must be reasonable, also 
plays a major role under the riparian doctrine: it defines the quantita-
tive use rights of each riparian and thus, provides a standard for 
resolving conflicts among users. Although the importance of this 
function cannot be denied, the reasonable use requirement has devel-
oped in two major ways that hinder resolution of modem water sup-
ply problems. 
First, courts in riparian jurisdictions have taken a narrow per-
spective in defining quantitative use rights. This perspective appar-
ently resulted because early in the development of the riparian 
doctrine courts began to assume that riparians were, and would con-
tinue to be, private agrarians who supplied all their consumptive 
needs. Though this assumption no longer is valid, many modem 
courts appear reluctant to reject it and broaden their scope of inquiry. 
As a result, private users involved in large-scale business operations 
and public users attempting to meet the demands of their public have 
had difficulty establishing their uses as reasonable. 80 
80. See infra notes 85-91 and accompanying text. 
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Second, the flexibility and uncertainty of the reasonable use stan-
dard create problems for public and large private users attempting to 
plan for future use. Like reasonableness standards adopted in other 
areas of the law, the reasonable use requirement is imprecise and var-
ies according to the facts and circumstances of a particular situation. 
Because of this imprecision, and flexibility, users have had difficulty 
predicting whether a use will be protected in the future. Each of these 
problems will now be discussed to determine whether they can be par-
tially or wholly resolved by modifying and updating the reasonable 
use requirement. 
I. Changing the Judiciary,s Perspective to the Reasonable 
Use Limitation 
The courts have identified a range of factors to be considered in 
determining whether a use is reasonable. They include: the normal 
conditions of the stream (such as its nature and size), the purpose of 
the use, the compatibility of the use with other uses, the status of the 
user as an upper or lower riparian, rainfall and other weather condi-
tions, the quantity of water used in relation to the size of the stream, 
and local custom. 81 Although the importance of a use is not determi-
native, 82 some uses tend to have a higher priority than others under 
the riparian doctrine. For example, domestic uses, such as using 
water for drinking, bathing, and cooking, 83 usually receive the highest 
priority when a conflict arises. Under certain circumstances this pri-
81. See Kyser v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 151 Misc. 226, 271 N.Y.S. 182, 186 (1934) (discussing 
extent of use, capacity of stream, downstream uses, effect of use on others); Davis v. Town of Har-
risonburg, 116 Va. 864, 83 S.E. 401, 403 (1914) (focusing on purpose of use); Arminius Chemical 
Co. v. Landrum, 113 Va. 7, 73 S.E. 459, 462-63 (1912) (discussing normal conditions and purity, but 
rejecting importance of use as a factor). See generally REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 8SOA 
(1977); 2 H. FARNHAM, supra note 13, § 466. 
82. See, e.g., Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co., 164 N.Y. 303, 58 N.E. 142, 147-48 (1900); Wheatley v. 
Chrisman, 24 Pa. 298, 302 (1855); Arminius Chemical Co. v. Landrum, 113 Va. 7, 73 S.E. 459, 463 
(1912). 
83. At common law, domestic uses typically include using a watercourse for drinking, bathing, 
cooking, and watering livestock. See, e.g., Cowell v. Armstrong, 210 Cal. App. 218, 290 P. 1036, 
1038 (1930) (domestic uses were those made to fulfill the "necessities of life on riparian land such as 
household use, drinking, watering domestic animals"); Filbert v. Deckert, 22 Pa. Super. 362, 368 
(1903) (domestic uses are not restricted to family enjoyment, but rather include all uses by a riparian 
to satisfy natural wants such as drinking, washing, cooking and helping to preserve life and health). 
Comprehensive permit systems generally have defined domestic uses in a similar manner. See, e.g., 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.019(6) (West 1974) (domestic uses include any "use of water for the individ-
ual personal household purposes of drinking, bathing, cooking, or sanitation"); KY. REv. STAT. 
§ 151.100(9) (Supp. 1982) (domestic uses include any "use of water for ordinary household purposes, 
and drinking water for poultry, livestock, and domestic animals"). 
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ority even may permit an upstream riparian to exhaust the water in a 
watercourse, without leaving any water for downstream riparians. 84 
The judicial preference for domestic uses suggests that a riparian 
locality meeting the domestic needs of its inhabitants would have pri-
ority over most other uses. In applying the reasonable use standard, 
however, the courts have taken a narrow perspective, defining the 
standard primarily in the context of an individual private agrarian. 85 
The cases establishing the priorities between different types of uses 
demonstrate the courts' tendency to assume that a riparian is a pri-
vate agrarian. 86 Traditionally the courts have distinguished between 
"natural" and "artificial" uses, giving a preference to those uses fall-
ing within the first category. 87 Natural uses, the preferred category, 
are those uses that satisfy the "natural" wants of a riparian and in-
clude watering livestock and supplying the domestic needs of the ripa-
rian and his family. 88 Artificial uses, on the other hand, are uses that 
are not needed to sustain life and generally include uses by business 
84. See Evans v. Merriweather, 4 ill. (3 Scam.) 492, 496 (1842); Spence v. McDonough, 77 
Iowa 460, 42 N.W. 371, 371 (1889); Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Graham Land & Improvement Co., 10 
Va. L. Reg. 983, 984 (Cir. Ct. 1904). See generally REsTATEMENT (SECOND} OF TORTS§ 850A 
comment c (1977) (explaining effect of preference under natural flow and reasonable use theories). 
Statutory planning and policy provisions enacted in many states generally reaffirm the common law 
preference for domestic uses, especially human consumptive uses. See, e.g., IND. CoDE ANN.§ 13-2-
1-3(1) (Burns 1981) ("use of water for domestic purposes shall have priority and be superior to any 
and all other uses"); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 151.140 (Bobbs-Merril11980) ("nothing herein shall 
interfere with the use of water for agricultural and domestic purposes"); VA. CoDE§ 62.1-44.36(2) 
(1982) ("preference shall be given to human consumption purposes over all other uses"). In many of 
these states, though, the preferences only affect the rights of permittees and do not bind courts 
applying riparian principles to exempted users. See, e.g., MD. NAT. REs. CoDE ANN. § 8-802(b) 
(1983). 
85. See, e.g., Pernell v. City of Henderson, 220 N.C. 79, 16 S.E.2d 449, 451 (1941) (concluding 
that supplying "the inhabitants of a municipality with water for domestic purposes is not a riparian 
right" and that municipality therefore could not divert for domestic uses). But see City of Canton v. 
Shock, 66 Ohio St. 19, 63 N.E. 600, 603 (1902) (concluding that "if the upper proprietors have 
grown so large or become so numerous as to consume most or all of the water, the lower proprietors 
have no cause of complaint, because it is only what they should have reasonably expected in the 
growth and development of the country"). 
86. Further evidence of the judiciary's narrow perspective is provided by the cases addressing 
the lawfulness of diversions by local governments, which will be discussed later. See infra notes 173-
83 and accompanying text. See generally Ziegler, Acquisition and Protection of Water Supplies by 
Municipalities, 51 MicH. L. REv. 349 (1959). 
87. See, e.g., Evans v. Merriweather, 4 ill. (3 Scam.) 492, 495 (1842). See generally REsTATE· 
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 850A comment c (1977); 7 R. CLARK, supra note 1, § 614.2, at 77 
(1976). 
88. Evans v. Merriweather, 4 ill. (3 Scam.) 492, 495 (1842). Today courts generally refer to 
these uses as domestic uses. See, e.g., Cowell v. Armstrong, 210 Cal. App. 218, 290 P. 1036, 1038 
(1930). 
128 UNIVERSITY OF PITISBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:95 
and industrial riparians. 89 Because municipalities are corporate bod-
ies, the courts traditionally have reasoned that they cannot have any 
natural wants and that they therefore should not be entitled to the 
preference given to natural users. 90 
The courts' traditional approach to evaluating the reasonableness 
of public uses is archaic. Although the courts' narrow perspective 
may have been responsive to the needs ofriparians in the 1800's when 
many of them were private individuals, it does not accurately reflect 
modem water use patterns. The courts' approach to public domestic 
uses, for instance, ignores the fact that today local governments con-
duct most significant domestic uses.91 Despite this change in roles, 
many courts continue to evaluate the reasonableness of these uses 
from their traditionally narrow perspective. To modernize their ap-
proach to the reasonable use standard, the courts either should rede-
fine the standard to protect public, as well as private, domestic users 
or should distinguish between the two types of users and develop sep-
arate standards and priorities for each. 92 Because of important differ-
89. Evans v. Merriweather, 4 ill. (3 Scam.) 492, 495 (1842). 
90. See, e.g., Stein v. Burden, 24 Ala. 130, 146 (1854). See also 7 R. CLARK, supra note 1, 
§ 614.2, at 80-81 (1976) (discussing the traditional belief that corporations do not have "natural" 
bodies and therefore cannot have natural wants). Many courts use a similar type of reasoning to 
evaluate the reasonableness of business uses. As corporate entities, business users are not conducting 
uses that are needed to sustain life and therefore are not entitled to a preference for their uses. See, 
e.g., Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co., 164 N.Y. 303, 58 N.E. 142, 147-48 (1900); Weiss v. Oregon Iron & 
Steel, 13 Or. 496, 11 P. 255, 257 (1886) (rejecting argument that use should be found reasonable 
because business was a "laudable enterprise"). Some courts also point out that any approach giving 
a private business use a preference because of its importance to the public or to the economy would 
constitute a taking for public use without just compensation of the rights of other private riparians 
injured by the use. Drake v. Lady Ensley Coal, Iron & R.R. Co., 102 Ala. 501, 14 So. 749, 751 
(1894); Arminius Chemical Co. v. Landrum, 113 Va. 7, 73 S.E. 459, 463 (1912); Day v. Louisville 
Coal & Coke Co., 60 W. Va. 27, 53 S.E. 776, 777 (1906). The few courts that take a more liberal 
approach to defining what constitutes a reasonable business or industrial use usually emphasize the 
productiveness of the use or its importance to the public in upholding the use as reasonable. Pugh v. 
Wheeler, 19 N.C. 50, 54 (1836); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, 6 A. 453,456-57 
(1886). 
Whatever the reason for denying a preference to business users, the consequence in most tradi-
tional riparian jurisdictions is that business users must exercise their rights so as not to destroy or 
materially diminish the flow for lower riparians and cannot, under any circumstances, consume all 
the water in a stream to the exclusion oflower riparians. See Evans v. Merriweather, 4 ill. (3 Scam.) 
492,495-96 (1842); see also 2 J. MINOR, INSTITUTES OF COMMON AND STATIJTB LAW 28 (4th ed. 
1892). 
91. According to an assessment done by the U.S. Water Resources Council, public water sup-
ply systems met the needs of 179 million people in 1975 (83% of the population), while the other 37 
million either used their own domestic systems or did not have a piped water supply system. See 1 
U.S. WATER REsoURCES CoUNCIL, THE NATION'S WATER RESOURCES: 1975-2000, at 32 (1978). 
92. Furthermore, although the common law preference for domestic uses over business uses 
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ences between the two, the second alternative is preferable. 93 
Regardless of the specific action taken to modernize the reason-
able use requirement, it is clear that a court willing to broaden its 
perspective of the reasonable use requirement, once again, should rec-
ognize the need to adopt limitations to protect the private interests at 
stake. For instance, although a change in perspective is needed to 
protect public domestic uses, local governments admittedly conduct 
domestic uses on a much larger scale than individual riparians. Be-
cause of this fact, it is highly likely that a substantial change in per-
spective would cause serious infringement of private interests. The 
severity and unreasonableness of the infringement would depend, to 
an extent, on the particular situation. Where public users are con-
ducting domestic uses for the benefit of numerous private riparians, 
the infringement may not be as serious as it would first appear. Be-
cause the locality is supplying riparian inhabitants, the public uses 
should not duplicate significantly the uses conducted by private ripar-
ians. At least in these situations, it would seem inaccurate to evaluate 
the reasonableness of the locality's domestic uses from the perspective 
of a single private riparian. That standard of comparison fails to rec-
ognize the change in water use patterns. Rather, what the courts 
should be comparing is the domestic use of the locality with the do-
mestic use of the appropriate number of private riparians who would 
have had to conduct the use if the locality had not done so. 
The problem of infringement is more difficult to resolve where a 
locality or private business is a nonriparian attempting to purchase 
use rights from a riparian proprietor or where the locality or private 
business is a riparian planning to exercise its riparian rights for the 
still seems justifiable, the courts need to develop a more meaningful standard for evaluating business 
uses. One possible standard, already used in a few jurisdictions, is to evaluate the reasonableness of a 
business use by comparing it to other "like" uses. As one court using this approach explained, "the 
use by any particular person must be the same as the neighboring proprietor in like circumstances.'' 
Dunlap v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 212 N.C. 814, 195 S.E. 43, 45 (1938). As the court further 
elaborated, "[t]he use of one farmer shall be judged by the use of another farmer, one manufacturer 
by the customs and use of another manufacturer." Id. Adoption of a "like use" standard for private 
uses would allow courts to develop more consistent standards of comparison and to protect profita-
ble business uses without having to rely on their economic importance to the public. Even under a 
like use standard, though, some comparison of different uses would be necessary, and if the compet-
ing use is domestic the business use generally should be subordinate to the domestic use. See infra 
notes 95-112 and accompanying text for further discussion of priorities of use. Whether riparian 
rights are transferable becomes an important issue when a riparian wants to pursue a productive 
business use without worrying about diminishing the flow. For a discussion of this issue see infra 
Part II.C. 
93. For further discussion of these differences see infra Part III.A. 
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benefit of nonriparian land. What is clear is that a populous locality 
or large business should not be able to purchase use rights for a small 
tract of riparian land and then exercise those rights for the benefit of 
all its inhabitants or corporate property. Permitting such a redistribu-
tion of resources in a riparian jurisdiction would raise serious fairness 
concerns. Any further treatment of the issue must wait until the con-
cepts of transferability and diversion have been discussed.94 
2. Clarifying Quantitative Rights 
Besides limiting the consumptive rights of public domestic and 
private business users, the reasonable use requirement also hinders 
long-range planning efforts. Because the reasonableness of a use var-
ies according to surrounding facts and circumstances, users generally 
cannot predict whether a use will be protected in the future. Changed 
conditions may cause a once permissible use to become unreasonable. 
Furthermore, under common law principles, a riparian who has been 
exercising a riparian right for a long time does not obtain any priority 
over rights subsequently exercised. Riparian rights in undeveloped 
riparian lands are not extinguished by nonuse and, once exercised, 
generally are entitled to the same legal protection as established 
uses.95 
While the supply of water remains abundant, the flexibility of the 
reasonable use limitation should not pose serious problems for ripari-
ans. Because most users would have sufficient water, few conflicts 
would arise. Aware of the abundance of water, users would be more 
willing to accept the risk of proceeding with a use even though its 
continued permissibility might be difficult to predict. As water be-
comes less plentiful, though, the flexibility of the reasonable use limi-
94. See infra Parts II.C. and III.A. 
95. Leonard v. St. John, 101 Va. 752, 45 S.E. 474, 477 (1903). But see REsTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 850A(h) (1977) (listing priority of use as one factor to consider in determining 
reasonableness of use). In the few cases where a limited supply has made it impossible for an old and 
a new user to co-exist, most courts have protected the prior user. See, e.g., Rowland v. Ramelli, 25 
Cal. 3d 339, 158 Cal. Rptr. 350, 362, 599 P .2d 656, 668-69 (1979) (when there is an interest in 
promoting clarity and certainty of rights, unexercised rights may lose their priority); Harp v. Iowa 
Falls Elec. Co., 1961owa 317, 191 N.W. 520, 525 (1923) (power company enjoined from interfering 
with use of prior riparian user). 
In contrast to the riparian doctrine, the prior appropriation doctrine uses an "all or nothing" 
approach to dispute resolution. Junior appropriators know that their rights always will be sub-
servient to those of a senior appropriator, regardless of the circumstances. 1 S. WIEL, supra note 13, 
§ 1014. Although this approach is clearer, it is not always more efficient. See infra note 96. 
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tation could produce serious inefficiencies. 96 The more uncertain a 
water allocation system is, the more it discourages reliance on prop-
erty rights and investment in productive activities. Also, because of 
the system's flexibility, riparian users often would have to resort to 
the courts to clarify their rights. 97 
Some flexibility admittedly is needed and desired.98 Physical 
conditions affecting use of watercourses can vary at any time, often 
without sufficient warning to permit planning. Flexibility at least is 
needed to allow the legal rules to respond to changes in physical con-
ditions. Indeed, a rule defining and taking into account such changes 
probably would be unworkable, if not impossible to formulate. The 
flexibility of the reasonable use requirement thus permits the courts to 
respond to factual variations in a manner that they consider fair.99 
Nevertheless, several steps should be taken by the courts to clar-
ify the quantitative rights of riparians. Perhaps the most significant 
96. According to one commentator, the flexibility of the riparian doctrine forces "[i]nvestors in 
multimillion dollar enterprises and international agencies underwriting large projects now [to] seek 
from the law the security once supplied by a seemingly inexhaustible stock of water.'' Trelease, 
supra note 10, at 386; accord REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 850A comment k (1977). This 
approach to defining rights and resolving conflicts, however, has some advantages. By reviewing 
uses as cases arise, the courts are not forced to define rights based on circumstances existing years 
ago, but rather can respond to changed circumstances. Also, the courts can protect new uses that 
are reasonable and efficient. In contrast, the prior appropriation doctrine requires courts to fix rights 
in time, regardless of changed circumstances. Senior appropriators have little incentive to develop 
more efficient uses because they rarely are threatened by a denial of water. Furthermore, because 
nonuse eventually may lead to forfeiture of their rights, see 1 S. WIEL, supra note 13, at 609, senior 
appropriators will continue to use the same amount of water they always have used even if they do 
not need that amount. Thus, although the prior appropriation doctrine instills security among se-
nior users, it can lead to inefficient results in the long run. See generally Trelease, Alternatives to 
Appropriation Law, 6 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POLICY 282 (1976). 
97. As one commentator explained, "where riparian owners share in the use of water based on 
the relative social value of their particular use, allocations are made on a case-by-case, ad hoc basis 
which ignores the need for certainty, an essential prerequisite for major capital investment.'' White, 
Legal Restraints and Responses to the Allocation and Distribution of Water, 6 DEN. J. INT'L L. & 
POLICY 341, 350 (1976). 
Because the reasonable use standard requires established uses to adjust to often unpredictable 
changes in circumstances, many commentators, legislators, and public interest groups have advo-
cated adoption of a more certain system for defining use rights and resolving conflicts. See supra 
notes 9-12 and accompanying text. 
98. See supra note 96. 
99. Such flexibility exists in other areas of property law as well. Under the law of easements, 
for example, the owner of the dominant estate is permitted to increase his use of the servient estate so 
long as the increase is "reasonable.'' Zubli v. Community Mainstreaming Associates, 423 N.Y.S.2d 
982, 102 Misc. 2d 320, 330 (1979); Waskey v. Lewis, 224 Va. 206, 294 S.E.2d 879, 881 (1982); 
Rippetoe v. O'Dell, 276 S.E.2d 793, 796 (W.Va. 1981). Whether an increase is reasonable depends 
on whether a development of the dominant tenement could reasonably be expected. See generally 2 
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY§ 8.66 (A. Casner ed. 1952). 
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step that could be taken would be to clarify the system of priorities or 
preferences used in evaluating the reasonableness of conflicting uses. 
As explained earlier, the outdated assumptions and general prefer-
ences of that system no longer provide an adequate basis for resolving 
conflicts between users. A clearer, more specific set of priorities 
would contribute to a more effective water allocation system by reduc-
ing the number of variables that a user would have to consider in 
weighing his options. Under a clearer system, users facing a water 
shortage would be better able to predict where they stood in relation 
to other users and thus could take appropriate action.100 
To improve the common law's priority system, the courts must 
clearly identify the factors that are important to resolving conflicts 
among users. To encourage and protect productive uses, these factors 
should include the duration of a use, its priority in time, and the 
amount of a user's investment.101 Courts in riparian jurisdictions 
100. In contrast, most water shortage provisions presently applicable in riparian and permit 
jurisdictions fail to provide a clear set of priorities and usually only apply when governing bodies 
determine that an emergency exists. See, e.g., VA. CoDE§ 15.1-37.3:4 (1981). Furthermore, the 
provisions define water shortage in vague terms, typically providing that a shortage exists when it is 
necessary to protect the public health or safety or to protect the public interest in lands or waters. 
See, e.g., GA. CoDE ANN. § 12-5-31(1) (1985). For a commentator's definition of water shortage see 
Trelease, supra note 10, at 408.09. Users frequently are not given any indication of how their needs 
may be curtailed. Only general legislative guidelines exist for determining priorities of users during a 
water shortage. See, e.g., VA. CoDE § 62.1-44.36(2) (1982). 
In developing a clearer, more detailed priority system, though, a court should avoid adopting a 
rigid, inflexible list of priorities. As Professor Trelease admonished, these types of lists "too often 
reflect the economic and social thought of the moment • . . and are soon outmoded by time and 
change." Trelease, supra note 10, at 400. Furthermore, they "prevent the intelligent weighing of 
alternative and relative values." Id. 
101. To minimize the degree to which clarifications made in the priority system would infringe 
on private interests, the courts might want to develop a more detailed priority system that would 
apply to private users only when the water in a watercourse falls below a predetermined level. As 
long as the water supply of the watercourse remained above the specified minimum level, normal 
riparian principles could apply. Under this suggested approach, the courts would be able to retain, 
in modified form, the main advantage of the reasonable use requirement: its ability to respond to 
variations in physical conditions. Now, however, the flexibility of that requirement would be limited 
to situations where it would not seriously handicap parties attempting to respond to water shortages. 
The significance of this suggestion depends in part on the standing requirements adopted by a 
court under the riparian doctrine. If a court requires a riparian to establish actual harm before 
recovering for an unlawful use, then the suggestion is not that significant. When water is plentiful, 
most riparians should not be injured. If, however, the court permits a riparian to establish potential 
injury to recover, then the suggestion could have important ramifications. Even though sufficient 
water may exist to meet present needs, a riparian still may be able to establish injury to future uses. 
For further discussion of the actual injury requirement see infra note 198. 
Although the courts could implement the suggestion fairly easily by using the minimum flow 
level of a stream as one factor affecting the reasonableness of a use and as triggering the use of the 
more specific priorities, the legislative branch probably could develop this alternative more effec-
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presently are reluctant to consider these factors. They need to recog-
nize that giving the factors some weight encourages the user to rely on 
his property rights and thus, increases his incentive to develop his 
property interests. Protection of reliance interests is especially impor-
tant to public users, who generally expend a significant amount of 
capital to operate a public water supply system. A priority rule, how-
ever, should not be based solely on length of-use or :first..;in-time status, 
for these factors tend to ratify the status quo and produce inefficient 
results. Prior users would not have any incentive to change or im-
prove their uses because they generally would be protected over new 
uses, even if the new uses were more efficient.102 Furthermore, 
although a rule based on the amount of investment might encourage a 
user to increase his investment to maintain his priority, it would not 
encourage him to consider whether the new investment would lead to 
a more efficient use. 
If riparian rights are freely transferable, then the efficiency 
problems caused by a rule based on duration of use, first-in-time sta-
tus, or the amount of an investment could be partially resolved 
through the marketplace. A party who believed he could make a 
more productive use of riparian rights could purchase them from the 
present user. This solution, however, would not help that party after 
he purchased the riparian rights of a less efficient user, at least not 
where he was subject to a first-in-time or duration of use rule. Even 
though his use may be the most productive in the area, it still would 
be subsequent in time to and, under a first-in-time or duration rule, 
therefore subordinate to many neighboring uses. Furthermore, the 
ability of a jurisdiction to encourage more efficient uses depends on 
the transferability of use rights, a characteristic not fully recognized 
in all riparian jurisdictions.to3 
Because of these problems, a riparian jurisdiction should not give 
first-in-time status or duration of use controlling, or even substantial, 
weight, but rather should consider them as part of a list of factors 
tively. Unlike the courts, it would not have to wait for a controversy to arise before it could define 
scarcity in a particular watercourse or set priorities. Most comprehensive reforms require minimum 
flows to be set by the appropriate regulatory body and set forth priorities in case of shortage. See, 
e.g., F. MALONEY, R. AUSNESS, & J. MORRIS, MODEL WATER CoDE§§ 1.07(4), 2.09 (1972). 
102. See supra note 13. Since riparian jurisdictions tend to be water-rich, the impact of this 
built·in inefficiency would not be as severe as in the arid West. Most users in riparian jurisdictions 
normally would be able to get sufficient water, so conflicts between prior and subsequent users would 
not arise as often. 
103. For a discussion of this issue see infra Part II. C. 
134 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:95 
affecting priority .104 Only when accompanied by other significant fac-
tors, like the domestic nature of a use, should those factors favorably 
affect the priority status of the user. 105 Although the amount of in-
vestment also should not be controlling, courts concerned about the 
high costs of developing public water supplies might want to give a 
preference to public users because of their high capital outlays. Given 
the judicial preference for domestic uses, these objectives also could 
be accomplished by recognizing that most public uses sustain the nat-
ural wants of a locality's inhabitants and therefore, are domestic uses. 
Besides recognizing the above factors, the courts also should con-
sider the water distribution patterns and needs of a particular area. 
Because most states have an uneven distribution of water resources 
and population, the priority rules should vary somewhat according to 
the hydrologic and demographic facts of particular regions.106 Such 
regional variation would allow courts to respond to differences in 
needs and types of uses without having to choose between a system 
favoring developed urban areas and one favoring rural, sparsely popu-
lated areas.107 
At the very least, though, riparian law should protect the prior 
user indirectly through its burden of proof, much as the United States 
Supreme Court did in a 1982 decision involving allocation of con-
sumptive rights among states. In Colorado v. New Mexico, 108 the 
104. According to the REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, only a few courts in riparian juris-
dictions have specifically mentioned priority in time as a factor affecting the reasonableness of a use. 
But when a situation arises where a new use threatens a prior use, the courts tend to protect the prior 
use. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 850A comment k (1977). Because of this tendency, the 
Restatement concludes that priority in time is "an important factor'' in determining the reasonable-
ness of a use. I d. 
105. Alternatively, a court could develop a preference for being first in time that would apply 
only to a defined category of uses, like those benefitting the public health and welfare or requiring 
high capital outlay. 
106. For example, although Virginia possesses an abundance of water, it is unevenly distrib-
uted throughout the state. Areas of the state experiencing the greatest growth in population and 
economic development physically lack sufficient water resources to meet the increased demand. 
Tidewater Virginia, for instance, has 60% of the state's population, but only 29% of the state's land. 
C. Cox, VIRGINIA'S MOST IMPORTANT WATER-RELATED PROBLEMS 8 (Virginia Water Resources 
Research Center, Special Report No. 13, Aug. 1981). See generally W. Cox, L. SHABMAN, S. BA-
TIE, & J. LooNEY, supra note 12 (discussing Virginia's current water supply problems). 
107. Most comprehensive reforms proposed in eastern states reject a regional approach to reg-
ulating water use rights and instead use a centralized administrative system. See, e.g., The Virginia 
Water Law, H.B. 1420, 1981 Va. Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. 
108. 459 U.S. 176 (1982), dismissed on reh'g, 104 S. Ct. 2433 (1984). In Colorado v. New 
Mexico, Colorado sought an equitable apportionment of the Vermejo River, which begins in Colo-
rado and flows into New Mexico. Before the request only farm and industrial users in New Mexico 
had been using the river's waters. A Special Master, appointed by the Supreme Court, initially 
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Court required a state seeking an apportionment of interstate waters 
to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the benefits of its 
proposed use of the waters substantially outweighed the harm that 
might result.109 Recognizing that this burden was higher than the 
preponderance standard ordinarily used in a civil case, the Court ex-
plained that the higher burden reflected its view that the party pro-
posing a use should bear the risks of an erroneous decision. In the 
words of the Court, "[t]he harm that may result from disrupting es-
tablished uses is typically certain and immediate, whereas the poten-
tial benefits from a proposed diversion may be speculative and 
remote. " 11° Further, as the Court explained on remand, the clear and 
convincing standard "accommodates society's competing interests in 
recommended that Colorado be permitted to divert a specified quantity of water. After considering 
New Mexico's exceptions to the Master's findings, the Supreme Court concluded, in its first decision 
in the controversy, that the Master did not properly consider all relevant factors and that additional 
findings needed to be made to reach an equitable apportionment of the river's waters. 459 U.S. at 
189-90. On remand the Master made some additional findings, but reaffirmed his original recom· 
mendation. In considering New Mexico's second set of exceptions, the Court held that Colorado did 
not establish by clear and convincing evidence that its proposed diversion should be allowed. Colo-
rado v. New Mexico, 104 S. Ct. 2433 (1984). 
One of the issues considered by the Court concerned the significance of the fact that approxi-
mately three-fourths of the river's flow originated in Colorado. In rejecting the argument that this 
fact automatically entitled Colorado to a portion of the river's waters, the Court explained that 
rights under the prior appropriation doctrine are based on appropriation and actual use, and not on 
land ownership as under the riparian doctrine. 459 U.S. at 179 n.4. In a prior appropriation state, 
then, equitable apportionment of water rights should depend on the benefits and harms of competing 
uses, or, in the words of the Court, on "whether the benefits to the state seeking the diversion 
substantially outweigh the harm to existing uses in another state." /d. at 190. This conclusion 
provides a strong disincentive to riparian jurisdictions thinking of switching to prior appropriation 
principles. By doing so, they may be jeopardizing their chance for equitable apportionment of inter· 
state waters. In distinguishing between the prior appropriation and riparian doctrines, the Court 
suggests that the fact that a portion of a river lies in one state could be significant in apportioning 
waters among riparian jurisdictions. /d. at 190. 
The doctrine of equitable apportionment was first applied by the Supreme Court in a contro· 
versy over the Arkansas River. See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1906). In that dispute the 
Court announced that it 
must consider the effect of what has been done upon the conditions in the respective states 
and so adjust the dispute upon the basis of equality of rights as to secure as far as possible 
to Colorado the benefits of irrigation without depriving Kansas of the like beneficial effects 
of a flowing stream. 
/d. at 100. This weighing of the potential benefits and harms has continued through the recent 
dispute over the Vermejo River. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176 (1982), dismissed on reh'g, 
104 S. Ct. 2433 (1984). For a discussion of the doctrine of equitable apportionment see Trelease, 
Arizona v. California: Allocation of Water Resources to People, States, and Nation, 1963 SUP. CT. 
REv. 158, 169-72 (1963). 
109. 459 U.S. at 187-88. 
110. /d. at 187. 
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increasing the stability of property rights and in putting resources to 
their most efficient uses."11 • 
Similar reasoning could be used to allocate the burden of proof 
among users of intrastate waters. As with new uses of interstate wa-
ters, a party pursuing a new use of waters within one state should bear 
the burden of establishing the reasonableness of its use. Because the 
benefits of established uses are known, while the benefits of the pro-
posed use are speculative, a new user should not be able to upset es-
tablished users without clearly demonstrating the reasonableness of 
the proposed use. 112 
111. Colorado v. New Mexico, 104 S. Ct. 2433, 2438 (1984). 
112. Establishing an unlawful diversion does not entitle a complaining riparian to relief, for 
other requirements exist as well. See Town of Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va 542, 106 S.E. 508, 515 
(1921). To be entitled to relief for unlawful diversion, a plaintiff must establish, by a preponderance 
of evidence, that defendant's actions prevented the watercourse from flowing in a natural course 
upon plaintiff's land, Heninger v. McGinnis, 131 Va 70, 108 S.E. 671, 676 (1921), and that plaintiff 
suffered injury because of defendant's conduct, see infra note 198. 
The type of cause of action brought when a riparian is unlawfully diverting a watercourse de-
pends to an extent on the context in which the issue arises. Compare Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. 
Graham Land & Improvement Co., 10 Va L. Reg. 983 (Cir. Ct. 1904) (issue arose as part of con-
demnation proceedings brought by a railroad pursuant to its statutory authority) with Latta v. Ca-
tawba Elec. Co., 146 N.C. 285, 59 S.E. 1028 (1907) (suit brought to construe a deed and determine 
who had riparian rights). Normally, the appropriate cause of action would be a private nuisance. 
See, e.g., Cook v. Town of Mebane, 191 N.C. 1, 131 S.E. 407 (1926); see also 2 H. FARNHAM, supra 
note 13, § 474, at 1606-07 (suggesting that a bill to quiet enjoyment of a watercourse may be filed) 
and § 505, at 1662 (stating that in some jurisdictions the proper cause of action would be trespass on 
the case}. 
As defined by one jurisdiction, a nuisance involves interference "with some right incident to the 
ownership or possession of real property" and may be established by substantial impairment of the 
owner's "comfort, convenience and enjoyment of the property, causing a material disturbance or 
annoyance in use of the realty." National Energy Corp. v. O'Quinn, 223 Va 83, 286 S.E.2d 181, 182 
(1982); see also REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1977) (private nuisance "is a non-
trespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land"). Because a 
nuisance action involves injury to property rights, a plaintiff bringing a diversion suit must have 
riparian rights that are being injured by the diversion to maintain the action. In a riparian jurisdic-
tion this generally means that the plaintiff must own riparian land downstream from the point of 
diversion. Jurisdiction over watercourses, especially nonnavigable ones, does not provide a locality 
with a sufficient basis for bringing a nuisance suit for unlawful diversion. Although jurisdiction may 
give the locality the power to regulate the watercourse and resolve disputes concerning it, jurisdic-
tion does not give the locality riparian rights in the watercourse. 
Determining when a cause of action accrues is not an easy task. The running of the statute of 
limitations for unlawful diversion depends on how a jurisdiction defines injury. For a discussion of 
the injury requirement see infra note 198. The running of the statute also may be affected by 
whether the diversion constitutes a continuing nuisance. According to one jurisdiction, a nuisance is 
permanent and not continuous "when the original act • . . is at once productive of all the damage 
which can ever result from it, and at once destroys the estate for all practical purposes." Norfolk & 
W. Ry. Co. v. Allen, 118 Va 428, 87 S.E. 558, 560 (1915). If defendant's diversion activities consti-
tute a continuing nuisance, an aggrieved riparian can bring a cause of action for injury even though 
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If such an approach to the burden of proof is adopted, it will 
increase the stability of prior users. It will not, however, guarantee 
that water resources are shifted to more efficient uses. Whether that 
occurs depends primarily on the degree to which riparian rights are 
transferable. The issue of transferability will be discussed now. 
C. The Severability Rule: Defining a Redistribution Principle for 
Consumptive Rights 
As with other areas of property law, an effective water allocation 
system must permit transferability of water rights. Without the 
power to transfer, the holder of a water right would not be able to sell 
out to a more efficient user. 113 Allowing unrestrained transfers of ri-
parian rights to any party and for the benefit of land located any-
where, though, would create some serious problems.114 Unlike the 
allocation of interests in other types of resources, the allocation of 
consumptive rights in water resources raises certain interests and pol-
icy concerns that either cannot be adequately protected in the market-
place or are better resolved by the judicial or legislative branches of 
the govemment.11s 
The dependency of the public health and welfare on water re-
more than the time prescribed in the statute of limitations may have passed since the wrongful 
conduct originally occurred. 
Defenses typically raised in suits for unlawful diversion include laches, see Town of Purcellville 
v. Potts, 179 Va. 514, 19 S.E.2d 700 (1942), acquiescence, see Risien v. Brown, 73 Tex. 135, 10 S.W. 
661 (1889), and acquisition of the right to divert by prescription, see infra notes 206-07 and accom-
panying text. For a discussion of situations where diversions may be permitted as exceptions to the 
normal rules see infra Part III.B. 
113. As Richard Posner explains, "[i]n order to facilitate the reallocation of resources from 
less to more valuable uses, property rights should, in principle, be freely transferable." R. POSNER, 
EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW§ 3.11, at 56 (2d ed. 1977). Where resources are freely transferable, 
"we can be reasonably confident that the shift involves a net increase in efficiency. The transaction 
would not have occurred if both parties had not expected it to make them better off." Id. § 1.2, at 
11; see also C. MEYERS & R. POSNER, supra note 30, at 15-17. 
114. Some of the problems can be attributed to the fact that riparian rights, as presently de-
fined, do not include the value of the return flow generated by a particular use. Because of this 
omission, not all transfers of riparian rights would lead to a more efficient outcome. See infra notes 
157-60 and accompanying text. 
115. Professor Trelease described the need for regulation of marketplace transfers of water 
rights in slightly different terms. According to Trelease, "the market cannot be relied upon to al-
ways produce optimum results" in part because of "the physical properties of water, its transient 
nature, and the interdependence of its use in common by a number of users" and in part because of 
"acknowledged imperfections in the market for water and water rights." Trelease, Policies for Water 
Law: Property Rights, Economic Forces, and Public Regulation, 5 NAT. REsoURCES J. 1, 39 (1965) 
(footnotes omitted). When the market cannot be relied on, Trelease advocates public intervention 
and regulation. For further discussion of situations where be perceives a need for regulation of the 
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sources, for instance, requires adoption of transferability rules that 
facilitate and protect uses by local governments, sometimes to the det-
riment of productive private users. If unrestrained transfers of ripa-
rian rights were permitted, the marketplace would not adequately 
accommodate the public's consumptive needs. In contrast with pri-
vate riparians, political factors affect the ability of public users to ac-
quire use rights. Limitations on a local government's ability to raise 
revenues, for instance, impose external restraints on its financial re-
sources.116 Also, the condemnation and purchasing powers of locali-
ties may vary, depending on size and other factors. 117 Thus, whereas 
a highly developed urban locality may have sufficient financial re-
sources and political powers to acquire use rights, an undeveloped 
rural locality may lack the necessary resources or powers. Because 
the marketplace does not adequately consider these political re-
straints, and because redistribution raises difficult policy choices, judi-
cial or legislative intervention is needed to protect the public interest. 
Restraints on transferability would help to ensure that one policy or 
interest group is not favored to the detriment of other important con-
cerns and thus that an equitable distribution is achieved.118 
To date, most courts addressing the question of transferability of 
riparian rights have considered it primarily in the context of noncon-
sumptive uses, such as constructing a pier or filling in lowland. The 
majority agrees that riparian rights may be severed from riparian land 
and separately conveyed.119 Although the language used by some of 
market see id. at 38-42. Also, for a discussion of some of the policy concerns better resolved by the 
legislature or judiciary see infra notes 163, 185. 
116. In Virginia, for example, the power to raise revenues is limited to taxation. VA. CoDE 
§ 15.1-841 (1981). 
117. Compare, e.g., VA. CoDE§ 15.1-335 (1981) (allowing cities and counties of a certain size 
to acquire waterworks systems) with id. §§ 15.1-504 to -581 (1981 & Supp. 1985) (describing general 
powers and duties of counties) and id. §§ 15.1-837 to -915.1 (1981 & Supp. 1985) (describing general 
powers of cities and towns)and id. §§ 15.1-916 to -945 (1981) (describing other forms of government 
for municipalities of less than 50,000). For a discussion of other political factors affecting manage-
ment and use of water resources see Butler, supra note 12, at 782-85. Although it may be more 
efficient to allow the locality with the lower transaction costs to acquire what water rights it can, 
such an approach would not necessarily lead to an equitable distribution of water rights among 
political subdivisions. 
118. But cf. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TOR'IS § 856 comment b (1977) (generally arguing 
that riparian rights should be freely transferable). 
119. Mianus Realty v. Greenway, 151 Conn. 128, 193 A.2d 713, 715 (1963); Harbor Island v. 
Bd. of County Comm'rs, 286 Md. 303, 407 A.2d 738, 746-47 (1979). See generally 1 R. CLARK, 
supra note 1, § 53.4; 3 H. FARNHAM, supra note 13, §§ 724, 725; 1A G. THoMPSON, supra note 74, 
§ 262 (1980). The courts, however, do not agree on what, if any, limitations should be imposed on 
the severability principle. Compare, e.g., Roberts v. Martin, 72 W. Va. 92, 77 S.E. 535, 537 (1913) 
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the courts in announcing this "severability rule" suggests that they 
would take a similar approach to consumptive rights, 120 their analysis 
provides an inadequate basis for extending the severability principle to 
consumptive rights. In considering whether nonconsumptive rights 
should be severable and transferable, the courts almost uniformly fo-
cus on the nature of riparian rights to determine whether a transfer 
would be consistent with the type of property right involved. While 
this approach may be adequate for nonconsumptive uses, it precludes, 
or at least discourages, consideration of policy concerns important to 
the consumptive use situation. The following examination of one 
court's treatment of the transferability issue in the context of a non-
consumptive use illustrates the court's theoretical perspective and in-
troduces some of the problems that the approach causes for 
consumptive interests.121 
1. The Severability Rule and Nonconsumptive Interests 
In Thurston v. City of Portsmouth, the Virginia Supreme Court 
unequivocally declared that "riparian rights may be severed from the 
land to which they were once appurtenant'' and separately con-
veyed.122 The case involved a dispute between the owner of a parcel 
(riparian rights may not be severed for use beyond the riparian land to which they are incident) with 
Pyle v. Gilbert, 245 Ga. 403, 265 S.E.2d 584, 589 (1980) (right to make reasonable use of water on 
nonriparian land could be acquired by grant from riparian owner). 
120. See, e.g., Harbor Island Marina v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 286 Md. 303, 407 A.2d 738, 
746-47 (1979); Thurston v. City of Portsmouth, 205 Va. 909, 140 S.E.2d 678, 680-81 (1965). 
121. Because the public user raises different policy concerns than the private user, the discus-
sion in Part II.C. will focus primarily on the private user. 
122. 205 Va. 909, 140 S.E.2d 678, 680 (1965). The court in Thurston also clarified that the 
principle of severability applied regardless of whether the watercourse was tidal or non tidal. Thur-
ston, 140 S.E.2d at 681. 
A 1973 decision by the Virginia Supreme Court suggests that the severability principle an-
nounced in Thurston is not absolute. That decision, Marine Resources Comm'n v. Forbes, 214 Va. 
109, 197 S.E.2d 195 (1973), involved a dispute between the state and several parties, who, the state 
argued, were filling in state-owned subaqueous beds without authorization or a superior claim of 
right. In response, those parties argued that section 62.1-3 of the Virginia Code, VA. CoDE § 62.1-3 
(1968) (present version at VA. CoDE § 62.1-3 (1982)), created a right to fill subaqueous beds in 
"riparian owners" and that this right had been severed by the owner of the highland, as permitted by 
Virginia law, and transferred to them. In rejecting the parties' arguments, the court observed that 
"Virginia law recognized two types of riparian owners," those with rights appurtenant to the high-
land and those with rights severed from the highland. Marine Resources, 197 S.E.2d at 199. In the 
instant situation, the relevant law, VA. CoDE§ 62.1-3 (1968), "conferred the new right to fill only 
upon the owner of highland with riparian rights appurtenant thereto" and thus did not permit sever-
ance of the statutory right. Marine Resources, 197 S.E.2d at 199. As the court explained, this con-
clusion followed from statutory language authorizing "the doing of such acts as are necessary for 
.•• fills by riparian owners opposite their property .... " VA. CoDE§ 62.1-3 (1968), quoted and 
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of riverfront property and a city which claimed ownership of all the 
riparian rights once appurtenant to that parcel. The deed conveyed to 
the landowner's predecessor-in-title had "expressly reserve[ d) and ex-
cept[ ed] from this conveyance all the riparian rights appurtaining or 
in anywise belonging to the said property."123 After the city acquired 
these reserved rights, it began to fill in along the shore for the purpose 
of constructing a highway. Suing to enjoin the fill-in operation, plain-
tiff argued that the riparian rights were easements appurtenant to the 
riverfront land that only could be enjoyed by the owner of that land 
and that therefore could not be severed from the dominant estate.124 
In rejecting plaintiff's argument, the court observed that prior 
law had recognized that a riparian right is not just " 'a mere easement 
to pass over the water or a privilege to use the surface, but [is] prop-
construed in Marine Resources, 197 S.E.2d at 198. If the legislature had intended to confer the right 
to fill upon all riparian owners, then, the court reasoned, it would not have used the phrase "opposite 
their property." 
Because Marine Resources involved a statutorily created riparian right which was defined in a 
manner indicating that severance was not permissible, the decision arguably should have limited 
precedential effect on Thurston. Even assuming that this is the correct interpretation of Marine 
Resources, that decision, nevertheless, indicates that under certain circumstances riparian rights are 
not severable, but rather must be held by the owner of the highland. The court in Marine Resources, 
however, does not define what those circumstances or rights are, beyond stating that the statutory 
right under review is one example. 
One commentator has concluded that Marine Resources Comm'n v. Forbes is "inconsistent" 
with Thurston and "substantially reduces the value of severed riparian rights." M. Livingston, Cur-
rent Law Governing Rights and Interests in Land Abutting Virginia Waters 44 (Aug. 15, 1982) 
(unpublished manuscript available at DePaul University College of Law, to be included in a forth-
coming book by M. Livingston and L. Butler). She explains: 
Under the Forbes rationale, for example, it is questionable whether the owner of severed 
riparian rights still may build a wharf on submerged lands. Although the common law 
recognized the right to w barf, the statute cited in Forbes also lists 'the placement of private 
piers for noncommercial purposes' as one of the statutorily permitted uses of subaqueous 
beds. It apparently limits the right to build a noncommercial pier to owners of riparian 
lands and to structures placed 'in the waters opposite such riparian lands.' Using the 
Forbes reasoning, a court might well find that the General Assembly intended to restrict 
the common law right of wharfage to only highland owners of riparian rights. 
Id. at 44-45 (footnotes omitted). The commentator also concluded that the no-severability rule of 
Marine Resources Comm'n v. Forbes probably should not violate the due process or takings clauses. 
In her view as long as the rule "does not reduce the aggregate value of the property below an 
acceptable level, it is irrelevant that one segment of the bundle of rights is virtually destroyed." Id. 
at 47-48. 
123. Thurston, 140 S.E.2d at 679-80. Courts will presume that a grant of riparian land in-
cludes riparian rights, unless a contrary intent is clear from the face of the deed. See, e.g., Mayor of 
Paterson v. E. Jersey Water Co., 74 N.J. Eq. 49, 70 A. 472, 479 (1905); Interstate Motels Inc. v. 
Biers, 213 Va. 498, 193 S.E.2d 658, 662 (1973). See generally 3 H. FARNHAM, supra note 13, § 723. 
124. Thurston, 140 S.E.2d at 680. 
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erty in the soil under the water.' , 125 As a valuable property interest 
in the soil, a riparian right could be the subject of a suit for damages 
or an injunction and could be condemned for public use. 126 Similarly, 
the right could be severed from the land to which it attaches and con-
veyed apart from that land. 
With the exception of these few principles, the court in Thurston 
v. City of Portsmouth did not attempt to explain the nature of riparian 
rights. Most courts have been equally as vague, perhaps because of 
the problems that would arise if traditional property concepts were 
used.127 Although riparian rights resemble several different types of 
property interests, none of the traditional classifications fit them pre-
cisely. Classifying riparian rights as easements appurtenant, for in-
stance, would mean that the rights only could benefit the dominant 
estate, or the tract of riparian land, and generally could not be sev-
ered.128 Also, even if the court concluded that riparian rights were 
easements appurtenant until severed from the dominant estate, at 
which point they became easements in gross, other problems then 
arise. As easements in gross, they would be subject to the same limits 
on transferability as other easements in gross. Although the law gov-
erning alienation of easements in gross is not clearly developed, they 
are, as a general matter, not freely transferable.129 By concluding that 
125. Id. (quoting Peek v. City of Hampton, 115 Va. 855, 80 S.E. 593, 594 (1914)); see also 
Thurston, 140 S.E.2d at 680 (quoting prior law as recognizing that riparian rights, "•are in no sense 
easements, but are qualified property rights incident to the ownership' " of riparian land). 
126. Thurston, 140 S.E.2d at 680. 
127. See, e.g., Harbor Island Marina v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 286 Md. 303, 407 A.2d 738, 
746-47 (1979); Cole v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R. Co., 106 Pa. Super. 436, 162 A. 712, 714 (1932). 
128. See generally 2 AMERICAN LAW OP PROPERTY§ 8.73 (A. Casner ed. 1952); R. MlNOR & 
J. WURTS, THE LAW OP REAL PROPERTY§ 87 (1910). 
129. Although there is no clear majority position, most courts do not permit transfers of ease-
ments in gross unless they are commercial in nature or purpose. See generally 2 AMERICAN LAw OF 
PROPERTY §§ 8.75-8.80 (A. Casner ed. 1952); 2 G. THOMPSON, supra note 74, § 325, at 89-92 
{1980). This distinction between commercial and personal easements in gross may provide a basis 
for distinguishing between public and private users and for permitting severability for public users 
when it would not be permitted for private users. 
An easement in gross technically is a right to use another's land for purposes personal to the 
holder of the right and arises independently of his ownership of land. See generally 2 AMERICAN 
LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.9 (A. Casner ed. 1952); R. MINOR & J. WURTS, supra note 128, § 86. The 
concept of easements in gross therefore is inconsistent with the basic nature of riparian rights, which 
initially arise as incidents of ownership of riparian land. 
Similar theoretical problems also would arise if riparian rights were classified as profits. A 
profit a prendre generally involves taking a product from the land of another. See generally R. 
MINoR & J. WURTS, supra note 128, § 66; 1 G. THOMPSON, supra note 74, § 139 (1980). Although 
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riparian rights are not "mere easements," the Virginia Supreme Court 
avoided these problems. 
The task of defining the nature of riparian rights is important, 130 
for the characteristics of a property right can affect the way a contro-
versy involving that right is resolved. The courts, however, appear to 
have focused on that task almost to the exclusion of the policies at 
stake and have used their conclusions about the nature of riparian 
rights to make some broad statements about the transferability of ri-
parian rights. In Thurston v. City of Portsmouth, for example, the 
court used unequivocal language to announce the severability princi-
ple, suggesting that it would apply the principle to all types of riparian 
rights, regardless of whether they involve consumptive or noncon-
sumptive uses.131 Those two categories of uses, however, raise differ-
ent practical and policy considerations. For instance, the holder of a 
nonconsumptive right, like the right to fill-in involved in Thurston or 
the right to build a wharf or pier, must, by definition, exercise the 
dght in the same general area of the riparian tract as his transferor. 
Because the principal change is in the identity of the user, a transfer of 
this right does not involve a high risk that the use will be expanded or 
altered. With a consumptive right, though, the potential for diver-
gence from the present use and for interference with other uses is 
much greater. A transferee of the right to use water from a water-
course may change the type of use made, increase the amount of 
water consumed, or use the water to benefit land in a different loca-
tion.132 Because of these differences between consumptive and non-
consumptive uses, resolution of the transferability issue should focus, 
to an extent, on the type of use involved and on the policies and inter-
ests that would be benefitted or infringed by the transfer. A discus-
a few riparian rights conceivably could fall within this category, most riparian rights do not involve 
removing products from the land. 
Classifying riparian rights as licenses also would not solve the theoretical problems since 
licenses technically are not interests in land. See generally R. MINOR & J. WURTS, supra note 128, 
§ 122. But see 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.110 (A. Casner ed. 1952) (A license is an 
interest in land which includes the privilege of use of the land in which it is an interest.). Further-
more, they generally are not assignable. R. MINoR & J. WURTS, supra note 128, § 125. See also 2 
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY§ 8.122 (A. Casner ed. 1952). 
130. Because of the problems in classifying riparian rights as one of the traditional property 
interests, some commentators have suggested that riparian rights really are sui generis. See, e.g., 1A 
G. THOMPSON, supra note 74, § 264 (1980). 
131. Thurston v. City of Portsmouth, 205 Va. 909, 140 S.E.2d 678, 680-82 (1965). 
132. Accord M. Livingston, supra note 122, at n.121. 
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sion of the policy implications of transferring consumptive rights 
follows. 
2. Transfe"ing Consumptive Rights 
The policies and interests affected by the transfer of consumptive 
rights vary according to the specific circumstances and can be identi-
fied by considering four key situations. They include: (a) a Thurston-
type situation, where consumptive rights are transferred to a nonri-
parian for use in conjunction with the transferor,s riparian land; (b) a 
riparian tract subdivision situation, where lots formed by subdividing 
a tract of riparian land are sold to third parties who would like to 
exercise the consumptive rights that had attached to the tract for the 
benefit of their lots; (c) an intrabasin transfer situation, involving the 
transfer of consumptive rights to parties p]anning to exercise the 
rights for the benefit of land never part of the transferor's riparian 
land, but within the same watershed or basin; 133 and (d) an inter basin 
transfer situation, involving the transfer of consumptive rights to par-
ties p]anning to exercise the rights for the benefit of land outside the 
watershed or basin of the watercourse to be used. Each situation 
raises different economic, equitable, and environmental concerns. 
a. The Thurston-Type Situation 
The first situation, which is perhaps the easiest to deal with 
under the severability principle, involves a riparian who wants to sell 
a consumptive right to a nonriparian to be exercised in conjunction 
with the seller,s riparian land. Such a situation may arise, for in-
stance, when the owner of the riparian land lacks the resources or the 
skills needed to exercise the riparian rights properly and productively. 
Or the riparian landowner may have decided to develop a recreational 
or boating facility next to the water to be used by those who are will-
ing to purchase a membership interest that includes the appropriate 
consumptive and nonconsumptive rights. 134 
133. As defined, the intrabasin transfer example should include situations where a riparian 
locality annexes adjoining areas. 
134. Such uses might include the right to use the water for recreational uses, the right of access 
to the watercourse, and the right to use a pier, wharf, or dock. Although commentators generally 
agree that recreational uses can be consumptive or nonconsumptive, most classify recreational uses 
as nonconsumptive. See, e.g., 1 R. CLARK, supra note 1, § 55.2, at 381. For a discussion of Vir-
ginia's approach to partial severance of riparian rights, seeM. Livingston, supra note 122, at 37-41. 
A riparian landowner attempting to develop a recreational or boating facility may face other 
legal problems besides those raised by the riparian doctrine. A developer planning to build "dock-
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Applying the transferability rule to this type of situation does not 
seem troublesome, as long as the class of users is not unreasonably 
increased, since the riparian rights still will be exercised in conjunc-
tion with the original riparian land. Although some increase in the 
amount of water consumed probably will occur, other riparians 
should have reasonably foreseen that the entire tract eventually would 
be benefitted by the exercise of riparian rights and the identity of the 
developer should not matter. Riparians do not acquire superior rights 
of use just because another riparian fails to exercise his rights.t3s Fur-
thermore, if the increase in the class of users or "beneficiaries" really 
is unreasonable, then the courts should be able to protect the other 
riparians through the reasonable use requirement.136 Normally, 
though, the benefits derived from permitting the transfer and making 
an efficient use of the tract of land should outweigh the harm to other 
riparians caused by the change in identity of those directly 
benefitted.137 
b. The Riparian Tract Subdivision Situation 
A more difficult question, however, is posed where a riparian 
ominiums" in Norfolk, Virginia, for example. discovered that his plans could be interfering with 
public rights in the watercourse and submerged bed. Because he planned to sell boatslips to private 
parties and because the boat slips would rest upon the publicly owned river bed, any interest sold 
would be subject to the state's right to use the river bottom. The developer, thus, could not guarim-
tee that those buying an interest in the "dockominium" would be acquiring a valuable, exclusive 
property right. Newport News-Hampton Daily Press, July 4, 1983, at 1, col. 1. 
A riparian landowner. attempting to develop waterfront property also must comply with federal 
requirements governing navigable waters. For example. construction of wharves, piers, and other 
similar structures must not impede navigation, and any project which will modify harbor lines or the 
affected watercourse must be recommended by the Army Corps of Engineers and approved by the 
Secretary of the Army. Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, § 10, 33 U.S.C. § 403 
(1982). 
135. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
136. Some courts already have demonstrated a willingness to use the reasonable use require-
ment to control development. In Pierce v. Riley, 35 Mich. App. 122, 192 N.W.2d 366 (1971), affd, 
51 Mich. App. 504, 215 N.W.2d 759 (1974), affd, 81 Mich. App. 39, 264 N.W.2d 110 (1978) (per 
curiam), for example, the Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that a proposed use was unreasona-
ble because it would have increased the number of persons having access to a small lake by 66%. In 
that case several owners of lakefront property sought to prevent other owners of lakefront property 
from granting rights of way for access to the lake to nonriparians. See Pierce, 192 N.W.2d at 367. 
As relief the court ordered the defendants to fill a channel which they had built to provide access to 
the lake. Pierce v. Riley, 51 Mich. App. 504, 215 N.W.2d 759 (1974), affd, 81 Mich. App. 39, 264 
N.W.2d 110 (1978) (per curiam). 
Like owners of land abutting a watercourse, owners of lakefront property are governed by the 
reasonable use requirement. See supra note 17. 
137. Cf. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 856 comment b (1977) (justifying grants of 
riparian rights, even to nonriparians). 
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landowner subdivides his tract of riparian land and sells lots to third 
parties. When a party purchases a lot not contiguous to the water-
course, the question arises whether the purchaser also acquires ripa-
rian rights for the benefit of the lot. If riparian rights generally can be 
severed from riparian land and transferred, then the policy of prop-
erty law favoring alienation 138 suggests that any restriction on trans-
ferability should be construed narrowly and thus that land within the 
watershed of a river or stream should retain its riparian status even 
though severed from the original tract of riparian land. 
The few cases addressing the issue appear to have disagreed with 
this analysis. In perhaps the leading case on the matter, Anaheim 
Union Water Co. v. Fuller, 139 the California Supreme Court held that: 
[i]f the owner of a tract abutting on a stream conveys to another a part of 
the land not contiguous to the stream, he thereby cuts off the part so 
conveyed from all participation in the use of the stream and from ripa-
rian rights therein, unless the conveyance declares the contrary.140 
Then, to emphasize the permanency of the loss of status, the court 
added: "[l]and thus conveyed and severed from the stream can never 
regain the riparian right," not even if it later is "reconveyed to the 
person who owns the part abutting on the stream, so that the two 
tracts are again held in one ownership."141 
It is unclear why the court qualified its holding with the phrase 
"unless the conveyance declares the contrary." One possibility is that 
the court added the phrase because it viewed the severability issue 
138. See 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY§ 26.1 (A. Casner eel. 1952); supra note 113. 
139. 150 Cal. 327, 88 P. 978 (1907). 
140. Anaheim, 88 P. at 980. Although the California court did not explain its approach, it did 
cite several other sources which provide some insights into the court's reasoning. One cite is to a 
section of a water rights treatise dealing with riparian land. Id. (citing 2 H. FARNHAM, supra note 
13, § 463a). In the treatise section, the author suggests that nonriparian tracts of land cannot attain 
riparian status merely by being purchased by the owner of contiguous, riparian land. 2 H. FARN-
HAM, supra note 13, § 463a, at 1572. As the author explains, this position seems to have been 
prompted by a fear that land corporations would purchase tracts of land stretching miles away from 
the stream. I d. The treatise section thus supports taking a restrictive approach to riparian status in 
the subdivision situation. 
Another source cited by the court in Anaheim is an earlier California decision, Boehmer v. Big 
Rock Creek Irrigation Dist., 117 Cal. 19, 48 P. 908 (1897). See Anaheim, 88 P. at 980. Like the 
treatise author, the court in that case concludes that land severed and separately conveyed from the 
part contiguous to the water never can regain riparian status, not even if it later is held by the owner 
of the waterfront part. It feared that if a contrary position were adopted riparian rights held because 
of ownership of a tract abutting a stream "would extend to all lands [the owner] • • • might subse-
quently acquire, no matter • • • how distant from the stream, provided he owned all the land be-
tween the stream and the land so purchased." Boehmer, 48 P. at 910. 
141. Anaheim, 88 P. at 980. 
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posed by the subdivision situation more as a question of conveyancing 
and intent than as a matter of transferability. Support for this view 
can be found in the court's subsequent description of the noncontigu-
ous subdivided part as land "obtained . . . by a conveyance which 
severed" it from the riparian tract.142 If the court intended this inter-
pretation, then Anaheim would not impose a restraint on alienation, 
except to the extent that it dealt with alienation of riparian rights in a 
manner inconsistent with the normal preference for transferability of 
property rights. 
Another possibility is that the court failed to realize the full im-
pact of its qualifying language and that it generally intended to re-
strict alienation of riparian rights. The court's subsequent statement 
about the permanency of the loss of status, as well as its continued use 
of phrases like "not contiguous to" or "not abutting" to describe the 
subdivided part, supports this second interpretation.143 Also, on sev-
eral occasions, the court restated its conclusion about the status of 
noncontiguous parts without adding the qualifying language.144 
Accepting the first interpretation and construing Anaheim as per-
mitting severability145 would cause a conflict to develop within the 
142. Id. at 981. 
143. ld. at 980-81. 
144. Id. 
145. Only a few courts have considered the severability issue in the context of the subdivided 
riparian tract situation. They apparently have agreed with Anaheim and prohibited severability. 
See, e.g. , Yearsley v. Carter, 149 Wash. 285, 270 P. 804, 805 (1928). In a few other decisions, 
though, the courts have permitted riparian rights to attach to land purchased by a riparian when 
that land is contiguous to his riparian land. See, e.g., Jones v. Conn, 39 Or. 30, 64 P. 855, 858 
(1901). Although these cases involve slightly different situations, they suggest that the courts decid-
ing them would permit severability in the subdivision situation. Accord REsTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 843 comment c (1977) (riparian tract of land defined as a continuous tract held by one 
possessor, without regard to area or size of tract, or manner of acquisition). 
The approach taken by some jurisdictions on this issue is confusing and contradictory. One 
decision in Virginia, for example, appears to approve of the California rule, quoting and discussing 
the Anaheim decision. See Town of Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 106 S.E. 508,512-13 (1921). 
Several other authorities, however, suggest that Virginia has rejected, implicitly at least, the position 
reken by the California court. In Marine Resources Comm'n v. Forbes, 214 Va. 109, 197 S.E.2d 195 
(1973), for example, the Supreme Court of Virginia stated that "when a property interest severed by 
an antecedent owner from the fee is acquired by a subsequent owner of the limited fee, the two 
property interests merge to revive the fee simple absolute." Marine Resources, 197 S.E.2d at 199. 
Although Marine Resources Comm'n involved a dispute over the transfer of a statutorily created 
riparian right, its application of the revival or merger doctrine suggests that it is rejecting at least 
part of the California rule. Furthermore, those Virginia cases that have recognized the severability 
and transferability of riparian rights have tended to state the principle broadly and without qualifica-
tion. In Thurston v. City of Portsmouth, 205 Va. 909, 140 S.E.2d 678, 680 (1965), for instance, the 
Virginia Supreme Court declared that "[i]t has long been assumed . • . that riparian rights may be 
severed ••. ," Thurston, 140 S.E.2d at 680, while in an earlier case, Hite v. Town of Luray, 175 Va. 
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riparian doctrine. Whereas the single transaction restriction adopted 
as part of the definition of riparian land suggests that riparian rights 
can benefit land not contiguous to a watercourse only where that land 
was acquired in the same transaction as land abutting the water-
course, the severability principle suggests that riparian rights should 
be freely transferable. Similarly, while the physical contact and uni-
tary tract standards indicate that only those unitary lots contiguous to 
the watercourse can retain their status as riparian land after being 
subdivided, the severability principle supports allowing noncontigu-
ous lots to be benefitted by the watercourse where appropriate ripa-
rian rights are transferred along with the lots. 
Accepting the above interpretation and resolving the conflicts in 
favor of the riparian land tests would mean that the riparian doctrine 
would pose a significant obstacle to development. Although the ripa-
rian doctrine initially may have served as a method for preserving and 
protecting low-density uses, other more appropriate methods for con-
trolling development now exist. Instead of promoting certain types of 
uses, the riparian doctrine should be concerned with allocating water 
rights as efficiently and equitably as possible.146 As a general matter, 
an efficient and equitable distribution system would require transfera-
bility of riparian rights.t47 
Furthermore, at least where a transfer would not result in new 
uses substantially different from the old, either in type or degree, up-
holding the transfer would not appear to create a serious conflict with 
the riparian land tests. 148 As in the first situation, the land to be 
218, 8 S.E.2d 369 (1940), the court described the principle as "a well settled doctrine .. applying to 
water rights in general, Hite, 8 S.E.2d at 371. Finally, at least one Virginia statute suggests that 
riparian rights can be exercised for the benefit of nooriparian land where that land once was part of 
an individual tract of riparian land. That statutory provision defines riparian land as including "real 
property under common ownership and which is not separated from riparian land by land of any 
other ownership . . • not withstanding that such real property is divided into tracts and parcels 
which may not bound upon the watercourse!• VA. CoDE§ 62.1-104(5) (1982). Although the effect 
of this provision is limited by its own language, which specifically refers to subdivided land still held 
under common ownership, and by the fact that it is contained in an act dealing only with impound-
ment of surface waters, it appears to be one of the few statutory provisions in the Virginia Code 
addressing the effect of subdividing land on the land•s riparian status. See generally 2A STATUTES 
AND STATUTORY CoNSTRUCTION § 47.07 (C. Sands ed. 1973) (a term defined in one statute is not 
generally extended to other code sections). 
146. For a discussion of the goals of a water allocation system and of the proper role of public 
regulation see Trelease, supra note 115, at 1-6, 37-47. 
147. See supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text. For further discussion of how to mini-
mize the conftict between the riparian land tests and the severability principle see infra notes 161, 
184-95 and accompanying text. 
148. If the courts permit the transfer of riparian rights to subdivided parts not contiguous to 
148 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:95 
benefitted in the second hypothetical situation is the original tract of 
land. Thus, to the extent that expectations are set by the boundaries 
of the tract and by the nature of the old use, the transfers should not 
undermine the policies of the riparian land tests. 
But where a significant change in use would result from sever-
ance in the subdivision situation, as would normally occur when the 
transferee is a locality, then other riparians would appear to have a 
legitimate interest in preventing the transfers. Their expectations 
about use of the watercourse would have been set by the fact that the 
riparian owner's land initially was not subdivided. Furthermore, a 
significant increase in use would reduce severely the return flow avail-
able to lower riparians and thus could create a situation where injuries 
to third parties outweighed the benefits received by those involved in 
the transaction. If such a situation arose, permitting the severance 
and transfer of riparian rights would create an inefficient result: 
although the new use might be worth more to the parties to the trans-
fer than the old one, the aggregate benefit to society of the new use 
would be less than that of the old use.t49 
Some degree of transferability, though, is needed to avoid locking 
the riparian owner into his present use. If the holder of a property 
right cannot transfer the right, he may not be able to shift his res~urce 
the watercourse, then the question arises whether the purchaser of the noncontiguous part has a 
right of access to the watercourse. Where a conveyance does not expressly provide for access rights, 
a court may choose to imply a right of way. But even if a court decides such a right cannot arise by 
implication, the problem can be resolved through the marketplace. In this type of jurisdiction, a 
potential purchaser would know that the market price did not reflect the value of access rights and 
thus could bargain for the rights as part of the conveyance. 
149. In his work EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, Posner describes such a situation by hypothe-
sizing that A, B, and D are farmers along a watercourse and that A, who is upstream to the others, is 
contemplating transferring his use right to X, a municipality. He assumes further that A's right is 
worth $100 to him, that X is willing to pay $125 for it and plans to use the water to supply its 
inhabitants, and that the value of return flow is not considered to be a property right. Although A 
probably would sell his right to X under these facts, the transfer would not necessarily produce a 
more efficient result. Because municipalities consume a much larger percentage of the diverted 
water than individual users and return the excess to a different point on the stream or to a different 
stream, downstream users, like 1J and D, probably would be adversely affected by the transfer. They, 
for example, would suffer if X returned excess water downstream from B, where only D could use it, 
and if A's return flow was worth $50 to B, while X's return flow was only worth $10 to D. Under 
these circumstances, it would be inefficient to allow A to sell his right to X: the value of A's and B's 
current uses ($150) would be greater than that of ..rs and D's proposed uses ($135). To encourage 
the efficient result, Posner suggests that the value of return flow generated by a use be part of the 
property rights of the user. Then each right holder would consider the value of return flow gener-
ated by its use in deciding whether to shift the resources to a new use. R. PoSNER, supra note 113, 
§ 3.11, at 56-51. 
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to more productive uses. 150 An absolute ban on severability in the 
subdivision example admittedly would not lock in the riparian owner 
completely since he still would have the option of selling his riparian 
land. The ban, however, would deprive him of options available to 
other riparians. For instance, another riparian who was planning to 
sever and transfer only his riparian rights to be used for a portion of 
his riparian land would appear to be able to do so under the Califor-
nia rule, even though the portion to be benefitted was not contiguous 
to the watercourse. By limiting the transfer to riparian rights and 
choosing not to sell his ownership interest in the noncontiguous por-
tion of land, the riparian should be able to circumvent the ruling in 
Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Fuller. 
One possible way to allow development of riparian land without 
unfairly burdening other riparians would be to permit riparian rights 
to attach to subdivided parts of the original tract only where the sub-
division was considered to be a reasonable development of the land.151 
Granted, evaluating the reasonableness of development plans might 
be difficult, especially where the "developer" is a local government or 
the new user is a large private business.152 At some point in time, 
protection of the reasonable expectations of present users would re-
quire denying the right to sever and transfer riparian rights to the 
purchasers of subdivided parts. Where the riparian developer is a lo-
cality, this denial can have serious consequences since the locality 
otherwise may have been able to justify using the watercourse for the 
benefit of residents purchasing the subdivided lots.153 
150. Property rights must be transferable if they are to be put to their most efficient uses. As 
Posner explains, if a farm is being managed by a bad farmer (A) whose future earnings from the land 
have a present value of $1,000 and if a better farmer {B) anticipated that his earnings on that parcel 
would have a present value of $1,500, it would be efficient forB to purchase A's interests for $250 
more thanA's expected present value. Then A would receive $250 more thanA's expected value and 
B still would make a $250 profit. Value maximization, in Posner's words, thus "requires a mecha-
nism by which the farmer [A] can be induced to transfer rights in the property to someone who can 
work it more productively; a transferable property right is such a mechanism." /d. § 3.1, at 28-29. 
See generally id. §§ 3.1, 3.11. 
151. An unreasonable development may exist, for example, where a use drastically reduces the 
flow for lower riparians or where the increase in use for the lot being developed is high in proportion 
to the actual size of the lot. 
152. It would be unusual for a new user in the subdivision tract situation to be a local govern· 
ment. If a locality was attempting to acquire use rights, it probably would buy land contiguous to 
the watercourse and not a noncontiguous subdivided part. The only circumstances under which a 
locality may, as a practical matter, be purchasing a subdivided part would be where the locality 
owned the part of the subdivided tract still in physical contact with the watercourse and was trying 
to reacquire some of the parts that were subdivided. 
153. Part III will discuss other options available to the locality. 
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At least where a development is reasonable, severance and trans-
fer of riparian rights to the subdivided parts should be allowed. Once 
again, other areas of property law provide protection for the interests 
of private riparians by helping to control development and ensure that 
compatible uses are conducted in the same general area. Further-
more, this type of approach to balancing the interests in development 
with the interests in preserving the status quo appears throughout 
property law. Under the law of easements, for instance, the benefit of 
an easement appurtenant generally can attach, upon subdivision of 
the dominant estate, to each subdivided part.154 As the Restatement 
of Property explains, the subdivision of dominant estates is a "com-
mon" occurrence which the parties are presumed to have contem-
plated, absent an intent to the contrary.155 As will be demonstrated in 
more detail later, adopting a similar standard for subdivision of ripa-
rian land could be accomplished easily through the reasonable use 
requirement.156 
This solution, however, still does not eliminate the inefficient out-
come that can occur when a reasonable development produces a sig-
nificant increase in use and reduces the return :flow available to other 
riparians. Because the value of the return :flow generated by a particu-
lar use is not considered part of the property rights of the user, he will 
not consider that value in evaluating his use options.157 In discussing 
this problem in a slightly different context, Posner recommends that 
the transferee be deemed "the owner of any new return flow that the 
transfer creates."158 Posner offered this suggestion while examining 
transfers of appropriation rights, which are another type of water 
right defined under the common law of many western states. Appro-
priation rights admittedly differ from riparian rights in several mate-
rial respects. Besides having more precise quantitative limits, 
appropriation rights also are subject to a clearer priority system based 
on the first-in-time rule. As a general matter, a party who appropri-
ates water to his use before another prevails in a dispute.159 Because 
154. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Perry, 309 Mass. 100, 34 N.B.2d 489, 491 (1941); Bang v. Forman, 
244 Mich. 571, 222 N.W. 96, 97 (1928); see also REsTATEMENT OP PROPERTY § 488 comments b, c 
(1944). Where an excessive use results because of changes in the dominant estate, the remedy usu-
ally is an injunction and not forfeiture of the easement, unless the unauthorized use cannot be sev-
ered and effectively prohibited. Crimmins v. Gould, 149 Cal. App. 2d 383, 308 P .2d 786, 791 (1957). 
155. REsTATEMENT OP PROPERTY § 488 comment b (1944). 
156. See infra notes 184-95 and accompanying text. 
157. R. POSNER, supra note 113, § 3.11, at 57; see supra note 149. 
158. R. POSNER, supra note 113, § 3.11, at 57. 
159. For a discussion of the prior appropriation doctrine see supra note 13. 
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the concept of appropriation rights developed in areas poor in water 
resources, it is not surprising that these rights are clearer and more 
inflexible than riparian rights. If clearer standards for defining use 
rights and for resolving conflicts among users had not developed, the 
already serious consequences that water shortages have in those arid 
areas would have achieved even greater magnitude.160 
Despite the differences between appropriation and riparian 
rights, Posner's suggestion should be extended to riparian rights. The 
concern being addressed by his recommendation is not the need for 
precise standards or clear priorities, but rather the need for efficient 
use of a resource, generally, and for recognizing the full impact of a 
use, more specifically. As with appropriation rights, the exercise of 
riparian rights generates a return flow which can be measured. 
Although the uncertainty of riparian rights may make this task more 
difficult, interested parties have, in the past, been able to make projec-
tions about the impact of present and future uses and thus should be 
able to estimate return flow. Also, although the uncertainty may 
cause the value of the return flow to depreciate or appreciate over 
time, this type of fluctuation is a risk which owners of property rights 
generally assume. As with appropriation uses, recognizing the value 
of the return flow generated by a riparian use will not guarantee that 
the flow will remain steady or last forever. But failing to take such 
action could result in the same inefficient outcome that Posner de-
scribes in the context of appropriation rights. 
c. The Intrabasin Transfer Situation 
A third situation presents a more serious conflict under the ripa-
rian doctrine. It arises when a party who already owns a tract of land 
within the watershed of a watercourse decides to purchase riparian 
rights from the owner of riparian land located in another part of the 
watershed. If the purchaser plans to exercise the rights for the benefit 
of the land that he owns and that land is waterfront property, then the 
transfer would conflict with the single transaction test. Where the 
purchaser's land is not waterfront property, a conflict with the physi-
cal contact standard also would arise. The problem in the first varia-
tion is not that significant, given the shortcomings of the single 
transaction standard. The conflict arising under the second variation, 
however, poses a more serious obstacle to the severability principle. 
160. See generally supra notes 2 & 13. 
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In contrast to the first two hypothetical situations, the land to be 
benefitted in the intrabasin transfer situation is not part of the tract 
owned by the riparian-transferor and, indeed, would not even qualify 
as riparian land where the purchaser did not own waterfront prop-
erty. The party seeking the transfer therefore could not argue, as was 
advanced in the first two hypothetical situations, that the transfer 
would not contravene the reasonable expectations of other riparians. 
Neighboring riparians could not anticipate that the transferor's ripa-
rian rights would be exercised for land located elsewhere in the 
watershed. 
Despite this seemingly insurmountable difference, a consistent in-
terpretation of both the riparian land requirement and the severability 
principle still can be achieved in the intrabasin transfer situation. The 
key to accomplishing this is recognizing that the two serve different 
functions under the riparian doctrine. The riparian land requirement 
helps the courts to identify those parties who have riparian rights to 
exercise or possibly sell. Once the parties holding those rights are 
identified, the severability principle then defines how and to what ex-
tent the rights can be sf'vered and transferred. As in other areas of 
property law, the legal principles governing alienation of riparian 
rights should be construed broadly. By permitting riparian rights to 
be transferred for the benefit of land throughout the watershed, the 
courts would be encouraging riparian landowners to sell their use 
rights to benefit other land in the watershed. 
Taking a functional approach to interpreting the riparian land 
tests and the severability principle will not resolve the matter entirely, 
for the reasonable use standard still needs to be redefined somewhat to 
reflect the new uses. Because the third situation involves two tracts of 
land, it is unclear which tract should be used to set priorities between 
users and define the quantitative limits of the transferee's uses. To 
protect the expectations and equities of other riparians, courts permit-
ting a transfer in the third situation should observe two related 
principles. 
The first principle is that no purchaser of riparian rights should 
acquire any greater interest than his transferor. If, for example, the 
transferee's lot is a ten-acre farm, while the transferor's is only a one-
acre farm, a court should not permit the transferee to exercise the 
purchased rights to satisfy all the needs of his ten-acre tract. The 
court should limit the amount that the transferee can use to the 
amount that his transferor would have been able to use. To permit 
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otherwise in a traditional riparian jurisdiction would seriously under-
mine the reasonable use requirement. 
Although applying this first principle may prove to be difficult, 
the courts should not, as a practical matter, have to apply it that 
often. Once parties learn about the principle, they should adjust to it 
voluntarily through the marketplace. For example, in the above situ-
ation an informed purchaser only would be willing to pay for rights 
that could be used for the one-acre tract, instead of his ten-acre tract. 
Reversing the size of the lots provides an even better illustration of 
how the parties would adjust to the first principle through the market-
place. If the transferee's lot consisted only of one acre, while the 
transferor's lot had ten acres, then the transferee would not want to 
purchase all of the transferor's use rights. Because the transferee only 
would need sufficient use rights to meet the needs of his one-acre 
tract, paying for anything more would be an unwise business decision. 
The second principle is that the reasonableness of a transferee's 
use generally should be measured in light of the expectations of ripari-
ans owning land near the parties to the transfer. For example, if the 
transferee owns nonwaterfront property located above, but not adja-
cent to, the transferor's riparian land, the transferee should not be 
able to purchase the transferor's riparian rights and then claim that he 
is upstream to, and therefore has certain priorities of use over those 
neighboring riparians located between the two tracts. Allowing this 
claim would undermine the reasonable expectations of the intervening 
riparians. They generally could not have anticipated that the owner 
of nonriparian land located above them in the watershed one day 
would acquire riparian rights. 161 Although this result also could be 
achieved under the first limitation, the second principle would func-
tion more as an equitable safety valve than as an incentive to properly 
value the purchased rights. 
If courts use these two principles to define the rights of transfer-
ees in the third situation, then intrabasin transfers may not be as ap-
pealing an alternative for public users and large private users as they 
would first appear. Depending on the nature and extent of the avail-
able transferors' rights, a locality may have to buy up the rights of 
numerous riparians to be able to supply its public's consumptive 
needs. At least to the small private user, this prospect should not 
161. If, on the other hand, the transferee owns nonwaterfront property below the transferor's 
waterfront property, then the expectations of riparians in the area between the two tracts would be 
to receive the flow of the watercourse after reasonable use by the transferor. 
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seem that troubling; what the two principles really are forcing public 
users to do is to pay for the use rights that they need. But to the 
public user, that prospect may be unacceptable, at least when com-
pared to several other options available under the common law. As 
will be shown, these other options may not require the public user to 
give value for public consumptive rights. 
d. The Interbasin Transfer Situation 
Perhaps the most troublesome situation arises where a private 
riparian severs and transfers his riparian rights to a party who intends 
to use the rights for the benefit of nonriparian land located outside the 
watershed. Unlike the first three situations, this hypothetical situa-
tion introduces a new factor, an interbasin transfer, which supports 
completely banning the transfer of severed riparian rights.162 Admit-
tedly, the same functional approach used with the intrabasin transfer 
could be applied to this last situation. That is, those favoring the 
transfer could argue that permitting transfers to nonwatershed land 
would not undermine the watershed requirement because that re-
quirement still would be used to determine who had riparian rights to 
transfer. This argument ignores the other functions served by the wa-
tershed test, especially the important balancing function served by it. 
As explained earlier, the watershed standard represents a compromise 
between often conflicting equitable, environmental, and efficiency con-
cerns. If the standard were not used, then some of those important 
concerns would be seriously undermined. 
Abandoning the watershed test would have an especially severe 
impact on the expectancy interests of users in the transferor's water-
shed. Because the benefitted land is not in the same watershed as the 
watercourse, the unused portion could not return to the watercourse 
for use by other riparians without construction of an elaborate return 
system. Assuming return flow is recognized as a property right, as 
suggested above, the transferee would be willing to construct such a 
return system only where the value of the return flow in the trans-
feror's watershed exceeded the construction costs. That such a situa-
tion would arise is highly unlikely, given the high costs of building 
water supply structures. In most interbasin transfers, then, the trans-
162. Though their reasons often are unclear, many courts agree that severability and transfer 
should not be allowed when land outside the watershed would be benefitted. See, e.g., Harvey Realty 
Co. v. Borough of Wallingford, 111 Conn. 352, 150 A. 60, 63 {1930); Roberts v. Martin, 72 W. Va. 
92, 77 S.E. 535, 537 (1913). 
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fer would decrease the amount of the return flow to other users in the 
transferor's watershed. Although this result would be more efficient 
when the value of the water in its new uses is greater than the value of 
the old uses, it would seriously infringe on the interests of other ripar-
ians along the diverted watercourse, not only in their exercise of pres-
ent uses, but also in their development of new uses. Until water 
resources in the eastern United States become scarce, the riparian 
doctrine can afford to strike a better balance between efficiency and 
equity. The watershed test provides such a balance. 
In conclusion, although case law establishes the general proposi-
tion that riparian rights are severable and transferable, the various 
policies at stake suggest that this proposition should not be uniformly 
applied to all transfers of riparian rights. The different policy con-
cerns raised by consumptive and nonconsumptive uses, for example, 
indicate that a distinction should be made between those two catego-
ries of rights. Nonconsumptive uses generally are exercised in con-
junction with the riparian land even after severance. Because the 
nature of the expected use does not change significantly in most cases, 
few restrictions on the transfer of nonconsumptive uses are necessary. 
Consumptive uses, however, are not as closely tied to the land, 
and the likelihood of a significant change in use is greater. Therefore, 
whether riparian principles should permit severance and transferabil-
ity of consumptive rights should depend on the circumstances sur-
rounding the change in use. Where, for instance, a private riparian 
wants to transfer a consumptive right to a nonriparian to be used for 
the benefit of the seller's land, it seems both efficient and equitable to 
permit the transfer, so long as the change in use is one that the ripa-
rian transferor could have made. Although allowing transferability in 
the subdivision example also is desirable under certain circumstances, 
equitable and efficiency concerns necessitate imposing restrictions on 
such transfers. A requirement that the subdivision be a reasonably 
foreseeable development, for instance, might be necessary to avoid im-
posing an unfair burden on other riparians. Also, to prevent an ineffi-
cient outcome, the property rights of a user should be redefined to 
include return flow. 
The last two situations pose the most serious conflicts under the 
riparian doctrine. Unlike the first two situations, which involve land 
that once could qualify as riparian land, the third and fourth may 
involve land that never could be riparian. Although this distinction 
suggests that transfers should be banned in the last two situations to 
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avoid a conflict with the riparian land restriction, focusing on the sep-
arate functions of the riparian land restriction and the severability 
principle helps to minimize the conflict between them. If intrabasin 
transfers are permitted, equitable and efficiency concerns once again 
would require imposing some restrictions. Besides limiting the trans-
feree's reasonable use rights to those held by the transferor, a court 
also should evaluate the reasonableness of the transferee's uses by 
considering the expectations of riparians in the vicinity. Although 
these limitations also could be imposed on interbasin transfers to min-
imize some of the concerns held by riparians, they would not remove 
the economic and environmental concerns raised by the fact that the 
transfers would be to land outside the watershed. The courts, at least, 
might have difficulty reaching a more acceptable compromise between 
the competing concerns.163 
The above conclusions reflect legal and policy considerations that 
generally should apply regardless of whether the user is a private 
party or a public entity. Because some of the considerations, though, 
change sufficiently when a public user is involved, further analysis of 
the public use situation is needed. Part III will focus on the nature of 
public consumptive rights in natural watercourses, examining the ex-
tent to which the riparian doctrine recognizes such rights, either di-
rectly or indirectly. 
III. PUBLIC CONSUMPTIVE RIGHTS 
As explained in Part II, many of the common-law riparian prin-
ciples are based on an assumption that the user is a private agrarian. 
Although this assumption may have been based in fact when the ripa-
rian doctrine first developed, it no longer reflects water use patterns 
and seriously limits the water options of localities attempting to sat-
163. If a basin in a riparian jurisdiction becomes water-poor, some sort oflegal action would be 
needed to provide for that area's public consumptive needs. Because of the importance of the policy 
concerns at stake and because of the need for a carefully developed management plan, the state 
legislature probably would be a more appropriate problem-solver than the courts. See Butler, supra 
note 12, at 777-80. It, more so than the courts, could enact a comprehensive regulatory system that 
promoted efficient and equitable transfers of water use rights to private parties for use outside the 
watershed. Under a comprehensive system, a regulatory body not only could review proposed trans-
fers to evaluate their economic and equitable implications for users in the watershed, but also could 
assess their environmental impact. Regulatory oversight thus could minimize some of the problems 
that would result if the transfers were allowed under the common law. At least in the area of 
interstate waters, though, the judiciary has demonstrated, through its application of the equitable 
apportionment doctrine, that it can take an active role in managing use of water resources. See supra 
note 108. 
1985] CONSUMPTIVE WATER RIGHTS 157 
isfy their inhabitants' needs. Unlike many private users, local govern-
ments usually must divert water from a watercourse to fulfill their 
public's needs. Effective operation of a public sewage system, for in-
stance, requires using large quantities of water for waste treatment, 
while the public's drinking needs generally cannot be met responsibly 
without storing water for future use. 
Whether a local government can divert or othenvise use a water-
course to satisfy the public's consumptive needs depends, to an extent, 
on a court's willingness to modify traditional riparian principles and 
their underlying assumptions.164 Because the policy considerations 
raised by public consumptive uses differ, sometimes significantly, 
from those relating to private consumptive uses, courts in riparian 
jurisdictions may be reluctant to alter riparian principles to accommo-
date the public interest, through direct or indirect means.165 Part 
III.A. will examine the nature of public consumptive rights under the 
riparian doctrine to determine whether the doctrine can provide 
greater recognition of public rights without seriously impairing ex-
isting interests. Part III.B. will consider the extent to which the doc-
164. It also may depend on the navigability of the watercourse. See generally 1A G. THOMP-
SON, supra note 74, § 258 (1980) (discussing meaning of navigability). If a watercouse is nonnaviga-
ble, then the public interest in the watercourse is governed primarily by the riparian doctrine. But if 
the watercourse is navigable, then other common-law doctrines provide possible bases for defining 
and interpreting the public interest in the watercourse. Significantly, because these theories do not 
depend on riparian ownership, they could apply in nonriparian jurisdictions as well. Perhaps the 
most important of these other common law concepts is the public trust doctrine, which is founded on 
the principle that certain natural resources are held by the state or its delegates in trust for its people. 
For a discussion of the doctrine by a leading authority see Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural 
Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MicH. L. REv. 471 (1970). Although other theo-
ries also exist, they are not as developed nor as accepted as the public trust doctrine. See, e.g., Old 
Dominion Iron & Nail Co. v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 116 Va. 166, 81 S.E. 108 (1914), appeal 
dismissed for lack ofjurisdiction, 242 U.S. 623 (1916) (where state court appears to be developing a 
"public waters" theory and recognizing certain public interests in those waters). 
165. If altering the legal principles would seriously undermine key aspects of the riparian doc-
trine, then courts normally should avoid acting on "personal policy preferences," as the Supreme 
Court recently admonished, and instead follow established legal principles. See Chevron U.S.A. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2793 (1984). Because the controversy in 
Chevron involved interpretation of the Clean Air Act,§ 172(b)(6), 42 U.S. C.§ 7502(b)(6) (1983), See 
104 S.Ct. at 2785, the Court's admonishment would not apply directly to a court examining riparian 
principles. But that court still should be careful not to change riparian principles radically because 
of personal policy preferences. Otherwise holders of riparian property rights affected by the change 
might challenge the judicial action as a violation of the takings or due process clauses of federal and 
state constitutions. See, e.g.;U.S. CoNST. amends. V, XIV; VA. CoNST. art. I,§§ 6, 11. If property 
is taken for public purposes without just compensation, contrary to the constitution, then a final 
judgment of a court upholding the taking would be a violation of due process. Chicago, Burlington 
& Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,235 (1891);see Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 
U.S. 403, 417 (1896). See generally Ausness, supra note 74, at 240-56. 
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trine permits public users to justify diversions and other consumptive 
uses through exceptions to traditional doctrine. 
A. Recognizing Public Consumptive Rights Under 
the Riparian Doctrine 
Although the efficiency and environmental concerns raised by 
public uses differ in some respects from those raised by private uses, 
the most significant policy differences between the two types of uses 
appear to involve equitable concems.166 Because public uses often oc-
cur on a much larger scale than private uses, public uses tend to cause 
more intense conflicts between users and to provoke stronger feelings 
of injustice. Water-rich localities, many of which are low-density ru-
ral areas, understandably fear that water-poor areas will rob them of 
important development opportunities by attempting to divert some of 
their abundant water resources. The anger and sense of injustice felt 
by the water-rich jurisdictions is intensified by a belief held by many 
of them that they own the waters within their boundaries, or at least 
have a right to use those resources for the benefit of their inhabit-
ants.167 Although this belief is not legally justified, 168 it does seem to 
166. Although public users tend to operate on a larger scale than private users, both types of 
users face similar efficiency concerns. Like the private user, for example, the public user can cause 
inefficient uses because of the common law's failure to recognize return flow as a property interest. 
See supra notes 149, 157-58 and accompanying text. 
Public and private users also face similar environmental concerns, though the magnitude of the 
concern often is greater for the public user. For instance, regardless of the identity of the user, it is 
clear that the prospect of interbasin transfer raises serious environmental concerns. Because a large 
quantity of water would be transferred to an area deficient in water resources, an impoundment 
structure probably would need to be built to hold and store the diverted water. Besides changing the 
ecology of the area where construction occurs, the impoundment plans would necessitate flooding 
land near the destination site and thus would alter or destroy wildlife habitats. Serious environmen-
tal concerns also would arise in the area of origin. Substantial withdrawals, for instance, could affect 
the salinity of remaining water resources, as well as the types of wildlife that frequent the area. See 
generally NATIONAL WATER CoMM'N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FuTuRE 19-37 (1973); Hagan & 
Roberts, supra note 55; Robie, Some Reflections on Environmental Considerations in Water Rights 
Administration, 2 EcoLOGY L.Q. 695, 710-21 (1972). 
Assuming water-poor users do not resort to self-help plans, prohibiting interbasin transfers for 
both public and private users would eliminate or minimize many of these concerns. To the extent 
that public users seek interbasin transfers more frequently than private users, though, the differences 
between the environmental concerns associated with each type of use become more significant. 
167. See 13 WATER NEws, supra note 3, No. 11, at 8 (Nov. 1982). A party who actually uses 
water from a watercourse develops a similar, and perhaps more justified belief, that the water in the 
watercourse generally becomes "his water." See Trelease, supra note 10, at 414. 
168. Although the question of ownership of flowing water has been debated for years, most 
property law scholars today agree that no one owns flowing water while it is in its natural state. See, 
e.g., 6A AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 28.55 (A. Casner ed. 1954). This position does not mean, 
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reflect a legitimate concern: a fair distribution of resources would 
seem to require giving a water-rich jurisdiction some priority over 
other jurisdictions in using resources within its boundaries. 
Water-poor localities, on the other hand, face the problem of 
supplying the sometimes urgent water needs of their populace. If the 
common law is interpreted as prohibiting diversions of watercourses 
for public use, it will limit seriously the options of water-poor locali-
ties. When such a prohibition exists in a state generally rich in water 
resources, it understandably leads to frustration and resentment. 
Water-poor jurisdictions are forced to bargain with those parties will-
ing to sell surplus water, often on unfavorable terms, or attempt to 
solve their water supply problems on their own. Because these self-
help schemes typically involve the diversion and transfer of water, 
challenges from private riparians and water-rich localities affected by 
the plan are likely to result.169 As will be explained, unless a court is 
willing to alter riparian principles for the public user, the challenges 
probably will succeed.11o 
Finally, the prospect of a change in the common law rules gov-
erning consumptive use by public users raises an important fairness 
though, that no one has an interest in those waters. A riparian proprietor, for instance, has the right 
to use the waters and to control use by other riparians and third parties. The state also has an 
interest as sovereign that justifies its regulation of the waters. See id. § 28.59. 
169. An example of such a situation exists in southeastern Virginia, where two of the state's 
largest municipalities are faced with impending water shortages. The city of Newport News has 
consulted with experts as to its alternatives, and the most recent plan proposed the drilling of addi-
tional wells to help delay the inevitable need for long-term expansion. Newport News-Hampton 
Daily Press, Aug. 19, 1984, at Bl, col. 1. Additionally, an Army Corps of Engineers study released 
in May, 1984, suggested that the city construct a 49 mile pipeline to a spot above Richmond on the 
James River, at an estimated cost of $81 million, and divert water to meet its needs. See U.S. ARMY 
CoRPS OF ENGINEERS, WATER SUPPLY STUDY: HAMPTON ROADS, VIRGINIA 273-75 (1984). The 
city of Richmond, however, has already declared that, in the absence of any clear state water plan, it 
will contest the diversion plan in court to protect its rights to the James River. Newport News-
Hampton Daily Press, Aug. 23, 1984, at 13, col. 4. For a discussion of the city of Virginia Beach's 
attempts to resolve its water supply problems, see infra note 170. 
170. A diversion plan may escape challenge, though, if it includes acquisition of all appropriate 
rights and interests by sale or condemnation. See infra notes 208-12 and accompanying text. In 
Virginia, for example, the city of Virginia Beach has proposed a plan to divert water from a lake 
located almost ninety miles from the city. Since 1923, Virginia Beach has been supplied with water 
by the city of Norfolk, but because the contract with Norfolk only requires that Virginia Beach be 
supplied with water after the needs of Norfolk residents are met Virginia Beach decided to look for 
more stable long-term sources. Under the proposal the City plans to contract with the Corps of 
Engineers for permanent use of storage space at Buggs Island Reservoir and to reimburse Vepco for 
the value of power generation lost on account of the diversion. Amended Complaint for Declaratory 
Judgment at 4-5, 10-16, City of Virginia Beach v. Roanoke River Basin Ass'n, Civil Action No. 84-
11-N (B.D. Va. Jan. 31, 1984). The plan also calls for the acquisition, by purchase or condemnation, 
of rights of way from property owners along the 90 mile diversion route. 
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concern among private users. A significant departure from prior law 
would, at the very least, impair their expectancy interests and may 
even deprive them of valuable property rights without due process or 
just compensation. Putting aside these potential due process and tak-
ings problems,171 it is nevertheless evident that a legal system allowing 
serious deprivations would have difficulty being accepted. Those pri-
vate riparians deprived of their rights and interests naturally would 
resent and oppose the change. Furthermore, other property owners 
would have reason to fear that the judicial action would be extended 
to other types of resources. A court that is willing to redefine riparian 
rights more restrictively to accommodate public uses may be just as 
willing to take similar actions with respect to other valuable 
resources. 172 
Whether traditional riparian principles can be modified so as to 
accommodate the public interest and achieve an acceptable balance 
between these competing policy concerns depends in part on the prin-
ciples and rationales at stake and in part on the type of diversion situ-
ation under review. Under traditional principles a riparian generally 
cannot divert the flow of a watercourse, sometimes not even to his 
own riparian land.173 This "no-diversion" rule applies equally to pub-
lic and private users. A city or town does not acquire greater rights 
just because of its status as a governmental entity.174 Nor does it ac-
quire consumptive rights because of the location of water resources 
within its boundaries. Although jurisdiction over water resources 
may provide sufficient justification for regulating those resources, it 
does not confer riparian rights upon a locality. 
171. For a discussion of the takings and due process issues raised by a comprehensive revision 
of a state's water allocation system see NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE 
FuroRE 281-83 (1973); Ausness, supra note 74, at 240-56. See also supra note 163. 
172. Nor would such a system be efficient. Without assurances that their rights would be 
protected, property owners would be reluctant to invest in long-range activities requiring high capi-
tal outlays, even though the activities otherwise would be efficient. See supra notes 96-97 and accom-
panying text. 
173. A riparian cannot divert water from a watercourse for use on his land if the diversion 
materially diminishes the watercourse. But where the riparian diverts a reasonable quantity of water 
for use on his riparian land and returns the watercourse to its original channel before it leaves his 
land, then the diversion should be allowed. See Stein v. Burden, 29 Ala. 127, 133 (1856); Cook v. 
Seaboard Air Line Ry., 107 Va. 32, 57 S.E. 564, 565 (1907). Diversions beyond riparian land gener-
ally are prohibited. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Gold, 88 Va. 551, 14 S.E. 329 (1892). See generally 2 H. 
FARNHAM, supra note 13, §§ 496, 497. 
174. See Pernell v. City of Henderson, 220 N.C. 79, 16 S.E.2d 449, 451 (1941); Town of 
Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 106 S.E. 508, 515 (1921). See generally 7 R. CLARK, supra note 
1, § 620.1 (1976). 
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To a public user the no-diversion rule means that the public user 
cannot use a watercourse to satisfy public consumptive needs without 
fear of legal repercussions by neighboring riparians. Although the un-
certainty of this situation may seem inefficient and unfair, not all pub-
lic diverters deserve the same degree of protection from the courts. If, 
for example, the public user is justifying the diversion on the basis of 
its own use rights, then the courts' approach should depend on the 
nature of those rights. A diverter that has attempted to purchase suf-
ficient use rights to justify the diversion should be treated differently 
than one that has not paid sufficient value. At least with respect to 
the nonpaying diverter, the countervailing concerns of water-rich lo-
calities and private users may justify a result unfavorable to the di-
verter. If, however, the diverter is supporting its diversion by 
attacking the rights of the complaining riparian, then the approach of 
the courts should vary according to the nature of the complaining 
riparian's interests. A diverter that is injuring neighboring riparians 
should be treated differently than one that is not causing harm. 
Part III.A.l. will examine the various approaches taken by the 
courts to the no-diversion rule to determine whether those approaches 
permit consideration of relevant policy concerns. Part III.A.2. will 
consider specific diversion situations to determine whether recogniz-
ing public consumptive rights in those situations would seriously im-
pair existing interests. 
1. The No-Diversion Rule and Public Consumptive Rights 
Three principal approaches have been used by the courts to de-
fine the no-diversion rule. The first, referred to as the per se unrea-
sonable approach, is alluded to by several courts when they describe 
diversions to nonriparian land as "extraordinary" and "unreasona-
ble."175 Because these descriptions are worded broadly and appear in 
the same discussion as the courts' conclusion that diversions to nonri-
parian land are unlawful, the courts could be interpreted as declaring 
all such diversions to be per se unreasonable.176 This approach thus 
175. See Harvey Realty Co. v. Borough ofWallingford, 111 Conn. 352, 150 A. 60, 63 (1930); 
Town of Purcellville v. Potts, 179 Va. 514, 19 S.E.2d 700,703 (1942); Roberts v. Martin, 72 W.Va. 
92, 77 S.E. 535, 536-57 (1913). But see Pyle v. Gilbert, 245 Ga. 403, 265 S.E.2d 584 (1980) (striking 
down per se approach and permitting reasonable uses on nonriparian land); Town of Gordonsville v. 
Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 106 S.E. 508 (1921) (failing to use language suggesting the per se approach as 
Potts did). Because diversions to nonriparian land are the principal type of diversion that public 
users conduct, the discussion will focus on them. 
176. Another possible interpretation of some of the language suggesting the per se approach is 
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treats the no-diversion rule as a procedural rule of law, at least where 
the diversions are to nonriparian land. Any diversion to nonriparian 
land automatically is considered to be unreasonable and therefore in-
jurious to the rights of some downstream riparian.t77 
Most courts are reluctant to follow the first approach, apparently 
because it requires them to declare diversions to nonriparian land to 
be unreasonable without looking at the surrounding facts and circum-
stances.178 Under the per se approach, a court would have to declare 
a diversion to nonriparian land to be unreasonable, regardless of its 
actual consequences. The diversion, for example, would be unreason-
able even though it represented the diverter's reasonable share of a 
watercourse and even though it did not infringe on the reasonable use 
rights of neighboring riparians. The first approach, therefore, does 
not permit a court to consider the efficiencies or equities of a particu-
lar diversion situation. Nor does it permit a court to determine 
whether key principles and policies of the riparian doctrine would be 
undermined if the diversion were allowed to continue. 
A second approach treats diversions by local governments for the 
purpose of creating a public water supply as unreasonable uses.179 
that the courts merely are restating the requirement that a riparian must establish actual injury to 
recover. See Abrams, Interbasin Transftr in a Riparian Jurisdiction, 24 WM. & MARY L. REv. 591, 
601 (1983). For a discussion of the injury requirement see infra note 198. 
177. The effect of this approach appears to be to shift the burden of proof between the parties. 
As a general matter, to be entitled to relief for unlawful diversion, a plaintiff must establish, by a 
preponderance of evidence, that defendant's actions prevented the watercourse from flowing in a 
natural course upon plaintifrs land, see supra note 112, and that plaintiff suffered injury because of 
defendant's conduct, see infra note 198. In addition, as the proponent of the evidence, the plaintiff 
has the duty of producing sufficient evidence to send the issue to the jury. 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 
IN TRIALS AT CoMMON LAW§ 2487(a) (J. Chadbourn ed. 1981). But in certain situations, if the 
proponent produces evidence that, when coupled with a rule oflaw, will persuade a jury of reason-
able men to rule in his favor, the burden will shift to the opponent to produce evidence sufficient to 
counter that offered by the proponent, or risk losing by default. 
Under the per se approach then, a party seeking relief for an unlawful diversion only has to 
prove the unlawfulness of the diversion-by establishing that it is to nonriparian land-in order to 
prevail in the suit. As one court adopting the per se approach explained, even if the plaintiff could 
not establish actual damage, he still could recover nominal damages at law for an unlawful diversion 
or receive injunctive relief in equity. See Roberts v. Martin, 72 W. Va. 92, 77 S.E. 535, 536 (1913). 
Therefore, the per se approach has the effect of relieving the plaintiff of the usual need to show some 
injury. 
178. See, e.g., Gillis v. Chase, 67 N.H. 161,31 A. 18, 19 (1892). As the Supreme Court ofNew 
Hampshire explained, a cause of action should not exist unless there is an unauthorized and unrea-
sonable diversion. 
179. See, e.g., Lonsdale Co. v. City of Woonsocket, 25 R.I. 428, 56 A. 448, 451 (1903); Town 
of Purcellville v. Potts, 179 Va. 514, 19 S.E.2d 700, 703 (1942). According to the Virginia Supreme 
Court in Town of Purcellville v. Potts, the fact that the wrongdoer was a municipality, "clothed under 
the Constitution and statutes of the State with the power of acquiring the plaintiffs' riparian rights by 
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The courts using this rationale apparently assume that diversions by 
local governments are unanticipated by most riparians, who acquired 
their land with the expectation that they could exercise their rights in 
low-density areas.180 Besides having many of the same problems as 
the per se approach, this rationale also seems indefensible on broader 
policy grounds. Although the courts' reasoning may have reflected 
the expectations of riparians in the 1800's, most riparians today could 
not reasonably expect land near watercourses to remain unsettled and 
undeveloped. Furthermore, the assumption of low-density conflicts 
with the pro-development stance taken in other areas of property law. 
For example, in evaluating whether the grantee of an express ease-
ment increased his use impermissibly, the courts generally presume 
that the parties to the conveyance anticipated reasonable development 
of the benefitted estate.181 Although a different approach to public 
uses may be justifiable on the grounds that development in these other 
areas tends to involve private parties and thus tends to occur on a 
much smaller scale, the second rationale still has one major weakness: 
it fails to account for public consumptive rights in water resources in 
any significant respect. If the riparian doctrine is to remain the pri-
mary source of law governing consumptive use of watercourses in 
many jurisdictions, then it should recognize and attempt to accommo-
date the public interest. 
The third approach, followed in the majority of jurisdictions, 
views diversions to nonriparian land solely as a function of the ripa-
rian land requirement; that is, the fact that a party is diverting to 
nonriparian land only establishes a violation of the riparian land re-
striction and nothing more.1B2 Under the third approach, then, a ri-
parian complaining about a diversion still would have to establish the 
other elements of his burden of proof, principally that he has sus-
tained injury, to recover.183 
eminent domain," made the wrongdoer's conduct "all the more inexcusable." Purcellville, 19 S.E.2d 
at 703. 
180. See Pernell v. City of Henderson, 220 N.C. 79, 16 S.E.2d 449, 451 (1941); Salem Flouring 
Mills Co. v. Lord, 42 Or. 82, 69 P. 1033, 1039 (1902). As several courts have pointed out in re-
sponse, though, the cities merely are drawing water for their domestic needs, which is a preferred 
use. See, e.g., City of Canton v. Shock, 66 Ohio St. 19, 63 N.E. 600, 603 (1902). 
181. The law of easements, for instance, allows the holder of the dominant estate to increase 
his use of the servient estate so long as the increase is reasonable and does not overly burden the 
servient estate. See supra note 99. 
182. See Williams v. Wadsworth, 51 Conn. 277,304-05 (1883); Town of Gordonsville v. Zion, 
129 Va. 542, 106 S.E. 508 (1921); Roberts v. Martin, 72 W. Va. 92, 77 S.E. 535, 537 (1913). 
183. See supra note 112; see also infra note 198. 
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Despite its more restrictive definition of the no-diversion rule, the 
third approach also could present serious obstacles to localities at-
tempting to create public water supplies, especially if it is interpreted 
literally. Most diversions for public use would require the transfer of 
water to nonriparian land, often to areas in another part of the water-
shed and sometimes to areas outside of it. Courts examining the va-
lidity of these transfers understandably may wonder how they could 
uphold the diversions under the riparian doctrine and still be doctri-
nally consistent. As long as the riparian land restriction remains an 
essential part of the doctrine, the courts must prohibit substantial vio-
lations of the restriction. Permitting public use diversions to nonri-
parian land certainly would seem to violate that restriction. 
Although this reasoning is appealing, it fails to consider the argu-
ment advanced in the severability section that the riparian land re-
striction should be interpreted from a functional perspective to 
achieve greater consistency with other aspects of the riparian doc-
trine. Under a functional interpretation, the riparian land tests would 
serve primarily to identify the parties who have riparian rights to ex-
ercise or sell, while the concepts of severability, alienation, and diver-
sion then would govern redistribution of those rights. Additionally, 
the above reasoning ignores the main distinction between the first two 
approaches and the third explanation of the no-diversion rule. 
Whereas the first two approaches force a court to conclude automati-
cally that all public use diversions to nonriparian land are unreasona-
ble, regardless of their actual impact on other users or on other 
aspects of the riparian doctrine, the third approach permits considera-
tion of these types of factors. Under the third approach, a court could 
evaluate the policy implications of particular diversion situations and, 
where appropriate, permit diversions to nonriparian land. Such an 
evaluation will be conducted now. 
2. The Policy Implications of Specific Public Uses 
As observed in the severability section, the policy implications of 
a public consumptive use will vary according to the situation. If, for 
example, a public user is diverting water to land outside the water-
shed, then a court should use the riparian land rationale to ban the 
diversion. Just as in the severability situation involving transfers of 
riparian rights to a party intending to use the rights for land outside 
the watershed, permitting the diversion would seriously undermine 
the policies furthered by the watershed test. Besides leading to envi-
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ronmental problems, allowing the diversion also would raise signifi-
cant equitable concerns among water-rich localities and private 
users.184 Until water supply conditions in a watercourse's basin ap-
proach the point where demand is equal to supply and thus where 
pressing public needs require a rebalancing of policy concerns, the 
watershed test should continue to define the maximum area that can 
benefit from a watercourse. Iss 
Where, however, the diversion for public use is occurring within 
the same watershed, then the permissibility of the diversion should 
depend to an extent on the location of the benefitted land. If the di-
verted water is benefitting land that is not contiguous to the water-
course but once was part of the locality's tract of riparian land, then, 
as discussed earlier, many policy arguments favor allowing the diver-
sion as long as it meets the reasonable use requirement. At least 
where the increase in use is reasonable, the diversion should not un-
fairly impair the interests of other riparians along the watercourse. 
As with a private riparian proprietor, other riparians should have 
foreseen reasonable growth of the riparian locality. Any other ap-
proach would restrict development to private users. To be an efficient 
use, though, the value of the return flow must be considered part of 
the property rights of the public user.Is6 
In many public use diversion situations, the increase in use may 
not seem reasonable to other riparians. Unlike situations involving an 
individual riparian landowner, a riparian locality probably has devel-
184. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying texL The issue of severability and diversion are 
closely related and much of the analysis in the section on severability can be applied to the diversion 
question. 
185. Furthermore, even when that point is reached, it probably should be the legislature, and 
not the courts, which decides how to meet the needs of the water-poor region and which redefines 
the balance between the competing policy concerns. Granted, the courts have some devices which 
they could use in reordering policy concerns and achieving a new balance. Some interpretations of 
the public trust doctrine, for example, would permit a court to incorporate the goal of environmental 
preservation in a solution authorizing interbasin transfers. As interpreted by some courts, the public 
trust doctrine imposes an obligation on parties making allocation decisions involving navigable wa-
ters to consider and protect the public interest in the environmenL See, e.g., National Audubon 
Soc'y v. Superior Ct., 33 Cal. 3d 419, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 658 P.2d 709, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 413 
(1983). For further discussion of the public trust doctrine, see Sax, supra note 164. As a general 
matter, though, the courts would be less effective at developing a comprehensive solution for the 
water supply problems of the water-poor region. Unlike the legislature, for example, the courts 
could not impose adequate limitations on diversions, except as permitted by the particular contro-
versy before them. The courts also would have difficulty fashioning a solution that contained the 
political compromises needed to ensure that it would be acceptable to most, if not all, political 
subdivisions and citizens within a state. See generally Butler, supra note 12, at 777-80. 
186. See supra notes 149, 157, 158 and accompanying texL 
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oped significantly since it first acquired its riparian tract. Expecting 
other riparians to anticipate the development that occurred may be 
unreasonable. As a practical matter, then, permitting diversions in 
the second situation may not benefit public users significantly. De-
pending on the size of the locality's riparian holdings and the number 
of inhabitants, a court may choose to define reasonable growth at a 
level far below the actual number of inhabitants on subdivided parts. 
Whether the riparian land rationale and the severability principle 
should be interpreted to prevent a diversion to land that is within the 
watershed of the diverted watercourse but not part of the tract of land 
encompassing the diversion site is a more difficult question. Assum-
ing, once again, that the law is modified to account for return flow, 
then permitting the diversion would not seem to raise serious effi-
ciency problems. Because the benefitted land is within the watershed, 
the unused water could return to the watercourse. Also, allowing the 
diversion would encourage users to maximize the area of the water-
shed being benefitted by the watercourse.187 
The primary problems would appear to involve the important, 
but competing, equities discussed earlier. On the one hand, permit-
ting the diversion would seem to violate the riparian land restriction 
and elevate the public user above other riparians that normally would 
have priority of use. Riparians located above the benefitted land but 
below the site of diversion would have less water available to them 
than otherwise. On the other hand, prohibiting the diversion would 
limit the options of water-poor localities and force them to buy water 
on more unfavorable terms. By increasing the number of people bene-
fitting on competitive terms, the diversion arguably would result in a 
more equitable, as well as efficient, distribution of water resources. As 
the number of satisfied parties rose, the number of parties characteriz-
ing the allocation system as fair also would increase. Furthermore, a 
court could deal with the concern that the public user's status would 
be elevated above other riparians by evaluating the reasonableness of 
the diversion as suggested earlier.188 
187. But, to the extent that permitting diversions reduces the certainty of the rights of 
nondiverting riparians, the diversions would be inefficient. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying 
text. 
188. See supra Part II.B. Furthermore, it could be argued that preferring a locality which is 
diverting for public domestic use merely would be recognizing that local governments now conduct 
most of the domestic uses traditionally preferred under the riparian doctrine. 
Allowing courts to evaluate the lawfulness of public use diversions on a case-by-case basis 
would cause some planning problems for localities. As the courts developed a rational diversion 
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To achieve a proper balance between these concerns, the courts 
need to recognize that public diversions fall within one of two catego-
ries. The first category includes those situations where the diverter 
has attempted to acquire, by purchase or condemnation, sufficient ri-
parian land or rights to justify the diversion. The second category 
includes those situations where the diverter has not attempted to give 
adequate value189 for the consumptive rights actually being exercised. 
Although the diverter may own a tract of riparian land or may have 
acquired the riparian rights for the tract of land encompassing the 
diversion site, the land to which the use rights attach usually is small 
in comparison to the area being served by the diversion. 
Permitting those diversions falling in the first category does not 
seem too troubling because of the value paid for the use rights. 
Courts and legislatures have been willing to protect the interests of 
bona fide purchasers for value in a variety of situations.190 Allowing 
the second type of diversion, however, raises the fairness concerns dis-
cussed earlier. These concerns seem serious enough, at first glance, to 
justify a judicial ban on all diversions in the second category. Closer 
scrutiny, however, reveals that the fairness concerns may relate more 
to the value paid in relation to the quantity of water being diverted 
than to the actual occurrence of the diversion. 
If this is indeed the main point of contention with the second 
type of public use diversion, then the courts could deal with the prob-
lem of the nonpaying diverter through careful application of the rea-
standard, though, more planning could occur. Also, a declaratory judgment procedure could help, 
in appropriate circumstances, to alleviate the problem. 
189. In most jurisdictions paying value requires parting with money, goods, or services that 
represent a substantial portion of the purchased property's market worth. See, e.g., Worthy v. Cad-
dell, 76 N.C. 82, 86 (1877). See generally 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY§ 17.10 (A. Casner ed. 
1952). Under this approach, then, giving a promise to pay would not constitute value even though it 
would be sufficient to support a contract. Compare Bell v. Pierschbacher, 245 Iowa 436, 62 N.W.2d 
784 (1954) (following this approach) with U.C.C. § 1-201(44)(d) (defining value as being given when 
a party parts with "any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract"). 
190. See generally 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY§ 17.10 (A. Casner ed. 1952). Bona fide 
purchasers for value, for example, can prevail over a prior claimant when the purchasers take an 
interest in realty not recorded by the claimant as required under the relevant state's recording stat-
ute. See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW§ 291 (McKinney 1968); VA. CoDE§ 55-96 (Supp. 1983). 
Additionally, they may prevail in many states when they purchase a voidable title, see Phelps v. 
McQuade, 220 N.Y. 232, 115 N.E. 441 (1917), or purchase from a party clothed with indicia of 
ownership by the prior owner, see O'Connor's Administratrix v. Clark, 170 Pa. 318, 32 A. 1029 
(1895). See also U.C.C. § 2-403 (1972) (adopting, with some modifications, the voidable title excep-
tion, as well as a new exception known as the merchant entrustment exception). See generally Do-
lan, The U.C.C. Framework: Conveyancing Principles and Property Interests, 59 B.U.L. R.Bv. 811 
(1979). 
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sonable use requirement. That is, where the diverter is attempting to 
justify the diversion on the basis of its own use rights, the courts could 
apply the modified reasonable use requirement suggested earlier to de-
fine the diverter's rights. Under the modified requirement, a public 
user generally could divert as much water as would be reasonable for 
the tract of land encompassing the diversion site.191 When doubt ex-
ists about the reasonableness of a diversion, the party proposing it 
should bear the risk of nonpersuasion. A party pursuing a new use 
like a diversion should not be able to upset established uses and rights 
without clearly demonstrating the reasonableness of the new use. If 
the public user fails to meet this burden, then it can try to acquire the 
rights of the parties who would be injured by the diversion.192 
This suggested approach to public use diversions makes several 
key assumptions. First, the proposal assumes that the law will recog-
nize the value of return flow as a property interest and thus reduce the 
inefficiencies that otherwise could result from a diversion. Second, 
the proposal assumes that the courts will recognize the need to adopt 
safeguards to minimize conflicts with other aspects of the riparian 
doctrine and to protect the reliance interests of neighboring ripari-
ans.193 Although the arguments favoring modernization of the ripa-
rian doctrine are compelling, judicial modifications should, to the 
191. See supra note 161 and accompanying text. In determining whether a use is reasonable, a 
court should consider the status of the user, the status of the benefitted land as upper or lower 
riparian land, the size of the diversion-site tract, the distance between the diversion-site tract and the 
benefitted tract, and other factors traditionally considered. 
192. See infra notes 208-12 and accompanying text. The uncertainty of the reasonable use 
standard thus could operate as an equitable safety valve for the benefit of users opposing the 
diversion. 
193. The need to adopt safeguards to protect the policies of the riparian land requirement 
becomes more apparent when the severability and diversion concepts are involved in the same situa-
tion. Suppose, for example, that a private riparian transfers use rights to a locality located down-
stream to the private riparian and that the locality plans to divert water from the transferor's upper 
tract to the locality's lower tract for public use. The proposed diversion raises several interesting 
questions concerning the priority and reasonableness of the public use. If the diversion is allowed, 
priority of use still should be defined by the benefitted land's position in the watershed. The public 
user generally should not be able to acquire a higher priority because of the upper riparian status of 
its transferor. 
Perhaps the more interesting question raised by the proposed diversion concerns whether the 
reasonableness of the public use should be measured by the upper or lower tract of land. The fairest 
approach would appear to be to focus on the expectations of the complaining riparian. If that ripa-
rian is located below the upper and lower tracts of riparian land, then he would have expected to 
receive the watercourse's flow after reasonable use by the owners of both tracts. The diverter thus 
should be able to take the reasonable share for both tracts without undermining these expectations. 
If the complaining riparian is between the two tracts, however, he would have expected to 
receive the stream flow after reasonable use by the upper tract only. He would not have measured 
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extent possible, protect legitimate expectations. Possible safeguards 
include continuing to focus on position in the watershed to define gen-
eral priorities of use and measuring the reasonableness of a diverter's 
use in terms of the diversion site and not the benefitted tract. Third, 
the proposal assumes that the courts will be willing to change some of 
the outdated assumptions used in determining the reasonableness of a 
use. The courts, for example, would need to change their assumption 
that riparians are individuals who expect their lands to remain rela-
tively undeveloped. 
With these modifications, the suggested approach should permit 
public use diversions only when serious impairment to existing inter-
ests would not occur. By carefully using the reasonable use require-
ment to measure the rights of diverters, the courts should be able to 
distinguish between the two types of public use diverters. Those pub-
lic users who have purchased sufficient use rights to justify the diver-
sions generally should be permitted to conduct the diversions.I94 
Artificial interpretations of the riparian land and reasonable use re-
strictions should not prevent or limit their public consumptive uses. 
Nor should such interpretations result in narrow rulings on the suffi-
ciency of a public user's rights. Where, however, the diverter has not 
paid value for all the use rights that it is exercising, the diverter 
should not be able to claim the right to continue the diversion on the 
strength of its riparian rights. Although this approach often may 
force the nonpaying public user to go to the marketplace to satisfy its 
public's consumptive needs, 195 the approach seems to be the fairest 
his rights in terms of the lower tract. In this situation then, it would only seem fair to permit a 
diversion of a reasonable share for the upper tract. See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
194. Furthermore, efficiency and equity concerns support adopting legal rules enabling a pub--
lic user to predict with some degree of certainty whether a diversion plan involving acquisition of use 
rights would be upheld. At the present time the lawfulness of such plans is unclear in many tradi-
tional riparian jurisdictions. See, e.g., supra notes 169-70 (describing uncertainty surrounding public 
use diversion plans in Virginia). 
195. A locality may have to purchase a significant amount of riparian rights to enable it to 
divert, depending on the status of the transferor. If, for example, the transferor is a private agrarian, 
then under the suggested approach the reasonableness of transferee's diversion initially would be 
defined by the transferor's rights and by what a reasonable development of his land would permit. 
So where the agrarian owns a small farm, his rights generally would not permit a large-scale diver-
sion. 
Adopting a legal rule that permitted intrabasin diversions where the diverter acquired sufficient 
use rights to justify the diversion admittedly would impose hardships on localities financially unable 
to purchase the necessary rights. The legislatures in some riparian states presently are considering 
ways to alleviate the financial burdens associated with water and other public works projects. In 
Virginia, for example, the General Assembly called for a reexamination of the financial relationship 
between state and local governments. H.J. Res. 12, 1983 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., 1983 VA. ACTS 
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way for the courts to balance the competing public and private inter-
ests under the riparian doctrine. Also, at least under this approach, a 
locality would know that it could conduct a diversion if it purchased 
sufficient use rights. Whether the nonpaying diverter could justify its 
diversions on other grounds, by, for example, attacking the rights of 
the complaining riparian, will be discussed in the remaining section of 
Part III. 
In conclusion, the various approaches used to explain the no-
diversion rule offer a range of alternatives for dealing with the public's 
consumptive needs. The second approach, which focuses on the sta-
tus of a user, seems the least acceptable of the three, given the devel-
opment patterns near watercourses and the importance of the relevant 
public policy concerns. Although less objectionable, the per se ration-
ale also has some troubling consequences. Because all diversions to 
nonriparian land would be per se unreasonable, a court could not ex-
amine the actual effects of such a diversion on the reasonable use 
rights of neighboring riparians. The per se approach thus limits the 
extent to which courts could permit diversions by upholding market-
place transfers of use rights or by creating exceptions to the no-diver-
sion rule. 
If properly interpreted, the riparian land approach could give the 
courts the greatest flexibility in dealing with diversions. A proper in-
terpretation would involve recognizing that the riparian land restric-
tion defines which parties have riparian rights to exercise or transfer, 
as well as modifying the riparian land and the reasonable use stan-
dards as suggested. Whether this interpretation would lead to greater 
recognition of public consumptive interests then would depend on a 
jurisdiction's approach to the severability principle. If a jurisdiction 
interprets the severability principle broadly and follows a modified 
1247; H.J. Res. 105, 1982 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., 1982 VA. Acrs 1646. In 1984 it received a 
detailed report studying the matter and recommending, among other things, that a more equitable 
and stable funding program be established. JOINT LEGISLATIVE AUDIT AND REVIEW CoMM'N, 
REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE GENERAL AssEMBLY OF VIRGINIA ON STATE MANDATES 
ON LocAL GOVERNMENTS AND LocAL FINANCIAL REsOURCES, H. Doc. No. 15 (1984). In that 
same year the Virginia General Assembly also received a report from the State Water Study Com-
mission recommending the establishment of a Water and Sewer Assistance Authority to help local 
governments finance needed water supply and wastewater treatment projects. See STATE WATER 
STUDY CoMM'N, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE GENERAL AssEMBLY OF VIRGINIA, H. 
Doc. No. 32, at 4-6, app. D (1984). Intended to alleviate the "critical need" for funding of such 
projects, the Authority would be empowered to receive public and private funds to be used for 
borrowing in the bond market and making loans and grants to local governments for construction of 
appropriate infrastructure projects. /d. at app. D, §§ 62.1-198, -203 to -218. 
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view of the riparian land restriction, a nonriparian locality in an ade-
quately sized watershed should be able to buy up enough riparian 
rights to entitle it to divert for use by its inhabitants. But, even if a 
jurisdiction follows a narrow approach to severability, diversions by 
public users still may be possible. Unlike the other two approaches to 
the no-diversion rule, the riparian land approach permits the develop-
ment of exceptions to the no-diversion rule. Part III.B. discusses 
those exceptions. 
B. Permitting Public Consumptive Uses Through Exceptions to the 
No-Diversion Rule 
Even under a traditional interpretation of the riparian doctrine, 
some exceptions to the no-diversion rule exist. Two related excep-
tions could, under certain circumstances, enable localities to divert 
significant quantities of water. The first exception, known as the sur-
plus water doctrine, focuses on whether a diversion involves excess or 
surplus water.196 A riparian generally is entitled to receive only the 
flow of a watercourse after reasonable use by upstream riparians.197 
Thus, if a locality is diverting water in excess of the natural flow of a 
watercourse, the locality could argue that the water being diverted is 
surplus water and that its conduct therefore is not interfering with the 
rights of riparians along the watercourse. 
196. The courts have had great difficulty defining surplus water. For instance, although they 
generally agree that flood waters would be surplus water, they have disagreed about whether flood 
waters would lose that status if the flooding was an annual occurrence. Compare Motl v. Boyd, 116 
Tex. 82, 286 S.W. 458, 463 (1926) (surplus exists when water is above line of highest ordinary flow 
''uninfluenced by recent rainfall or surface runoff") with Herminghaus v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 
200 Cal. 81, 252 P. 607, 610 (1926) (annual flooding constitutes "usual and ordinary" flow of the 
river). For a discussion of the courts' approach to defining flood waters and to diversions of such 
waters see Teass, Water and Water Courses-Riparian Rights-Diversion of Stonn or Flood Waters 
for Use on Nonriparian Land, 18 VA. L. REv. 223 (1932). 
197. This definition of a riparian's rights is known as the "reasonable use theory." Another 
approach also developed under early common law and still is used in some riparian jurisdictions 
today. Referred to as the English or "natural flow theory," it provides that a riparian only has the 
right to receive the natural flow of a stream, undiminished, except nominally, by other riparians' 
uses. Under this approach a use that was reasonable under the first theory would not be permitted if 
it substantially diminished the flow. Although most riparian jurisdictions have adopted the reason-
able use theory, a few still appear to follow the natural flow theory. See supra note 13. See generally 
Introductory Note on the Nature of Riparian Rights and Legal Theories for Detennination of the 
Rights in REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 41, at 209-13 (1977). Some courts have given 
inconsistent signals and have failed to distinguish clearly between the two. Compare, e.g., Town of 
Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 106 S.E. 508, 514 (1921) (using natural flow language) with 
Virginia Hot Springs Co. v. Hoover, 143 Va. 460, 130 S.E. 408, 410 (1925) (using reasonable use 
language). 
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The second exception arises because riparian jurisdictions gener-
ally require a riparian to establish injury before he can obtain relief for 
an unlawful use.198 The extent to which this exception overlaps with 
198. See, e.g., Elliot v. Fitchburg R.R. Co., 64 Mass. (10 Cush.) 191, 197 (1852). See generally 
1A G. THOMPSON, supra note 74, § 272 (1980). One of the underlying reasons for the injury re-
quirement is the principle de minimis non curat lex-that is, that the law does not concern itself with 
trivial matters. Where a use does not have an adverse effect on others, it should not be enjoined. 
Stratton v. Mt. Hermon Boys' School, 216 Mass. 83, 103 N.E. 87, 88 (1913). Courts have had 
difficulty defining injury. They generally require some perceptible damage to the rights of another 
riparian. C<Jmpare People v. Hulbert, 131 Mich. 156, 91 N.W. 211, 213 (1902) (injury exists if use 
destroys, renders useless, or materially diminishes flow) with Lawrie v. Silsby, 76 Vt. 240, 56 A. 
1106, 1109 (1904) (injury must be palpable or perceptible). 
Under the early approach to the injury requirement, courts required the plaintiff to show injury 
to some present use, which meant that if plaintiff riparian was not making any use of the watercourse 
he could not establish injury to his rights. See 2 H. FARNHAM, supra note 13, § 499, at 1651 & n.2. 
Yet, if a court denied recovery on this ground, it was jeopardizing plaintifi's future exercise of his 
riparian rights. By the time plaintiff actually used the watercourse, he may have lost the ability to 
sue, either because his waiting would be interpreted as acquiescence or because defendant acquired 
the right to divert by prescription. Because of this dilemma, many jurisdictions adopted the position 
that sufficient injury existed and relief therefore was justified where defendant could acquire a pre-
scriptive right by continuing his use. See, e.g., Parker v. Griswold, 17 Conn. 288, 303 (1845); Town 
of Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 106 S.E. 508, 514 (1921); see also 2 H. FARNHAM, supra note 
13, § 499, at 1651-52. Although some cases indicate that courts following this approach presume 
injury to a lower riparian whenever an unlawful diversion to nonriparian land occurs, see, e.g., Town 
of Purcellville v. Potts, 179 Va. 514, 19 S.E.2d 700, 704 (1942), others appear to recognize that such 
a diversion may not necessarily cause injury to riparian rights (e.g., where surplus water is diverted), 
see, e.g., Harris v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 153 N.C. 542, 69 S.E. 623, 624 (1910); Town of Gor-
donsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 106 S.E. 508, 515 (1921). 
Many riparian jurisdictions allow a riparian to protect his future as well as his present needs. In 
Virginia Hot Springs Co. v. Hoover, 143 Va. 460, 130 S.E. 408 (1925), for example, several riparian 
owners sought to enjoin a nonriparian from diverting water from a spring to a nonriparian resort 
hotel. Defendant claimed it was entitled to divert the water because it had been assigned the rights 
of a riparian proprietor of the spring. The court granted plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunc-
tion, reasoning that defendant's diversion for nonriparian use would injure plaintiffs' land in times of 
drought. Hoover, 130 S.B. at 410. The court reached this conclusion in spite of evidence showing 
that the stream only had been dry twice in thirty years, noting that future reasonable uses may be 
considered but must be based on more than mere speculation. /d. Where, for instance, lower ripari-
ans argued that manufacturing was a possible future use, but failed to show such use was reasonable 
in light of the character of the land, the power of the watercourse, or even future construction plans, 
the court limited its inquiry to domestic uses. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Graham Land & Improve-
ment Co., 10 Va. L. Reg. 983, 989 (Cir. Ct. 1904). See generally 2 H. FARNHAM, supra note 13, 
§468. 
Whether a lower riparian establishes injury to present uses, however, may affect the type of 
relief to which he is entitled. If the plaintiff fails to establish actual injury, then the most he could 
recover at law is nominal damages. Diversion alone, without evidence of actual damages, will not 
warrant substantial recovery at law. Elliot v. Fitchburg R.R. Co., 64 Mass. (10 Cush.) 191, 197 
(1852); see also Virginia Hot Springs Co. v. Hoover, 143 Va. 467, 130 S.E. 408, 410 (1925) (sug-
gesting that not even nominal damages may be recovered). Equity, however, may grant an injunc-
tion even though a lower riparian has not sustained any actual injury. Where an unlawful diversion 
is an infringement of his property rights, equity generally will allow the lower riparian to vindicate 
his rights and prevent their loss by adverse use. See Purcellville, 19 S.E.2d at 704. As long as 
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the surplus water doctrine depends on how the courts define injury. 
Where actual injury or harm is required, the injury exception would 
be more expansive than the surplus water doctrine. The injury excep-
tion, for instance, could be used to protect a party who was diverting 
part of another riparian's reasonable share, or nonsurplus water. If 
that other riparian was not conducting any uses and otherwise not 
exercising his- rights, he eould not establish actual h&~. But where 
the courts define injury broadly to include any potential or threatened 
harm, then the conflict could be resolved similarly under either the-
ory. Because the water being diverted in the example represents a 
portion of another riparian's reasonable share, it could not qualify for 
protection as surplus water. Nor could the diversion fall within the 
injury exception, for at least one riparian should be able to establish 
potential harm to the future exercise of his reasonable use rights. 
Courts in riparian jurisdictions have differed in their approaches 
to the surplus water and injury exceptions. Some have accepted both 
doctrines as welcome limitations to the no-diversion rule.199 Others 
have been hesitant to accept or reject the exceptions. 200 One factor 
plaintiff's legal right is "clear, and its violation palpable" and as long as plaintiff' has not slept on his 
rights, "equity ordinarily will interfere, although the right has not been established at law." Carpen-
ter v. Gold, 88 Va. 551, 14 S.E. 329, 330 {1892); accord REsTATEMF.NT {SECOND) OP TORTS§ 850A 
comment m (1977). 
Where damages are sought, the measure of damages usually is the difference between the mar-
ket value of the entire tract before and after the injury, and not the amount of loss to the injured 
right. See Rider v. York Haven Water & Power Co., 251 Pa. 18, 95 A. 803, 804 (1915); Norfolk & 
W. Ry. Co. v. Allen & Sons, 122 Va. 603, 95 S.E. 406, 409 (1918). Sometimes, however, courts allow 
evidence of the reduced value of the damaged portion. See, e.g., Baltimore & P. R.R. Co. v. Fifth 
Baptist Church, 108 U.S. 317, 335 (1883); Southern Ry. Co. v. Watts, 134 Va. 503, 114 S.E. 736 
(1922). The courts generally do not award punitive damages, in the absence of malice, wantonness, 
or fraud. See Rider v. York Haven Water & Power Co., 95 A. at 804. For a discussion of the 
remedies available to riparians see REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OP TORTS§ 850A comment m (1977). 
199. See, e.g., Texas Co. v. Burkett, 117 Tex. 16, 296 S.W. 273, 276 (1927) (diversion allowed if 
water supply abundant); Lawrie v. Silsby, 76 Vt. 240, 56 A. 1106, 1109 (1904) (diversion allowed if 
no actual injury). 
200. Virginia authorities, for instance, have given conflicting signals about their approach to 
the surplus water doctrine. In Town of Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 106 S.E. 508 (1921), the 
Virginia Supreme Court suggests that under proper circumstances it would recognize the surplus 
water argument as a valid justification for a diversion. The suggestion arose while the court was 
discussing whether injury could be established in a situation where other riparians would not suffer 
actual damages and would not have the prescriptive period running against them. Although the 
court acknowledges that the case before it did not involve such a situation, the court states that 
under those circumstances "the court below might properly have declined to decide the issue of right 
raised between the parties to the suit and might have properly refused to award the injunction." 
Zinn, 106 S.E. at 515. 
More recent Virginia cases recognizing the common law right of a municipality to sell surplus 
water appear to provide further support for the exception. In one decision, City of Martinsville v. 
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apparently affecting how a court reacts to the exceptions is the ration-
ale that it uses to explain the no-diversion rule. 
Depending on the courts' interpretation, the second approach, 
which declares public use diversions by localities to be unreasonable, 
could seriously restrict the effectiveness of the two exceptions in per-
mitting public consumptive uses. Because the second approach is not 
fully developed, it could be interpreted as focusing on the status of the 
diverter as a local government, the public nature of the use, the size of 
the locality conducting the diversion, or any combination of the 
above. If a court considers the status of the diverter as a local govem-
ment201 or the public nature of the use to be the focus of the second 
rationale, then the no-diversion rule would appear to reject both ex-
Board of Supervisors, 222 Va. 505, 281 S.E.2d 883 (1981), the state supreme court summarily states 
that "[a] city has the power, without the aid of statute, to sell its surplus water rather than permit-
ting it to be wasted," even to "customers beyond the corporate limits." Martinsville, 281 S.E.2d at 
884-85. Although this statement suggests that the surplus water argument is valid, the court in 
Martinsville did not actually address the question of whether the local government's surplus water 
was obtained lawfully and indeed seems to assume that it was. An examination of Mount Jackson v. 
Nelson, 151 Va. 396, 145 S.E. 355 (1928), cited by the Martinsville court in support of its summary 
statement, Martinsville, 281 S.E.2d at 885, more clearly demonstrates this point. In Mount Jackson 
v. Nelson, the court concludes that "a city in possession of surplus water, lawfully acquired," may 
sell the surplus to persons beyond the corporate limits. Mount Jackson, 145 S.E. at 357 (emphasis 
added). The court explains its conclusion by describing it as a matter of"[c]ommon sense." id., and 
by noting that such action would be needed to avoid waste, id. In yet another decision, the court 
provides additional justification for the common law right to sell surplus water, observing that 
"[m]en of wisdom look towards future needs," that planning for those "future needs" sometimes can 
result in surplus energy and that it would be "unreasonable" and uneconomical to "hold that the 
surplus energy thereby created should be denied others in the community, separated only from the 
city by an invisible geographical or political line." Light v. City of Danville, 168 Va. 181, 190 S.E. 
276, 285 (1937). Thus, although the cases recognizing the common law right to sell surplus water 
may not support the surplus water doctrine directly, the policies reflected in this common law right 
appear to justify the doctrine. 
Other Virginia authorities, however, indicate that diversion of surplus water is impermissible. 
A state Attorney General opinion written more than fifty years after Town of Gordonsville v. Zinn, 
for instance, summarily dismisses the argument as "questionable unless authorized by statute." 
1971-1972 OP. OF THE ATT'Y GEN. OF VA. 80 (1972). Similar discrepancies appear in other Vir-
ginia authorities. Compare, e.g., 1967-1968 OP. OF THE ATT'Y GEN. OF VA. 297-98 (1967) (diver-
sion of "excess water" is lawful as long as lower ripariaos are not adversely affected) with STATE 
WATER STUDY COMM'N, INTERIM REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE GENERAL AssEMBLY OF 
VIRGINIA, S. Doc. No. 21, app. I (1979) (rejecting surplus water doctrine). 
Legal authorities in other jurisdictions appear to be just as confused as Virginia about the doc-
trine. This confusion stems in part from the problems the courts have experienced in trying to define 
surplus water. See supra note 196. 
201. If the key factor is the status of the diverter as a local government, then a no-diversion 
rule explained in those terms arguably may not cover diversions by private parties, perhaps not even 
where those parties are supplying water to the locality's inhabitants. Furthermore, even if the courts 
also ban diversions by private parties, the use of this factor as the rationale suggests that a court may 
be adopting a per se rule for public diverters but not private diverters. 
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ceptions. Any diversion conducted by a locality or for a public pur-
pose would be unreasonable, even where the diversion involved 
surplus water or did not cause injury. If, however, the size or density 
of the municipal diverter is the crucial factor, then a no-diversion rule 
explained in those terms conceivably could be interpreted as permit-
ting diversions by sparsely populated localities where the diversions 
involved surplus water or did not injure other riparians. 
Using the per se rationale also limits the effectiveness of both 
exceptions. Under the per se approach, a court automatically would 
have to declare diversions to nonriparian land to be unreasonable and 
therefore injurious to riparians below the diversion site, regardless of 
whether injury actually occurred. Similar reasoning should prevent a 
court from using the surplus water doctrine to protect diversions by 
public users. Because the court would be forced to find all diversions 
to nonriparian land to be unreasonable, it could not consider a diver-
sion's actual impact on the flow rights of neighboring riparians.202 
These limitations would not exist if a court used the riparian land 
rationale to explain the no-diversion rule and if it were willing to in-
terpret the riparian land requirement as suggested. Using such an ap-
proach would p~rmit a court to evaluate the reasonableness of a 
diversion according to the facts and circumstances of the particular 
situation and to consider the actual consequences of the challenged 
use. As long as a public use diversion involved a reasonable quantity 
of water and did not interfere with the flow and reasonable use rights 
of neighboring riparians, a court could permit the diversion even 
though it was to nonriparian land. 203 But if the riparian land restric-
tion were interpreted strictly, then this third explanation of the no-
diversion rule would appear to prevent, or at least limit, application of 
the exceptions like the other two approaches.204 
Regardless of the exact nature of the relationship between the 
two exceptions and the various approaches to the no-diversion rule, 
both exceptions can be justified by economic and equitable considera-
202. See supra note 198. 
203. So if the diversion were based on a stream's natural flow before reasonable use by upper 
riparians, a diverter would not rely on this argument to justify the diversion. 
204. It could be argued that a strict interpretation of the riparian land restriction primarily 
would limit use of the surplus water exception and would make the actual injury exception the key 
exception. Such an interpretation would prohibit all diversions of surplus water to nonriparian land, 
except where the diversion did not cause injury to other riparians. Under this interpretation, then, 
the fact that surplus water was being diverted would be one factor to be considered in determining 
whether other riparians were injured. 
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tions. Allowing diversions within a watershed when surplus water is 
used or when neighboring riparians would not be injured should pro-
mote more efficient uses of the watercourse. The diversions not only 
would increase the area in the watershed being benefitted by the wa-
tercourse, but also would reduce the percentage of water in the water-
course not being used. Furthermore, because other riparians would 
be receiving their reasonable share, they should not have reason to 
complain about the harsh or unfair effects of the diversion on their 
rights.205 
Neighboring 'riparians, however, may be justified in questioning 
the fairness of permitting the diversions on a more general level. 
Although their rights may not actually be injured by the diversions, 
many of them would have acquired their riparian rights through legit-
imate marketplace transactions. In contrast, the locality seeking to 
protect its diversion under the surplus water or injury exceptions 
often has not attempted to purchase sufficient use rights to support 
the diversion. Despite this more general "injustice," it seems prefera-
ble to favor the approach that promotes an efficient use of a water-
course, at least until other riparians establish injury. 
Furthermore, even neighboring riparians may not find their last 
argument so compelling once they realize that the surplus water and 
injury exceptions do not provide permanent solutions to the water 
supply problems of water-poor localities. By definition, diversions 
based on those exceptions can continue without legal repercussions 
only so long as surplus water exists or injury does not occur. Addi-
tionally, a locality conducting diversions under either exception prob-
ably could not seek judicial protection of its use against unlawful 
conduct by others. Both theories permit diversions because neighbor-
ing riparians cannot sue, and not because the diverter has acquired a 
legally protected riparian right. 
A public user that desires a more permanent solution can pursue 
several other exceptions to the no-diversion rule. It, for instance, can 
attempt to acquire the necessary rights and interests entitling it to 
divert by prescription.206 This exception, however, requires long, con-
205. To the extent, though, that lower riparians come to expect and rely on flooding that 
occurs regularly, they may have reason to complain. See Thompson v. New Haven Water Co., 86 
Conn. 597, 86 A. 585 (1913); Hyatt v. Albro, 121 Mich. 638, 80 N.W. 641 (1899). 
206. See, e.g., Town of Gordonsville v. Zion, 129 Va. 542, 106 S.E. 508 (1921). An interesting 
issue raised by the suggestion that riparian rights can be acquired by prescription concerns whether 
the prescriptive right could include interbasin transfers and other uses not generally considered to be 
within the rights of most riparians. To resolve this issue, the court must recognize that what ripari-
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tinuous, wrongful use and thus would not be as effective as the first 
two exceptions.207 It also would not permit much foresight and plan-
ning. To ensure greater planning, a locality instead can try to negoti-
ate with riparians below a proposed diversion site to obtain a release 
and prevent them from subsequently complaining about the diver-
sions. Courts generally will uphold a contract that restricts or alters 
riparian rights and even may allow specific perform-ance if damages 
would not adequately compensate the aggrieved party.208 If numer-
ous riparians are involved, though, the release approach may not be 
feasible. Those riparians who negotiated with the locality near the 
end of the process probably would hold out for consideration greater 
than the normal market value of their rights. 209 
Where voluntary negotiations are not feasible, eminent domain 
proceedings can prove effective, providing that the locality has suffi-
cient eminent domain powers and financial resources to acquire the 
necessary interests. As the preceding discussion demonstrates, the 
ans would be losing is their right to complain about the unlawful use. Although riparians may not 
be permitted to conduct the uses themselves, they still could be injured by the prescriptive use. 
Thus, the more accurate approach to defining the prescriptive right -would appear to be to describe 
the prescriptive user as acquiring the right to continue a use that harms other riparians, and not as 
acquiring the right to conduct the use from an unwilling riparian. But even then courts probably 
would strictly interpret the scope of the prescriptive use right to limit it to the use actually acquired 
by prescription. See Hamsberger, Prescriptive Water Rights in Wisconsin, 1961 WIS. L. REv. 47 
(1961) (discussing the courts' approach to defining prescriptive rights in Wisconsin). 
207. The length of the prescriptive period varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In Virginia, 
for example, the period would be 20 years. Although VA. CoDE § 8.01-236 (1984) sets forth a IS-
year period for recovery of land, the statutory period apparently only applies to adverse possession. 
See Leake v. Richardson, 199 Va. 967, 103 S.E.2d 227 (1958). The common law period of20 years 
thus still governs prescriptive use in Virginia. See Cornett v. Rhudy, 80 Va. 710 (1885). 
Where a locality fails to acquire a use right by prescription, it still could acquire the right, after 
the fact, by condemnation. Under appropriate circumstances courts have stayed proceedings 
brought by an injured riparian against a locality to permit the locality to condemn the interests of the 
injured party. See, e.g., Town of Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 106 S.E. 508 (1921). For a 
discussion of the eminent domain alternative see infra notes 210-12 and accompanying texl 
208. See, e.g., Colmenero Canal Co. v. Babers, 80 Ariz. 339, 297 P.2d 927 (1956); Daniels v. 
Bethlehem Mines Corp., 391 Pa. 195, 137 A.2d 304 (1958); Brisco Home Trustees v. Ohio River R. 
Co., 78 W.Va. 502, 89 S.E. 727 (1916). See generally 2 H. FARNHAM, supra note 13, § 470, at 1587-
88. Although the release approach may have the same practical effect as a conveyance of riparian 
rights, a release is not an "effective substitute for a true grant of a riparian righl, REsrATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 856 comment b (1977). As the REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS explains, 
a release generally "operates only between the parties, and is viewed as a covenant not to sue, not a 
property righl Id. But see Whittenton Mfg. Co. v. Staples, 164 Mass. 319, 41 N.E. 441 (1895) 
(agreement involving flowage may be binding in equity against subsequent grantee). Thus, in many 
jurisdictions the remedies available for breach of a release should differ from those available for 
infringement of a riparian right. 
209. See R. POSNER, supra note 113, § 3.5, at 40. 
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"necessary interests, theoretically would include the reasonable use 
rights of all riparians located below the point of diversion who would 
be affected by the diversion, as well as easements to lay conduit pipes 
across riparian and nonriparian land located between the diversion 
site and the destination area. If the watercourse is a major river, as 
would probably be the case where a public water supply project is 
involved, these acquisitions can be very costly.21° Furthermore, even 
if a locality has sufficient financial resources, its condemnation of ap-
propriate interests may not be legally possible. A local government 
can only exercise its eminent domain powers to acquire private inter-
ests when the condemnation is for a public use. When the private 
interests are water rights, this principle has been interpreted to mean 
that the condemnation cannot produce a significant private benefit.211 
Thus, if only a few of a locality's inhabitants would benefit from the 
condemned rights, or if the primary purpose of the condemnation is 
to meet the business needs of a few private users, the condemnation 
may not be possible.212 
The limited effectiveness of the exceptions to the no-diversion 
rule demonstrates the inadequacy of traditional riparian principles in 
providing for the consumptive needs of the public. Expanding the 
two principal common-law exceptions, the surplus water doctrine and 
the injury exception, would provide relief for the public user, but 
210. The city of Virginia Beach, Virginia, for example, has estimated that its plan to divert 
water from Lake Gaston and transfer it almost ninety miles will cost $190 million for the initial 
capital investment and $18 million annually for maintenance. For a discussion of the plan see supra 
note 170. Thus, unless a jurisdiction is financially sound, the eminent domain alternative may be 
impractical. But cf. supra note 195 (mentioning financial assistance bills for local governments). 
The viability of the condemnation and purchase alternatives also depends on a jurisdiction's 
approach to the severability principle. If riparian rights are severable, then a local government can 
condemn just the appropriate riparian rights, which would be less costly than acquiring the riparian 
land as well. Apparently aware of the difference in costs, many courts allow condemnation of the 
riparian rights without condemnation of the respective riparian land or submerged bed. See, eg., 
Clear Creek Water Co. v. Gladeville Improvement Co., 107 Va. 278, 58 S.E. 586, 588 (1907); State v. 
Superior Court, 48 Wash. 277, 93 P. 423, 425 (1908). See generally J. LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE 
LAW OF EMINENT DoMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES§ 56 (1888) (recognizing that rights incident to 
land may be separately condemned). However, where a statute specifies what may be condemned, a 
lesser interest may not be taken. Charlottesville v. Maury, 96 Va. 383, 31 S.E. 520, 521 (1898). The 
value of the condemned riparian rights usually is measured by diminution in value. See J. LEWIS, 
supra, § 464. 
211. See, e.g., Burger v. City of Beatrice, 181 Neb. 213, 147 N.W.2d 784 (1967). Thus, to be 
permissible, the primary benefit of the condemnation should be to supply the domestic needs of the 
locality's public. See generally Hams berger, Eminent Domain in Water Law, 48 NEB. L. REv. 325, 
366-69 (1969). 
212. See, e.g., Burger v. City of Beatrice, 181 Neb. 213, 147 N.W.2d 784 (1967). For further 
discussion of this issue see Hamsberger, supra note 211. 
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probably would not be appropriate. Although the temporary nature 
of the exceptions may impose an unfair burden on the locality con-
ducting the diversion, greater unfairness would result if the two ex-
ceptions were broadened to permit a locality to conduct the diversion 
on a regular basis when the locality did not own sufficient use rights 
to justify the diversion. Unless a locality can point to an independent 
basis for recognizing its public consumptiveus-e,2 I-3 the locality gener• 
ally should have to acquire riparian rights in the same manner as a 
private user, either through ownership of riparian land or acquisition 
of severed rights. But, to permit the locality to acquire riparian rights 
or land effectively, courts in riparian jurisdictions must be willing to 
develop a broader and more realistic definition of riparian rights-one 
that recognizes and permits public consumptive uses. 
IV. SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS: BALANCING PUBLIC AND 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTIVE INTERESTS 
As traditionally interpreted by the courts in many eastern states, 
the riparian doctrine does not provide an adequate accommodation of 
the public interest. Because that doctrine was developed in a water-
rich, agrarian environment, many of its principles are designed to pre-
serve domestic uses by private individuals. The narrow approach 
taken by the judiciary in developing the riparian doctrine imposes se-
rious limitations on the ability of local governments to meet public 
consumptive needs. Perhaps the most significant limitation is the rule 
that prohibits most diversions of water from a watercourse. Because 
of the rule, localities often find operation of a public water supply 
system to be a very costly and impracticable proposition. 
Although other areas of property law also developed in the con-
text of an agrarian economy, the courts have not been as hesitant in 
those areas to change their perspective and accommodate the public 
interest. Since the 1920's, for example, the courts have been sympa-
thetic to attempts by local government to control private development 
of land through zoning ordinances.214 Like the attempts to recognize 
213. See supra note 164. 
214. The courts also have been sympathetic to legislative attempts to protect the public interest 
in tidal lands. A recent opinion by the Virginia Supreme Court, for instance, interprets two statutes 
protecting the public interest in certain lands lying on tidal waters more broadly than necessary. See 
Bradford v. Nature Conservancy, 224 Va. 181, 294 S.E.2d 866 (1982). In Bradford v. Nature Con· 
servancy, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that one act passed in 1780 reserved title in the state to 
certain shoreland along the Atlantic Ocean for common use by the public, Bradford, 294 S.E.2d at 
874, and that another statute enacted in 1888 prohibited alienation of marshland on the Eastern 
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public consumptive rights in water resources, these ordinances 
prompted constitutional challenges under the due process and takings 
clauses. Yet, in resolving the challenges, the courts generally were 
willing to uphold the ordinances as long as they were reasonable 
methods of protecting the public interest in controlling private land 
development. 215 
Perhaps the hesitancy of modem courts in recognizing public 
consumptive rights can be attributed to the fact that persistent water 
supply problems are a relatively recent occurrence in the eastern por-
tion of the country. Given the prolonged absence of chronic water 
supply problems, as well as the agrarian surroundings in which the 
riparian doctrine developed, it is not surprising that the courts 
adopted a narrow, private-user-oriented perspective in defining and 
allocating consumptive rights. Although rapid growth in recent years 
has altered water supply conditions in many areas of the eastern 
United States, the principles of the riparian doctrine have become too 
firmly entrenched for many courts to respond quickly to the changes, 
or even recognize the need for reexamining some of those principles. 
Whatever the reason for the judiciary's hesitation, it is time for 
the legal system to respond to the changes in water supply conditions 
that have begun to occur in many riparian jurisdictions. Unless the 
legislatures of riparian states are willing to respond with comprehen-
sive reforms, the courts must accept responsibility for that task and 
develop a more acceptable accommodation of public and private 
interests. 
This Article has suggested modifications that the judiciary could 
make to modernize the riparian doctrine and provide greater recogni-
tion of public consumptive interests. Effective implementation, 
though, would require an active judiciary committed to the task of 
updating the riparian doctrine and well-timed lawsuits permitting re-
interpretation of appropriate riparian principles. Changes in the ripa-
rian doctrine that would need to be made include eliminating some of 
the archaic assumptions upon which the riparian doctrine is based, 
Shore, id. at 872. Instead of construing the acts as reserving title in the state, the court could have 
concluded that the statutes merely give the public an easement or right to use the appropriate lands 
for fishing, hunting, fowling, and other related activities. This interpretation would have given 
greater effect to another Virginia statute that extends the boundary of land abutting bays, rivers, 
creeks, and the sea to the low water mark, but that makes the extension subject to the 1780 commons 
act. See VA. CoDE§ 62.1-2 (1982) (originally enacted as Act ofFebruary 16, 1819, 1818-1819 VA. 
Acrs, ch. 28, § 1). 
215. See, e.g. , Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
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modifying the riparian land and reasonable use restrictions to ratify 
reasonable expectations and promote current policy objectives, and 
interpreting the severability principle broadly to permit freer transfer-
ability of consumptive rights. 
Even if these changes were implemented, though, unrestrained 
diversions for public use still would not be possible, because protec-
tion of present users' rights and reasonable expectations would re-
quire imposition of certain limitations. A court, for instance, should 
prevent attempts by populated localities to acquire use rights from the 
owner of a small riparian tract and then claim the right to conduct 
large-scale diversions to meet their consumptive needs. The pur-
chaser of use rights should not acquire greater rights than his trans-
feror, not even where the purchaser is a local government. Because 
limitations would need to be imposed on the use rights acquired by a 
locality, the modified riparian doctrine still may not accommodate the 
public interest to the satisfaction of some localities. 
Although the localities' dissatisfaction may be somewhat justi-
fied, especially if the judiciary fails to broaden its perspective as much 
as suggested, their discontent ignores an important facet of the modi-
fications. The proposed modifications represent attempts to work 
with the common-law allocation system to achieve an acceptable ac-
commodation of private and public interests. They do not represent 
attempts to alter the common-law system radically. The modified 
principles do not give governmental entities free and un1irnited water 
rights; nor do they guarantee that a locality's public consumptive 
needs will be met. Localities desiring more radical changes should 
urge development of a new allocation system or seek an independent 
theory for recognizing public consumptive rights. 
